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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Torey Michael Adamcik appeals from the judgments summarily dismissing two of
his post-conviction relief claims, and denying his two remaining claims following an
evidentiary hearing.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The Idaho Supreme Court set forth the facts underlying Adamcik’s convictions for
first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, as follows:
On September 22, 2006, [Cassie Jo] Stoddart was spending the night at
her cousin’s house, the Whispering Cliffs residence, performing housesitting duties. Matt Beckham (Beckham), Stoddart’s boyfriend, stated that
he and Stoddart had invited Adamcik to the Whispering Cliffs residence
that evening to “hang out.” Adamcik and [Brian] Draper arrived at the
Whispering Cliffs residence at approximately 6:30 or 7:00 PM. After
spending approximately two hours at the Whispering Cliffs residence,
Draper informed Stoddart and Beckham that he needed to leave and
shortly thereafter Draper and Adamcik departed.
Approximately fifteen minutes after Adamcik and Draper departed, the
power at the Whispering Cliffs residence went out. Beckham called his
mother to ask for permission to stay the night, but such permission was
denied. After speaking with his mother, Beckham phoned Adamcik to
inform him that Beckham would be going home for the night. ... Beckham
and Adamcik spent the following day together. Beckham tried repeatedly
to call Stoddart throughout the day but was unable to get an answer.
On September 24, 2006, it was discovered that Stoddart had been killed
at the Whispering Cliffs residence. Police [O]fficer Hatch responded to the
scene and noted large amounts of blood on the victim’s body, as well as
deep lacerations and stab wounds. Shortly after responding, police and
paramedics confirmed that Stoddart was dead. Detectives conducting the
preliminary investigation determined that Adamcik and Draper had been
among the last people to see Stoddart alive.
Detectives Thomas and Ganske went to the Adamcik home and
interviewed Adamcik on September 24, 2006. Adamcik’s father ... was
present. ... During the course of the first interview, Adamcik informed the
1

detectives that he and Draper had gone to the Whispering Cliffs residence
at approximately 8:30 PM on September 22, 2006, for a party. Adamcik
stated that ... he and Draper decided to go and see a movie in Pocatello.
When the detectives questioned Adamcik regarding the movie he had
reportedly seen, Adamcik was unable to describe what the movie had
been about. Adamcik told detectives that following the movie he and
Draper had gone to spend the night at Adamcik’s home.
On September 27, 2006, after Adamcik’s first interview, but before the
second, Draper led law enforcement agents to a stash of evidence buried
in the Black Rock Canyon area (BRC site). The evidence uncovered by
law enforcement at the BRC site included:
1. Two dagger-style knives with sheaths.
2. A silver-and-black-handled knife with a smooth and non-serrated
blade.
3. A folding knife with a silver blade and black handle, which is
similar to a survival knife. The portion of the blade nearest to the hilt
is serrated.
4. A homemade Sony videotape (BRC tape).
5. A box of stick matches.
6. A melted brown bottle of hydrogen peroxide.
7. Partially burned notebook paper.
8. A partially melted multi-colored mask.
9. A red and white mask.
10. A pair of black boots.
11. A single black glove.
12. A pair of black “Puma” gloves.
13. A pair of blue latex gloves.
14. A pair of fingerless black “Athletic Works” gloves.
15. A black “Calvin Klein” dress shirt.
16. A black “Hagger” shirt.
Adamcik conceded that his handwriting was present on the notebook
paper found along with the other evidence at the BRC site. The BRC tape
contained footage of Adamcik and Draper planning Stoddart’s murder, and
later reacting to having killed Stoddart. ... The following relevant portions
of the BRC tape have been rearranged according to the time and date
stamps that appear on the BRC tape.
1. September 21, 2006, at 8:05:23 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car,
Adamcik is driving and Draper is filming from the passenger seat]
Draper: We’re going for a high death count.
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Adamcik: Plus, we’re not going to get caught Brian, if we’re going
for guns, we’re just gonna end it. We’re just gonna grab the guns
and get outta there and kill everybody and leave.
Draper: We’re going to make history ....
history.

We’re gonna make

Adamcik: For all you FBI agents watching this -Draper: (laughing)
Adamcik: Uh ... you weren’t quick enough. (laughing)
Draper: You weren’t quick enough, and you weren’t s-s-smart
enough. And we’re going over to [Jane Doe 1’s] house, we-wewe’re going to snoop around over there and try to see if she’s home
alone or not, and if she’s home alone, SPLAT! ... She dead.
….
2. September 21, 2006, at 8:08:12 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car,
Draper is filming Adamcik with the camera light on]
Draper: We’re at [Jane Doe 1’s] house. It’s clear out there in the
pasture. We’ve already snooped around her house a couple times,
Uh, and sh-sh-she’s not at home so we’re gonna go to that church
over there and we’re gonna call a girl and a guy named Cassie and
Matt. They’re our-our friends but we have to make sacrifices. So
um I feel tonight i-i-it is the night and I feel really weird ... and stuff.
I feel like I want to kill somebody. Uh, I know that’s not normal but
what the hell.
Adamcik: I feel we need to break away from normal life.
...
Draper: Natural selection, dude. Natural selection, that’s all I’ve
gotta say.
Adamcik: There should be no law against killing people. I know it’s
a wrong thing, but ...
...
3. September 21, 2006, at 8:15:39 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car,
Adamcik is driving and Draper is filming from the passenger seat]
....
Draper: Now we’re going to go over to Cassie and Matt’s house. If
they’re home alone, we’re gonna ...
Adamcik: It’s Cassie’s house. Matt is there.
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Draper: Matt is there. Sorry. We’re gonna ga [sic] -- we’re gonna
knock on the door. We’ll see who is there. We’ll, we’ll see, we’ll
see -- see if their parents are home or not. If they’re home alone
we will leave our way and then we will come back in about ten
minutes. We’ll sneak in through the door because chances are
they’re probably in Cassie’s room. S–s–s–so we will sneak in the
front door, we’ll make a noise outside.
Adamcik: And Matt will come out to investigate.
Draper: We’ll kill him. And we’ll scare the shit out of Cassie ...
okay?
Adamcik: Sounds like fun.
Draper: Well stay tuned.
4. September 21, 2006, at 8:36:46 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car,
Adamcik is driving and Draper is filming from the passenger seat]
Draper: We found our victim and sad as it may be she’s our friend
but you know what? We all have to make sacrifices. Our first
victim is going to be Cassie Stoddart and her friends . . .
....
Draper: We’ll let you ... (laughs) we’ll find out if she has friends
over, if she’s going to be alone in a big dark house out in the middle
of nowhere (laughs). How perfect can you get? I, I mean like holy
shit dude.
Adamcik: I’m horny just thinking about it.
Draper: Hell yeah. So we’re gonna fuckin’ kill her and her friends
and we’re gonna keep moving on. I heard some news about [Jane
Doe 2], she’s gonna be home alone from six to seven so we might
kill her and drive over to Cassie’s thing and scare the shit out of
them and kill them one by fucking one. Hell yeah.
Adamcik: Why one by one? Why can’t it be a slaughterhouse?
Draper: Two by two and three by three. Cause we’ve got to keep it
classy.
Adamcik: Keep it classy.
Draper: So yeah. It’s going to be extra fun.
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Adamcik: You’re evil (laughs).
Draper: Yes, I am. So are you dude. Evil. Evil.
....
Adamcik: We are bad.
Draper: That sounds so shitty.
Adamcik: We’re evil. That sounds even shittier.
Draper: Hey, we’re not, okay. Then we are sick psychopaths who
get their pleasure off killing other people.
Adamcik: That sounds good baby.
Draper: We’re gonna go down in history. We’re gonna be just like
Scream except real life terms.
Adamcik: That sounds good baby.
Draper: We’re gonna be murderers. Like, let’s see, Ted Bundy,
like the Hillside Strangler.
Adamcik: No.
Draper: The Zodiac Killer.
Adamcik: Those people were more amateurs compared to what
we are going to be, we’re gonna be more of higher sources of Ed gl
[sic] …
Draper: Gein
Adamcik: Gein.
Draper: (laughs) Well let’s say we’re that sick and that twisted -Adamcik: Oh, you know what Ed Gein’s words were?
Draper: What?
Adamcik: He saw a girl walking’ down the street, right?
Draper: Yeah.
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Adamcik: Two questions came to his head. Hmm, I could take her
out and have a nice time with her -Draper: -- and then kill her? Skin her alive?
Adamcik: -- charm the pants off her. Or, I wonder what her head
would look like on a stick? (laughs)
(laughs)
Draper: Holy shit!
Adamcik: It’s creepy huh?
….
Draper: Murder is power, murder is freedom, goodbye.
….
5. September 22, 2006, at 12:10:58 PM [Adamcik and Draper are sitting at
a table with the camera facing them]
Draper: Alright, cool.
Adamcik: [looking down and writing in a notebook] I was planning
to kill him.
Draper: September 22, 2006, we’re skipping our fourth hour class.
We’re writing our plan right now for tonight. It’s gonna be cool.
Adamcik: We? Torey and Brian ... [writing] ... we’re making our
death list right now, for when, for actually tonight ...
…
Draper: Yeah, if you’re watching this we’re probably deceased …
Draper: Hopefully this will go smoothly and we can get our first kill done
and then keep going.
Adamcik: For you future serial killers watching this tape
Adamcik & Draper: (laughing)
Adamcik: I don’t know what to say.
Draper: It -- It’s -Adamcik: -- good luck with that.
Draper: Good luck.
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Adamcik: Hopefully you don’t have like 8 or 9 failures like we have.
Draper: Yeah, we’ve probably tried maybe 10 times, but they’ve
never been home alone so –
Adamcik: Or when they have, their parents show up.
Draper: As long as you’re patient you know, and we were patient
and now we’re getting paid off, cuz our victim’s home alone, so we
got er, our plan all worked out now .... I’m sorry. I’m sorry Cassie’s
family, but she had to be the one. We have to stick with the plan ...
and she’s perfect, so she’s gonna die (laughs) …
6. September 22, 2006, at 9:53:20 PM [It is dark and Draper and Adamcik
are sitting in a car.]
Draper: We’re here in his car. The time is 9:50, September 22nd,
2006. Um ... unfortunately we have the grueling task of killing our
two friends and they are right in -- in that house just down the
street.
Adamcik: We just talked to them. We were there for an hour, but
....
Draper: We checked out the whole house. We know there’s lots of
doors. There, there’s lots of places to hide. Um, I unlocked the
back doors. It’s all unlocked. Now we just got to wait and um ...
yep, we’re, we’re really nervous right now but, you know, we’re
ready.
Adamcik: We’re listening to the greatest rock band ever.
Draper: We’ve waited for this for a long time.
Adamcik: Pink Floyd. Before we commit the ultimate crime of
murder.
Draper: We’ve waited for this for a long time.
Adamcik: A long time.
Draper: We -- well stay tuned.
7. September 22, 2006, at 11:31:56 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car
driving.]
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Draper: -- just killed Cassie! We just left her house.[1] This is not a
fucking joke.
Adamcik: I’m shaking.
Draper: I stabbed her in the throat, and I saw her lifeless body.
It just disappeared. Dude, I just killed Cassie!
Adamcik: Oh my God!
Draper: Oh, oh fuck. That felt like it wasn’t even real. I mean it
went by so fast.
Adamcik: Shut the fuck up. We gotta get our act straight.
Draper: It’s okay. Okay? We -- we’ll just buy movie tickets now.
Adamcik: Okay
Draper: (Unintelligible)
Adamcik: No.
Draper: Okay. Bye.
On September 27, 2006, after the BRC site evidence was found,
detectives Ganske and Thomas conducted a second interview with
Adamcik at the Pocatello Police Department in the presence of Adamcik’s
parents. Detective Ganske read Adamcik his Miranda rights at the
beginning of the interview and Adamcik signed a waiver-of-rights form.
During the course of the interview, Adamcik informed detectives Ganske
and Thomas that he and Draper had arrived at the Whispering Cliffs
residence at 8:00 or 8:30, got a tour of the home, watched a portion of the
film Kill Bill Vol. 2, departed from the Whispering Cliffs residence at
approximately 10:00 PM, and began attempting to break into cars.
Adamcik stated that during the course of their attempted burglaries he
made multiple calls to Beckham and during the final call Beckham
1

After a sheriff’s office transcriber prepared a transcript of the videotape, Detective
Hamilton listened to the video with “really good headphones” and enhanced sound, and
made a corrected version of the transcript (St. Ex. 89) which was admitted into
evidence. (Tr., vol. II, p.1910, L.16 - p.1911, L.6; p.1913, L.6 - p.1915, L.7; p.1927, L.15
- p.1929, L.18.) Detective Hamilton testified at trial that, using the enhanced measures
and after listening to the videotape in court, Draper said “We just killed Cassie!” (Tr.,
vol. II, p.1930, L.3 – p.1932, L.2.) Adamcik’s trial team entered its own transcription of
the videotape into evidence, which read “... just killed Cassie.” (Def. Ex. VV, p.5, L.13.)
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informed Adamcik that his mother was coming to get him from the
Whispering Cliffs residence.
Adamcik stated that he and Draper returned to Adamcik’s house at around
11:30 PM and did not leave for the remainder of the night. However,
when Ganske informed Adamcik that witnesses had seen him at the
convenience store, Common Cents, Adamcik stated that he and Draper
had gone to the store so that Draper could buy matches for Draper’s
cigarettes. Adamcik eventually admitted that he and Draper had gone to
Black Rock Canyon. At the close of Adamcik’s second interview, the
detectives informed Adamcik of the evidence that they had discovered at
the BRC site and pressured Adamcik to tell the truth. Adamcik responded
by asking “Can I talk to an attorney?” The detectives stopped questioning
Adamcik immediately, and exited the room, allowing Adamcik and his
father, Sean, to converse in private in a different room. Following this
private meeting, Adamcik, Sean and the detectives reconvened in the
interview room where detectives proceeded to tell Adamcik that he was
going to be arrested and informed Adamcik of the evidence they had
gathered.[2] [3] In response to intervening questions from Sean, Adamcik
made both verbal and nonverbal replies.
At trial, the jury heard extensive forensic testimony documenting and
analyzing Stoddart’s wounds. The medical examiner, Dr. Steve Skoumal,
performed the autopsy on Stoddart on September 25, 2006. Dr. Skoumal
determined that the cause of Stoddart’s death was stab wounds to the
trunk. In all, Dr. Skoumal documented thirty knife-related wounds on
Stoddart’s body, twelve of which were potentially fatal. The State also had
forensic pathologist Dr. Charles Garrison examine Stoddart’s body. Dr.
Garrison testified “It’s my opinion that there were at least two knives used,
one of which was a non-serrated blade, and one of which was a serrated
blade.” In general, the majority of the potentially fatal wounds that Dr.
2

On June 21, 2007, the Idaho Supreme Court granted the state’s motion to take judicial
notice of the Clerk’s Record, Reporter’s Transcripts, and Exhibits in State v. Torey
Adamcik, Supreme Court Docket No. 34639-2007. Due to volume, all citations to those
documents will remain as originally presented in that appeal; all citations to the district
court post-conviction record (etc.) will be preceded by “PC.”
3

A search warrant executed on Brian Draper’s home on September 26, 2006, led to
the discovery of a knife sheath under Draper’s bed, which was consistent with the
shape and length of the “Sloan” knife (St. Ex. 70). (Tr., vol. III, p.2764, L.24 - p.2771,
L.2.) A search warrant executed on the Adamcik residence on September 27, 2006,
resulted in the seizure of three shovels (St. Exs. 87, 88) and a notebook with a page
listing: (1) supplies (watches, communication devices, pliers), (2) clothing (cargo pants,
gloves, utility belt), (3) mask, (4) weapons (daggers, survival knife, pocket knife), and (5)
the names of six “victims” (St. Ex. 84).
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Skoumal listed were inflicted with the serrated blade, however, wound
number 1, which struck the right ventricle of Stoddart’s heart, was inflicted
by a non-serrated blade -- consistent with Dr. Garrison’s testimony -- and
was potentially fatal.
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 453-459, 272 P.3d 417, 425-431 (2012) (footnotes
omitted).
On June 8, 2007, a jury convicted Adamcik for the first-degree murder of Cassie
Jo Stoddart and for conspiring with Draper to commit first-degree murder, and Adamcik
was sentenced to fixed life for first-degree murder and indeterminate life with thirty
years fixed for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 453454, 272 P.3d at 425-426.

Adamcik filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his

sentences, which was denied. (PC R., p.641.) The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
Adamcik’s convictions and sentences.

Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417.

Adamcik filed a petition for rehearing with the Idaho Supreme Court, which was denied.
(PC R., p.641.) Adamcik then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court, which was denied. (Id.; State v. Adamcik, 133 S.Ct. 141 (2012).)
On September 27, 2013, Adamcik, through counsel, filed a petition for postconviction relief, presenting seven claims. (PC R., pp.12-67.) Those claims were:
(1)

The state withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 88 (1963) (PC R., pp.16-25);

(2)

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to “get important
expert testimony before the jury in part because they failed to
obtain the murder weapons for testing by the defense expert” (PC
R., pp.25-30 (capitalization modified));

(3)

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move to suppress
or exclude evidence of (a) a notebook found in Adamcik’s bedroom,
and (b) “kiddie porn” found on the Adamcik’s computer, and for
making an illogical trial decision when the state threatened to
introduce such evidence (PC R., pp.31-44);
10

(4)

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move to exclude
Adamcik’s invocation of the right to counsel from videotape of
police interview (PC R., pp.45-46);

(5)

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to the cumulative effect of
prejudice caused by counsel’s various instances of deficient
performance (PC R., p.46);

(6)

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to communicate a
favorable plea offer to Adamcik (PC R., pp.46-48); and

(7)

Violation of state and federal constitutional provisions against cruel
and unusual punishment under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455
(2012) (PC R., pp.48-66).

After the state filed an Answer (PC R., pp.152-169), Adamcik filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Disposition on all but Claims 1 and 6 (PC R., pp.205-256), and the
state filed a motion for summary dismissal with a supporting brief (PC R., pp.257-281).
Adamcik filed a response to the state’s motion for summary dismissal, with a
memorandum supported by the affidavits of the two prosecutors who initially tried
Adamcik, Sean Adamcik (father), Shannon Adamcik (mother), and Barbara Adamcik
(grandmother). (PC R., pp.288-344.)
After a hearing on the cross-motions for summary dismissal and partial summary
disposition (PC Tr. 10/17/14), the district court entered a memorandum decision and
order, making the following rulings: Claim 1 – summarily dismissed (PC R., p.407);
Claim 2 – both motions denied (id.); Claim 3(a) (notebook) – summarily dismissed (PC
R., pp.407-408); Claim 3(b) (“kiddie porn” on computer) – both motions denied on
the “deficient performance” prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), but
summarily dismissed on the prejudice prong; the court later ruled that evidence on the
claim could be presented at the evidentiary hearing in regard to Claim 5 (cumulative
prejudice) (PC R., pp.408, 468); Claim 4 – summarily dismissed on the prejudice prong
11

of Strickland (PC R., pp.402-403);4 Claim 5 – both motions denied (PC R., p.408);
Claim 6 – state’s motion denied (PC R., p.408) (Adamcik’s motion did not pertain to
Claim 6; see PC R., p.205); Claim 7 – to be decided in a separate order. (PC R.,
pp.407-408.) Adamcik filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order on the
parties’ motions for summary dismissal/disposition, with a supporting brief (PC R.,
pp.438-447), which was denied (PC R., pp.461-473).
On February 24, 2015, the district court entered an order granting the state’s
motion for summary dismissal of Adamcik’s seventh claim, based on Miller. (PC R.,
pp.410-426.) Adamcik filed a “Second Motion for Reconsideration” in regard to the
summary dismissal of Claim 7 (PC R., pp.613-618), which, after the submission of
briefs, supplemental authorities, and oral argument, was denied. (PC R., pp.692-702.)
Following a two-day evidentiary hearing in July 2015 at which 21 witnesses
testified (PC R., pp.499-502), and after receiving written closing arguments from
counsel (PC R., pp.505-609), the court entered “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Memorandum Decision and Order on Post-Conviction Relief,” denying Adamcik’s
post-conviction “claims as related to Cause of Action Two, Cause of Action Five and
Cause of Action Six.” (PC R., pp.640-675.) On July 19, 2016, the court entered a
“Judgement of Dismissal,” stating that “each of Petitioner’s Seven Causes of Action are
Dismissed.” (PC R., pp.704-705.) Adamcik filed a timely notice of appeal. (PC R.,
pp.706-710.)
4

In the “Conclusion” section of its decision on the parties’ motions, the district court
said “the State’s Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to Adamcik’s Fourth Cause
of Action is DENIED[.]” (PC R., p.408 (emphasis original).) However the court clearly
ruled to the contrary in the body of its decision. (PC R., pp.402-403 (“As such the Court
will DISMISS Adamcik’s Fourth Cause of Action and GRANT the State’s Motion for
Summary Dismissal . . . .”).)
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ISSUES
Adamcik states the issues on appeal as:
A.

Did the district court err in denying the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim that the defense team’s performance was deficient
because it failed to move to suppress the evidence found on a
computer seized without the authority of a warrant?

B.

Did the district court err in finding Torey was not prejudiced by the
deficient performance of the defense team which failed to get
important expert testimony before the jury?

C.

Did the district court err in finding that Torey was not prejudiced by
the cumulative effect of the defense team’s deficient performance?

D.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the Eighth
Amendment claim?

(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1. Has Adamcik failed to show error in the district court’s rulings that he failed to show
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance as alleged in Claims 2, 3, and 5?
2. Has Adamcik failed to show error in the district court’s denial of Claim 7 which
alleged, that under Miller and Montgomery, his fixed life sentence was cruel and
unusual punishment?

13

ARGUMENT
I.
Adamcik Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court’s Rulings That He
Failed To Show His Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance As
Alleged In Claims 2, 3, And 5
A.

Introduction
Adamcik argues that the district court erred in denying relief on his claims that his

trial counsel team (“trial team”) was ineffective for failing to: (1) move to suppress
evidence of “kiddie porn” found on a computer seized from the Adamcik residence
pursuant to a search warrant, which, in turn, caused counsel to not present character
evidence about Adamcik and Draper (Claim 3(b)), and (2) present expert testing of the
serrated Rambo knife (St. Ex. 74) and the smooth-edged Sloan knife (St. Ex. 70), to
show that the Rambo knife caused wound number 1 (Claim 2). (Appellant’s Brief, pp.325.) Additionally, Adamcik contends “the district court erred in finding that [he] was not
prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the defense team’s deficient performance” (Claim
5). (Appellant’s Brief, p.25 (capitalization modified).)
Adamcik’s arguments fail. Application of the law to the facts supports the district
court’s determinations that Adamcik failed to carry his burden of proof with respect to
either the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, and that any prejudice – cumulative or individual – was insufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome of Adamcik’s jury trial.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file
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….” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing GilpinGrubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of
fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they
are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district
court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730
(1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and
the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province
of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App.
2003). A trial court’s decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not met his burden of
proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964,
965 (Ct. App. 1990).
C.

Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction

petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho
129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). With respect to the deficient performance prong,
the United States Supreme Court has articulated the defendant’s burden under
Strickland as follows:
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction
must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness. A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance
must apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The challenger’s
burden is to show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
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not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted). “This
Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial
counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective evaluation.” Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 710, 351 P.3d 636, 638 (Ct.
App. 2015) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App.
1994)).
To establish prejudice, a post-conviction petitioner must show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Id. (citations and

quotations omitted).
D.

Adamcik Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Showing That The District Court
Erred In Summarily Dismissing Claim 3(b) – That His Trial Team Was Ineffective
For Failing To Move To Suppress Evidence Of “Kiddie Porn” Found On The
Computer5
1.

Introduction

Adamcik argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing Claim 3(b),
which alleged his trial team was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence
described as “kiddie porn” found on a computer seized from the Adamcik residence

5

The district court explained that, “more concerning from Adamcik’s . . . perspective,
would be the images focusing on Adamcik’s fixation with violence and slasher/horror
movies.” (Addendum B; PC R., p.653 n.7.) All references to “kiddie porn” in this brief
will also implicitly refer to the other images noted by the district court.
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pursuant to a search warrant. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.3-16.) His claim is based on the
fact that, although the search warrant affidavit of probable cause listed computers as
one of the items sought, the “command” portion of the search warrant did not authorize
the seizure of computers.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.3-16.)

Based on that anomaly,

Adamcik contends he meets the three criteria required to show his trial team was
ineffective for failing to move for suppression: (1) a motion to suppress would have been
granted, (2) the failure to move to suppress was not outside the boundaries of
reasonable trial strategy, and (3) he was prejudiced by his trial team’s deficient
performance.6 (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-7 (citing Wurdemann v. State, --- Idaho ---, --P.2d --- (February 28, 2017).) Adamcik’s claim fails.
2.

Factual Background

The district court made the following findings of fact germane to Adamcik’s claim:
24. Adamcik asserts in his P.C.R. Petition’s Third Cause of Action that it
was his Defense Team’s intention to “call several character witnesses
during the trial.[”] P.C.R. Petition, p.23, ¶ 87. Adamcik’s P.C.R. Petition
asserts further that it was also his Defense Team’s intent “to call
witnesses to testify about Brian Draper’s prior bad acts.” ld., p. 24, ¶ 93.
Adamcik asserts in his P.C.R. Petition that “counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced Torey because he was deprived of the character
evidence which formed a large basis of the defense.” Id., p.32.

6

As noted, this claim was summarily dismissed on the prejudice prong of Strickland
(PC R., p.393), but, in denying Adamcik’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, the
court ruled that evidence on the claim could be presented at the evidentiary hearing in
regard to Claim 5, cumulative prejudice (PC R., p.468). In its memorandum decision
and order following the evidentiary hearing, the court first determined, as a prerequisite
to considering whether counsels’ conduct added any prejudice under Claim 5, that
Adamcik’s trial team was not deficient for not filing a suppression motion because such
motion would not have been successful. (PC R., p.669.) Having made that
determination, the court “nonetheless” discussed “this claimed failure (for appeal
purposes) in considering Adamcik’s prejudice claim based upon the cumulative nature
of Adamcik’s Defense Team’s conduct.” (PC R., p.670.)
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25. On September 27, 2006, Detective Tom Sellers of the Idaho State
Police submitted an Affidavit of Probable Cause in support of a search
warrant. See Exhibit “C”. This Affidavit of Probable Cause sought a
warrant to search the residence located at 1598 Pointview Drive in
Pocatello, Idaho. The Court understands this to have been the residence
of Adamcik and his family. It also sought a warrant to search a red 1994
Geo Prism.
26. The Affidavit of Probable Cause outlined a lengthy “Statement of Facts
in Support of Probable Cause”. It then makes a specific request
concerning the items law enforcement wishes to “search for and seize as
evidence”. These requested items were “bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers,
and other trace evidence as well as clothing, knives, scripts, journals,
video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, computer, computer
programs, cellular telephone and cellular telephone account information,
fingerprints.” See Exhibit “C”. This Affidavit of Probable Cause was
“subscribed and sworn” to before the Honorable Gaylen L. Box on
September 27, 2006.
27. On September 27, 2006, Judge Box signed a Search Warrant
authorizing a search of the property and vehicle outlined in the Affidavit of
Probable Cause. It also authorized law enforcement to “search for and
seize all evidence including but not limited to bodily fluids, stains, hair
fibers and other trace evidence as well as fingerprints.” See Exhibit “B”.
28. It is perplexing to this Court that the warrant itself does not authorize
the search for or seizure of a computer, even though the Affidavit of
Probable Cause request includes computers. In fact, the Search Warrant
does not address or include “clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video
cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, computers, computer programs,
cellular telephones and cellular telephone account information.”
29. The Honorable Gaylen L. Box testified at Adamcik’s post-conviction
relief evidentiary hearing. When Judge Box was asked why computers
were not specifically listed on the Search Warrant, he responded as
follows:
I issued the warrant as it was presented to me. I recall no
specific discussion concerning the computer.
Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 136, LL. 2-3.
30. On cross-examination, Judge Box testified, that following his review of
the Probable Cause Affidavit, he made no effort to cross-out or delete
anything from the Search Warrant itself. Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p.136, LL.
22-25, p.137, LL.1-2. However, he did require that the Affidavit of
Probable Cause be modified to “provide some basis for the issuance of a
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nighttime search warrant.” See Exhibit “C”, ¶ 11 and Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg.,
p.136, LL.2-5.
31. Finally, Judge Box testified that when he signs a search warrant he
intends to give permission to search for the items identified on the warrant
and does not intend to grant permission to search for items not listed on
the search warrant. Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p.139, LL.16-23.
32. Pursuant to the Search Warrant issued by Judge Box on September
27, 2006, law enforcement conducted a search of the Adamcik residence.
Incident to that search, law enforcement seized as evidence a “computer
tower.” See Exhibit “D”. A review of Exhibit “D” reflects that twenty-five
(25) separate items were seized incident to the search of the Adamcik
residence and not one of the seized items were “bodily fluids, stains, hair
fibers, other trace evidence or fingerprints.” In fact, each one of the seized
items exceeded the scope of the enumerated items in the Search Warrant.
33. During the course of Adamcik’s jury trial, the State notified the
Defense Team that it had obtained a computer that had been seized as
evidence incident to the September 27, 2006 Search Warrant. The State
notified the Defense Team that if it attempted to introduce character
evidence, the State would attempt to introduce evidence obtained from the
computer. The computer in question contained what has been
characterized by Adamcik throughout these post-conviction relief
proceedings as “kiddie porn.” A CD containing the photographs that have
been described as “kiddie porn” was introduced into evidence at the postconviction relief evidentiary hearing. While the images and photographs
are distasteful and do show some nude images, this Court would not
characterize the same as “kiddie porn.” However, the Court can certainly
understand the Defense Team’s desire not to have those images and
photographs introduced into evidence and shown to the jury.
34. As a result, the Defense Team made a strategic decision not to put on
the character evidence that it had originally planned to introduce at trial.
Neither did the Adamcik Defense Team attempt to prohibit the threatened
introduction of this evidence by way of a motion in limine or motion to
suppress.
35. The Court heard character testimony evidence from numerous friends,
acquaintances and family members touching upon their impression of
Adamcik and various positive and upstanding character traits and qualities
which they attribute to him.
36. Adamcik himself testified at the post-conviction relief evidentiary
hearing addressing issues concerning his Defense Team, trial strategy,
and offers or the lack thereof. Finally, he testified in detail concerning his
version of the crime and facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime.
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(PC R., pp.651-654 (footnotes omitted).)
3.

Deficient Performance

The district court ruled (although in regard to Claim 5 regarding cumulative
prejudice (see n.6, supra)) that Adamcik failed to meet his burden of showing his trial
team was deficient for not filing a suppression motion to exclude the “kiddie porn” found
on the computer, and, presumably, anything else from the computer that cast a bad light
on his character (PC R., pp.669-670).

The court held that a motion to suppress

evidence from the computer would not have succeeded because the omission of the
words “clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags,
computer, computer programs, cellular telephones and cellular account information” as
requested in the Probable Cause Affidavit was “due exclusively to a scrivener’s error.”
(PC R., pp.666, 668-669.)
The state relies upon and incorporates into this response, as if fully set forth
herein, that part of the district court’s analysis and decision in its post-evidentiary
hearing order (Addendum B; specifically p.665 ¶28 – p.669 ¶43)7 finding Adamcik’s trial
team was not deficient for not filing a motion to suppress evidence from the computer.
In addition to the district court’s well-reasoned analysis, the state makes the following
arguments.
The face of the search warrant shows an obvious scrivener’s error. The Affidavit
of Probable Cause lists the items to be searched for and seized, “including but not
limited to, bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers and other trace evidence as well as clothing,

7

References to page numbers to Addendums A through D will be to the page numbers
assigned by the Clerk’s Record.
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knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, computer,
computer programs, cellular telephones and cellular telephone account information,
fingerprints and any indicia whatsoever of this crime.”

(PC Plaintiff’s Ex. C, p.15

(emphasis added).) The “command” portion of the Search Warrant, the last of three full
paragraphs of the warrant, did not include the above italicized items. (PC Plaintiff’s Ex.
B.) The district court concluded that the failure to transpose the full list of items to be
searched from the Affidavit of Probable Cause to the “command” section of the Search
Warrant was an obvious scrivener’s error. (PC R., pp.666, 668-669.)
Adamcik contends that “nothing in the text of the search warrant would lead the
police officer to conclude that the seizure of computers was implied . . . .” (Appellant’s
Brief, p.9.) However, the opening paragraph of the Search Warrant states:
SEARCH WARRANT
THE STATE OF IDAHO to any peace officer of the State of Idaho:
Detective Tom Sellers, having this day by affidavit and sworn
testimony shown that there is probable cause to believe that said affidavit
is true, that certain property consisting of evidence, including but not
limited to, bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers and other trace evidence as well
as clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage
bags, computer, computer programs, cellular telephones and cellular
telephone account information, fingerprints and any indicia whatsoever of
this crime.
(PC Plaintiff’s Ex. B (emphases added).)
The Search Warrant was signed and dated at the bottom by the magistrate
judge. (Id.) In doing so, the magistrate made a finding of probable cause, based on the
truth of Detective Sellers’ affidavit, to search for all the items listed in the opening
paragraph as evidence of the crime, including “computer” and “computer programs.”
(PC Plaintiff’s Ex. B.) Because the magistrate made a finding in the first paragraph of
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the Search Warrant that there was probable cause to search for and seize the computer
and computer programs, the failure to accurately transpose the list of those items from
the first to the third paragraph of the Search Warrant was an obvious clerical or
scrivener’s error – one readily observed on the face of the warrant.8
Because a “probable cause” finding is germane to the issuance of a search
warrant, no other purpose would have prompted the magistrate court to make such a
finding. The district court correctly concluded that, despite the scrivener’s error, the
search warrant was plainly intended to command law enforcement officers to search for
and seize the computer (etc.); therefore, a motion to suppress the evidence found on
the computer would not have been granted, and Adamcik’s trial team could not have
been deficient for failing to file such a motion.
4.

Prejudice

Adamcik asserts that had the evidence of “kiddie porn” from the computer not
been available for the state to use at trial, the state could not have threatened to present
it in the event “the defense put on its planned character witnesses” (Appellant’s Brief,
See United States v. Premises and Real Property with Bldgs., . . . , 949 F.Supp. 166,
170-171 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), which explained:
8

An officer armed with the search warrant at issue in this case could, with
reasonable effort, ascertain that the attic was a place intended to be
searched. The recitation of probable cause on the first page of the
warrant specifically states that marijuana and marijuana-growing
equipment are believed to be in the attic of the subject premises. … The
search warrant specifically states that “the attic of 500 Delaware Street ...
is used to cultivate marihuana in felony quantities.” … Although the
command clause of the warrant fails to include the attic, the description of
the items to be seized includes marijuana plants and paraphernalia to
package, administer, or grow marijuana. … An officer armed with the
warrant in this case needed only to read the warrant in its entirety to
determine that the attic was a place intended to be searched.
22

p.4) – thwarting the trial team’s plan to introduce character evidence that would have
shown Adamcik incapable of committing the crimes charged (id., pp.3-16).9
The state relies upon and incorporates into this response, as if fully set forth
herein, that part of the district court’s analysis and determination in its summary
dismissal memorandum decision and order which found that any failure by Adamcik’s
trial team to seek suppression of the evidence from the computer did not prejudice
Adamcik under Strickland (Addendum A; specifically pp.390-393). The state also relies
upon the Idaho Supreme Court’s recitation of facts, as set forth at pages 1 through 9,
supra, to show that Adamcik has failed to meet his burden of showing a reasonable
probability that, but for counsels’ deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different, and that confidence in the outcome has been undermined.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. Additionally, several of Adamcik’s arguments warrant further
comment.
The ten people Adamcik claims should have been called to testify at trial about
his good character, and Adamcik himself, would have been impeached, either directly or
indirectly, with the many comments by Adamcik that were recorded on the Black Rock
Canyon videotape, which showed a side of his character that was anything but “good.”
As one of many examples from that recording, after Draper announced that their first
9

Adamcik alleged in his post-conviction petition that the prosecutor’s threat caused his
trial team to not call three witnesses to testify about Draper’s bad character. (PC R.,
pp.34-35.) The factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in the
form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau v. State,
103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684,
978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). Because there appear to be no affidavits,
depositions, testimony, or any explanation of what the three witnesses would say
through admissible evidence regarding Draper’s bad character, and because Adamcik
does not explain on appeal what they would have said at trial, they need not be
addressed further.
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victim was going to be Cassie Stoddart, Draper fantasized out loud that Cassie was
“going to be alone in a big dark house out in the middle of nowhere,” and said, “How
perfect can you get? I, I mean like holy shit dude.” Adamcik responded, “I’m horny just
thinking about it.” Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 456, 272 P.3d at 428. Adamcik’s contention
that he would have been acquitted if his character witnesses would have shown he was
not like Draper, is not realistic.
Next, Adamcik argues parenthetically that “the [evidentiary hearing] testimony of
Rudolf Reit, had it been presented at the trial, would have corroborated Dr. Leis’s
testimony that only one knife was used.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.15 (explanation added).)
Testimony by Reit about his testing of the two knives was relevant at the evidentiary
hearing only to Claim 2, ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain the murder
weapons for testing by the defense expert, and Claim 5, cumulative prejudice. (PC R.,
pp.25-30, 407 (denial of summary motions), 658-664, 671-672.) Any consideration of
Reit’s evidentiary hearing testimony in regard to proving prejudice under Claim 3(b) is
improper and irrelevant. Moreover, the district court only allowed evidentiary hearing
testimony about prejudice under Claim 3(b) to be presented in regard to cumulative
prejudice as alleged in Claim 5. (PC R., pp.469, 670-671.)
Adamcik also argues that he was prejudiced by the failure of his trial team to
move to suppress the “kiddie porn” found on the computer (precluding testimony by his
character witnesses) because his evidentiary hearing “testimony that Brian killed Cassie
with the serrated Rambo knife would have been corroborated by Dr. Leis’ [trial]
testimony that only the Rambo knife was used.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.15.) Alternatively,
Adamcik contends, “even if the jury believed Dr. Garrison’s [trial] testimony that there
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were two knives used, Torey’s [evidentiary hearing] testimony that he dropped the
Sloan [non-serrated] knife, and ran out of the house ahead of Brian, who did not arrive
at the car for another couple of minutes, would have caused the jury to conclude that
Brian used both knives, inflicting additional wounds with the Sloan knife after Torey left.”
(Id.) Regardless of the propriety of considering Adamcik’s own self-serving evidentiary
hearing testimony in regard to whether he has shown prejudice under Claim 3(b), his
testimony does nothing to show that, had he testified accordingly at trial, the result
would have been different.
As to the number of knives used to inflict the twelve “potentially fatal wounds” into
Cassie’s body (out of a total of thirty knife wounds), and focusing on wound #1, the state
addresses that issue in section E, infra, and relies on that argument to show that the
Idaho Supreme Court correctly determined there was sufficient evidence “for a jury to
reasonably conclude that (1) two knives were used to murder Stoddart; (2) both knives
inflicted potentially fatal wounds; (3) Draper favored the knife with the serrated blade
which inflicted most of the potentially fatal wounds; and (4) the other [non-serrated] knife
was used by Adamcik to inflict the other stab wound that injured Stoddart’s vital
structures and which had the potential to be fatal.” Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 461-462, 272
P.3d at 433-434.

Adamcik testified at the evidentiary hearing, and presents on

appeal as an alternative theory, the following version of events: Draper must have used
both knives to stab Cassie after Adamcik ran from the murder scene to his car and
waited for Draper; Adamcik “might” have dropped the (non-serrated) Sloan knife while
kneeling down beside Cassie while she lay “snoring” on the living room floor, as he held
a key-ring light to see what was going on. (PC Tr., p.346, L.11 – p.348, L.3; p.361, L.23
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– p.362, L.13.) Adamcik’s version of events would have been viewed with more than a
little incredulity, especially in light of the voluminous evidence of teamwork he and
Draper employed all through the planning, carrying out, and concealment phases of
Cassie’s murder. As Adamcik testified at the evidentiary hearing, he lied to the police
about going to the movies, and (later) about burglarizing cars; he also lied to his parents
about going to the movies. (PC Tr., p.363, Ls.3-22.) Moreover, Adamcik confirmed that
he drove his car to Black Rock Canyon, and, once there, used his own shovel to dig a
hole to bury the evidence used in the murder. (PC Tr., p.363, L.23 – p.364, L.7.) In
short, no number of character witnesses could have rehabilitated Adamcik’s character
as “good,” much less to the extent that he would have been acquitted of first-degree
murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.
Based on the above arguments, and those parts of the district court’s
memorandum decisions and orders incorporated herein, Adamcik has failed to meet his
burden of demonstrating any error in the summary dismissal of Claim 3(b).
E.

Adamcik Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of Claim 2
Following An Evidentiary Hearing – That His Trial Team Was Ineffective For
Failing To Obtain Expert Testing Of The Knives To Show That Wound No. 1 Was
Inflicted By A Serrated Knife
The district court’s memorandum decision and order on the parties’ summary

disposition motions succinctly explained Claim 2 of Adamcik’s post-conviction petition
as follows:
Adamcik alleges that his trial counsel retained a forensic investigator by
the name of Rudolf Reit (Reit) to testify at trial. P.C.R. Petition, p.14, ¶48.
Adamcik asserts that his defense counsel’s intent with respect to Reit’s
testimony, was to . . . have “Reit testify about the results of an experiment
he conducted which showed that knives similar but not identical to Exhibits
70 and 74 would make different marks on a body.” P.C.R. Petition, p.14,
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¶¶49-50. The claimed import of this testimony was to establish “that
Wound #1 was caused by the serrated blade knife.”
Adamcik’s
Supporting Memorandum, pp.2-3, ¶51. Adamcik argues that “Reit’s
evidence about the knife marks would have corroborated Dr. Leis’
testimony that Wound #1 was inflicted with a serrated blade. It could have
tipped the balance on that issue and resulted in an acquittal.” Id., at p.8.
(PC R., p.373-374 (footnote omitted).)
After an evidentiary hearing (see generally PC 7/22/15 Tr.), the district court
entered a memorandum decision and order concluding that Adamcik’s trial team was
deficient for failing to take reasonable steps to have Reit conduct tests of the Sloan
(non-serrated) and Rambo (serrated) knives that would have led to expert testimony
about the types of stab wounds each type of knife made – all for the purpose of
supporting Dr. Leis’ trial testimony that a serrated knife was used to inflict wound #1.
(PC R., p.644, ¶5 – p.650, ¶21; p.658, ¶13 – p.660, ¶20.) However, the district court
concluded that Adamcik failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his trial team’s
deficient performance prejudiced him under Strickland. (PC R., p.664, ¶27.)
The state relies on the Idaho Supreme Court’s rendition of facts recited above
(see pages 1-9, supra), and the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding Claim 2, which are incorporated as if fully set forth herein. Those findings and
conclusions are part of the attached Addendum B. (Addendum B; specifically PC R.,
p.644, ¶5 – p.650, ¶21; p.658, ¶13 – p.665, ¶27.) In addition to the district court’s
“prejudice” analysis regarding Claim 2, the state offers the following argument.
Adamcik first contends he was prejudiced by his trial team’s failure to obtain the
Sloan knife (St. Ex. 70) and Rambo knife (St. Ex. 74) for expert testing by Mr. Reit
because the “lack of witness preparation led to a situation where the jury saw both the
long-serving Judge and the elected Prosecuting Attorney castigate [defense counsel] –
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calling him unprepared, unprofessional, and a liar,” thereby undermining counsel’s
credibility. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.16-20.) Regardless of the propriety of the prosecutor’s
and trial judge’s comments to Adamcik’s trial team during the failed attempt to present
Mr. Reit as an expert witness, the comments bear little, if any, causal relationship to the
actual deficient performance of his counsel alleged in the post-conviction petition and
found by the district court – the failure to obtain the two knives for testing. The essential
elements of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are that the attorney’s
performance was deficient and prejudice caused by the deficiency. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687-688; Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 713, 274 P.3d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 2012). The
question is not whether the outcome of the trial would have been different had the
comments by the prosecutor and trial judge not been made. The relevant question is
whether, had Adamcik’s trial team obtained the knives for testing, the result of the trial
have been different.

Here, the comments by the prosecutor and the trial judge in

discussing the admissibility of Mr. Reit’s expert testimony are far too attenuated from
Adamcik’s counsels’ failure to obtain the knives for testing to give rise to a reasonable
likelihood of a different result. See Atkins v. Zenk, 667 F.3d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2012)
(finding the defendant’s chain of inferences “little more than an invitation for the Court to
make speculation-fueled inferential leaps”); Beyah v. Uribe, 2010 WL 5524912 (C.D.Ca
2010) (“Petitioner’s defense was not prejudiced because the link between the testimony
of the potential witnesses and a reasonable likelihood of a better outcome at trial for
Petitioner is too attenuated.”); Soto-Beltram v. United States, 946 F.Supp.2d 312, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (trial counsel’s “negotiation efforts were simply too attenuated from any
prejudice that arose during the sentencing phase”).
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It should also be noted that the trial court instructed the jury that it was to
“consider only the evidence at trial” consisting “of the testimony of the witnesses, the
exhibits offered and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts.” (R., vol. V, p.1087
(Jury Instruction No. 2).) The same instruction stated:
Except as explained in this instruction, none of my rulings were intended
by me to indicate any opinion concerning the evidence in this case.
The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case
are intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the
instructions, but they are not themselves evidence. If any argument or
remark has no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard it.
(R., pp.1087-1088.) Any risk that the jury may have thought less of the defense team’s
credibility due to comments made by the prosecutor and trial judge, and allowed that to
enter into its verdict, was minimized by the court’s instructions about both trial counsels’
and the courts own remarks. In short, the jury was instructed to only consider the
evidence at trial in reaching its verdict, and it is presumed to have followed that
instruction. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997) (the
jury is presumed to follow instructions). Based on the above arguments, Adamcik has
failed to show that the prosecutor’s and/or the trial judge’s comments constituted
Strickland prejudice as to Claim 2.
Next, Adamcik contends he was prejudiced as a result of his trial team’s failure to
obtain the knives for testing because he was precluded from presenting Mr. Reit’s
testimony, which, he argues, “was strong evidence that only one knife was used” to
murder Cassie. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.21-25.) At trial, Dr. Garrison testified for the state,
in effect, that wound #1 was caused by a non-serrated knife, such as the Sloan knife
(St. Ex. 70). Dr. Garrison concluded that two knives (the other being a serrated knife
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such as the Rambo knife) were each used to inflict at least one “potentially fatal” wound
to Cassie.

(Tr., vol. II, p.2219, L.17 – p.2227, L.15.) Dr. Garrison based his opinion

upon the fact that wound #1: (1) showed no signs of having been inflicted by a serrated
knife, (2) had a hilt mark, and (3) was thirteen centimeters (i.e., 5.118 inches) deep, but
the Rambo knife’s serrations began seven centimeters (i.e., 2.755 inches) from the tip
of the blade. (Tr., vol. II, p.2224, L.5 – p.2226, L.9; p.2251, L.17 – p.2252, L.4; see
http://www.inches-to-cm.com.) Dr. Leis, testifying for Adamcik, concluded that only one
knife was used – the Rambo serrated knife (St. Ex. 74) – “in the attack.” (Tr., vol. III,
p.2653, Ls.3-6.)
In the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Mr. Reit testified that, after he
conducted tests of the actual Rambo and Sloan knives on pig skin, he concluded “the
wounds made by the Rambo [serrated] knife could in part be similar to the wounds
made by the tanto [i.e., Sloan] knife. And that the tanto knife wound could be totally
accounted for by the Rambo knife, if the Rambo knife is not plunged all the way into the
skin.” (PC Tr., p.283, Ls.9-14 (explanations and emphasis added).) Based on the
premise that the Rambo knife had not been “plunged all the way into the skin,” Mr. Reit
agreed with Dr. Leis’ trial testimony that only one knife was used to murder Cassie.
There is no dispute that, if it is assumed that the Rambo knife was only thrust part of the
way into Cassie’s chest, the wound might look “in part” similar to a wound inflicted by
the Sloan knife. However, the testimony by Dr. Leis totally belies that assumption.
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At trial, Dr. Leis testified that wound #1 to Cassie’s upper right chest showed no
signs of serrations and had a “hilt mark;”10 therefore, his testimony has always been
contrary to any suggestion – including his own – that wound #1 was caused by a
serrated knife. Dr. Leis testified:
Q.

Can you describe, Dr. Leis, what Exhibit 22 is?

A.

This depicts wound number “1” – which was to Cassie’s right upper
chest area.

Q.

And would you agree that that wound was to the hilt?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And there is a hilt mark there?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Are there serrations on that – on that wound?

A.

Not – that I can see definitively in this photograph.

(Tr., vol. III, p.2647, Ls.12-24; see id., p.2610, L.22 – p.2612, L.11 (Dr. Leis’ summary of
Dr. Garrison’s testimony that his photos show wound #1 has a hilt mark, “the result of a
part of the handle of the knife striking the skin’s surface and leaving an outline behind”);
p.2651, L.19-25 (“In just looking at wound number “1” or “2” by themselves, there is not
a specific feature that depicts a serrated blade striking the skin . . . .”).)
Because Dr. Leis testified at trial that wound #1 penetrated Cassie’s chest “to the
hilt,” the blade used to inflict that wound necessarily went all the way into her chest until
10

Dr. Garrison testified that a “hilt” mark or “impact injury” is a mark left by either the
hilt, hand or finger “as it impacts the skin” during a blow with a knife. (Tr. vol. II, p.2217,
L.21 - p.2218, L.10.) While showing the jury showing photos of wound #1 (see St. Ex.
94, slides 15, 16), Dr. Garrison explained that, “although this picture is somewhat out of
focus, you can see it’s fairly rounded here – and another impact injury. So we know that
this knife went in up to where the hand was. It’s an impact injury . . . .” (Tr., vol. II,
p.2219, L.23 – p.2220, L.5.)
31

it was stopped by the hilt – leaving a mark. To be clear, whatever knife was used to
inflict wound #1 was thrust all the way into Cassie’s chest. If the serrated Rambo knife
had been used, wound #1 would have exhibited irregularities and disruptions from the
serrations on the upper part of the knife blade that was closest to the hilt. Because both
Dr. Garrison (see Tr., vol. II, p.2219, L.7 – p.2220, L.11) and Dr. Leis agreed that wound
#1 did not have any serrations, and that it penetrated Cassie’s chest cavity “to the hilt,”
the only reasonable conclusion is that wound #1 was inflicted by a non-serrated knife,
such as the Sloan knife.11 Moreover, because wound #1 was thirteen centimeters
deep, and the Rambo knife’s serrations began only seven centimeters from the tip of
the blade, it is unlikely that a serrated knife inflicted wound #1, even taking the
possibility of “compression” into account.12

(Tr., vol. II, p.2224, L.5 – p.2226, L.9;

p.2251, L.17 – p.2252, L.4.) Having convicted Adamcik of first-degree murder, the jury
clearly understood the significance of these facts – a non-serrated knife was used to
inflict wound #1.

11

If Dr. Leis’ theory was correct, there should be no hilt mark on wound #1 if wound
#22 to Cassie’s left hand pinkie stopped the serrated Rambo knife from fully penetrating
her chest. Conversely, the fact that wound #1 had a hilt mark, and wound #2 did not, is
an indication that wound #22 aligned with wound #2 – not wound #1.

12

Adamcik’s trial counsel tried to get Dr. Garrison to agree that, based on the
possibility of “compression,” the knife used to inflict wound #1 “doesn’t have to be
thirteen centimeters long. This could be eight, nine centimeters long, as well,” Dr.
Garrison answered, “No, it’s going to depend on the compressibility of the tissues.” (Tr.,
vol. II, p.2252, Ls.9-16.) When testifying about wound #15, an unserrated knife wound,
Dr. Garrison explained, “if we have a wound that goes into the thigh fourteen
centimeters leaving no markings, even though you would have compression, it’s not
going to compress that much, so that would have to be, in my opinion, a knife other that
the serrated knife.” (Tr., vol. II, p.2226, Ls.4-9 (emphasis added).) Based on that
testimony, the jury could have reasonably concluded that wound #1, only one
centimeter less deep than wound #15, would also not compress enough to allow for the
possibility that it was inflicted by a serrated knife.
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Despite the fact that he testified that wound #1 went into Cassie’s chest to the hilt
and showed no sign of serrations, Dr. Leis later testified that wound #1 was caused by a
serrated knife. He said that he reached that opinion by enlarging and lightening one of
the photos Dr. Garrison used to show how wound numbers 22 (left hand pinkie) and 2
(chest) aligned together (see St. Ex. 94, slides 3, 5), but concluded that, because he
believed he saw a hilt mark on wound #2, it was really wound #1 (Tr., vol. III, p.2613,
L.22 – p.2615, L.10; see Def. Ex. DD, slides 6, 8, 10-12; St. Exs. 23; 94, slides 4, 5
(showing no obvious hilt mark on wound #2)). A mere glimpse at Dr. Garrison’s photos
of wound #1 (see St. Ex. 94, slides 15, 16) – showing an extremely pronounced hilt
mark on the right side – should cast doubt on Dr. Leis’ testimony that the same wound
can be seen in Dr. Garrison’s photos (or Dr. Leis’ enhanced photos) showing wound
#2213 and wound #2 in alignment (see St. Ex. 94, slides 3, 5; Def. Ex. DD, slides 6, 8,
10-12).
Lastly, Dr. Leis asked the jury to believe that Dr. Garrison misidentified wound #1
as wound #2, a mistake that was highly unlikely due to the following factors:
(1)

Dr. Garrison personally conducted an examination on Cassie’s
body (Tr. vol. II, p.2193, L.16 - p.2194, L.20; p.2201, Ls.5-18), and
was present when the photo was taken during the re-examination
of Cassie’s body (Tr. vol. II, p.1731, L.9 - p.1732, L.12; St. Ex. 28).

(2)

Dr. Leis did not attend Cassie’s autopsy or Dr. Garrison’s reexamination of her body; he had only seen photos of those
procedures, and there is no indication he ever actually saw or
examined Cassie’s body. (Tr. vol. III, p.2646, L.23 - p.2647, L.8.)

13

Adamcik mistakenly states that Dr. Garrison “testified that wound #22 . . . was
caused by a smooth-bladed knife, like the Sloan knife.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.22.) Dr.
Garrison testified that wound #22 to Cassie’s left hand pinkie was inflicted by a serrated
knife. (Tr., vol. II, p.2211, L.8 – p.2213, L.21 (“this was a serrated or survival-type knife
cut to the hand”).)
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(3)

Each of Cassie’s wounds were clearly identified with easily read
numbered labeled stickers, placed on her body and photographed
by Dr. Skoumal or his staff. (Tr., vol. II, p.2084, L.16 – p.2085, L.7;
see St. Exs. 20, 94.)

(4)

Dr. Garrison testified in detail about the points of identification
linking the two photos of wound #2 in the side-by-side slide
showing Cassie’s left hand pinkie (wound #22) laid over wound #2
(closed with tape) on the left, and a photo of wound #2 (not closed
with tape) on the right. (See St. Ex. 94, slide 5; Tr. vol. II, p.2213,
Ls.3-21.)

Mr. Reit’s testimony would not have made any difference at trial in attempting to
buttress Dr. Leis’ testimony.

The “assumption” Mr. Reit employed to theorize that

wound #1 was a partial stab wound is based entirely on Dr. Leis’ self-contradicting
testimony that – despite the fact there was a hilt mark on wound #1 – the knife blade
only partially penetrated Cassie’s chest. That contradictory testimony, combined with
the consistent and logical testimony of Dr. Garrison, the photos of the stab wounds, and
the improbability that wound #1 was mis-identified by Dr. Garrison by a stickered label
placed by Dr. Skoumal as wound #2 (see St. Ex. 94, slide 5), all reinforce the district
court’s determination that Adamcik failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland in
regard to this claim.
F.

Adamcik Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of Claim 5 –
Cumulative Prejudice
1.

Introduction

The district court rejected Claim 5 of Adamcik’s petition, which alleged
cumulative prejudice based on Claims 2, 3(b), and 4. (PC R., pp.665-672.) On appeal
Adamcik asserts cumulative prejudice based on the district court’s findings that his trial
counsel were deficient in regard to Claim 2 (failure to obtain the knives for testing), and
Claim 4 (failure to excise Adamcik’s invocation of rights that appeared on videotaped
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police interview). (Appellant’s Brief, pp.25-27.) Adamcik further argues that Claim 3(b)
(failure to move to suppress the “kiddie porn” found on the computer) should be
considered in the cumulative prejudice mix, even though the district court found (in the
context of determining cumulative prejudice under Claim 5) that his trial counsel’s
performance was not deficient. (Id.; see PC R., pp.468, 665, 670 (stating it would
“nonetheless” consider Claim 3(b) in regard to cumulative prejudice for appeal
purposes).)
Regardless of whether cumulative prejudice is based on all three claims, or just
the two for which the district court found Adamcik’s trial counsel deficient, Adamcik has
failed to meet his burden of showing that he was prejudiced to the extent that he was
denied a fair trial.
2.

Adamcik Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Rejection Of
His Cumulative Error Claim

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez,
125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of
the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958
P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).
The ultimate question of Strickland prejudice is whether the defendant was
denied “a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Adamcik
has failed to show that the errors he cites, i.e., instances of deficient performance,
amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho
784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16
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P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors deemed harmless). In response
to this issue, the state incorporates, as if fully set forth herein, those portions of the
district court’s orders relevant to the denial of this claim. (Addendum A; specifically PC
R., pp.394-403; Addendum B; specifically PC R., p.650, ¶22 – p.654, ¶38; p.656, ¶4;
p.665, ¶28 – p.672, ¶50.)
Additionally, in light of the strong evidence presented against Adamcik at trial as
set out in the Statement of Facts (pp.1-9, supra) and incorporated herein, the strong
testimony of Dr. Garrison, and the fact that Dr. Leis contradicted his own “one-knife”
theory by testifying at trial that wound #1 penetrated Cassie’s chest “to the hilt” and
showed no sign of being made by a serrated knife, Adamcik has failed to show that his
trial was less than fair or reliable. For these reasons, Adamcik has failed to show
cumulative error.
II.
Adamcik Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court’s Denial Of Claim
7 – That Under Miller And Montgomery, His Fixed Life Sentence Was
Cruel And Unusual Punishment
Adamcik argues that the district court erred in denying his claim (Claim 7) that he
was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution based on Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). (Appellant’s Brief, pp.27-42.) For its
response to this issue, the state relies upon, and incorporates as if fully set forth herein,
those parts of the district court’s decisions that are relevant to this issue: (1) the court’s
Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama [etc.],
attached as Addendum C (specifically PC R., pp.419-425), and (2) the court’s
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Memorandum Decision and Order on Second Motion for Reconsideration, attached as
Addendum D (specifically PC R., pp.696-702).
Additionally, the district court’s decisions are consistent with the Idaho Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. State, Docket No. 42857, 2017 Opinion No. 45 at
17 (Idaho May 12, 2017) (quoting Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 735), which explained that
“Miller and Montgomery do, however, require that the sentencing court weighs the
juvenile offender’s youth and characteristics against the nature of the crime to
determine whether the crime was one that ‘reflected the transient immaturity’ of youth.”
The Idaho Supreme Court also explained that “Montgomery was careful, however, to
note that ‘Miller did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child’s
incorrigibility.” Johnson, Docket 42857 at 16 (quoting Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 735).
(See Appellant’s Brief, p.34 (“Absent a finding that a crime reflects a juvenile’s
‘irreparable corruption,’ life without parole may not be imposed.”).)
Based on the district court’s well-reasoned analysis of this issue, Adamcik has
failed to meet his burden of showing any error in the denial of Claim 7.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgments dismissing
Adamcik’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 28th day of June, 2017.

__/s/ John C. McKinney________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of June, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
at the following email addresses: db@nbmlaw.com and lm@nbmlaw.com.

JCM/dd

__/s/ John C. McKinney_________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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TOREY ADAMCIK,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

i

,

CV-2013-3682

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON ADAMCIK1S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary dismissal/disposition
arising out of Petitioner's, Torey Adamcik (Adamcik), Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(P.C.R. Petition). Adamcik has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition (Adamcik's
M.S.D). 1 The State of Idaho (State) also filed its motion for summary disposition and supporting
brief in one (I) document titled Respondent's Dispositive Motion with Brief in Suppo11 of
Motion for Summary Dismissal (State's M.S.D). Adamcik filed his Response to Respondent's
Dispositive Motion (Response Memorandum). 2 Finally, Adamcik submitted a document entitled
Supplemental Authority sho11ly in advance of the oral argument on these cross-motions. The
parties argued their cross-motions to the Court, and following argument, the Court took this

1

Adamcik's M.S.D. was supported by a Brief in Suppmi of Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition (Adamcik's
Supporting Memorandum).
: Adamcik's Response Memorandum was supported by several affidavits: l 1) the Affidavit of Mark lleideman (Heideman
Anidavil); (2) the Affidavit of Vic Pearson (Pearson A111davit); (3) the Affidavit of Sean Adamcik {Scan Adamcik Affidavit); {4)
the Affidavit of Shannon Adamick [sic] (Shannon Adamcik Affidavit); and (5) the Al11davit or Barbara Adamcik (B. Adamcik
Allidavit).
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matter under advisement. 3 The Comt, having considered the parties' written submissions along
with the argument presented, now issues it Memorandum Decision and Order (MD&0). 4

BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Adamcik filed his P.C.R. Petition in September, 2013. His P.C.R. Petition outlines seven
(7) separate claims upon which he seeks post-conviction relief.

Adamcik seeks summary

disposition on five (5) of the seven (7) claims asserted in his P.C.R. Petition. 5 The State in turn
seeks summary dismissal of each claim raised by Adamcik in his P .C.R Petition.
Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition arises out of the underlying criminal proceedings in Bannock
County Case CR-2006-17984. In this proceeding, Adamcik was charged with and convicted by
a jury, of committing the first-degree murder of Cassie Jo Stoddart (Stoddart). Adamcik was
also convicted of conspiring with co-defendant, Brian Draper (Draper), to commit the firstdegree murder of Stoddart At sentencing, Adamcik was sentenced to a thiity (30) year fixed
sentence and an indetenninate life sentence for the conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and
a fixed life sentence for the first-degree murder conviction of Stoddart. Adamcik filed a motion
seeking a reduction of his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (l.C.R.). This motion

3

It should be noted that incident to this post-conviction relief proceeding, the Court has taken judicial notice of the entire record
of the criminal proceedings in Bannock County Case CR-2006-17984 pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 (l.ll.E.). See
Order Taking Judicial Notice, Additionally, at the hearing on the cross-motions for summary dismissal/disposition, the parties
apprised the Court of their stipulation that the summary dismissal/disposition record will include the depositions taken of
Adamcik's defense team, Greg May, Bron Rammell, and Aaron Thompson.
4
Adamcik, in his Response Memorandum objected to the State's M.S.D. on the grounds that it had failed to Hie a motion separate
from ils memorandum, identii)'ing with particularity the grounds supporting the motion and the rule or statute under which it was
seeking relief. At hearing on the cross-motions for summary dismissal/disposition, Adamcik acknowledged that following the
objection identified in his Response Memorandum, the State did file Respondent's Amended Dispositive Motion which Adamcik
advised Lo be "a proper motion filed citing the correct statute." As such, any defect in the initial filing of the State's M.S.D. has
been cured and the Court will consider the merits of both parties' motions for summary dismissal/disposition.
'Adamcik acknowledges that his sixth claim or cause of action requires an evidentiary hearing because of the existence of
material issues of fact, and therefore asks that an evidentiary hearing be set on that matter. Because Adamcik has not moved for
summary dismissal on his first claim or cause of action, it is also clear that he is conceding, at a minimum, that this issue also
requires an evidcntiary hearing. It may be that Adamcik has waived or withdrawn this claim entirely, but because the Court is
not certain of this fact. the Com! will consider the State's M.S.D. on this cause of action as well in this MD&O. See Adamcik's
Response Memorandum where Adamcik states "further, as will be explained below, Causes or Action 2· 7 should not be
summarily dismissed even if the Court reaches the m0rits of the Respondent's arguments." Response Memorandum, p. 3.
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was denied after hearing by the trial court. Adamcik then filed an appeal. In Stale v. Adamcik,
152 Idaho 445, 458-59, 272 P.2d 417, 486-87 (2012), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
Adamcik's conviction and sentence. Adamcik filed a Petition for Rehearing; the Idaho Supreme
Court denied the relief sought in that petition.

Adamcik then filed a Petition for Writ of

Certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. This petition was denied. State v. Adamcik, 133
S. Ct 141, 184 L. Ed. 2d 68 (2012).

STANDARD OF REVIEW SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Post-Conviction Relief proceedings are generally governed by the Unifom1 PostConviction Procedure Act (U PCP A) whfoh is codified at Idaho Code §§ l 9A90 l through 194911 (LC.) As summarized in Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249-50, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068-69
(2009) (Rhoades):
[A]petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646
(2008). However, "[t]he 'application must contain much more than a short and
plan statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P.
8(a)(l)."' State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008) (quoting
Goomvin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271, 61 P.3d 626,628 (Ct.App.2002)). Instead,
the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth the
grounds upon which the application is based." Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d
at 136 (citing LC. § 19-4903). "The application must present or be accompanied
by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be
subject to dismissal." id.
The UPCPA applies to the Adamcik's M.S.D. and the State's M.S.D. LC. §19-4906(c)
provides that:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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As stated in Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 713, 274 P.3d 11, 14 (Ct.App.2012),
summary dismissal is the functional or procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Rule
56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (l.R.C.P.). In considering a summary judgment, or in
this case a motion for summary disposition, this Court applies the same standard applied by the
appellate courts on appeal. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 63,
305 P.3d 499, 507 (2013).

DeRushe v. S'tate, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (DeRushe), provides
that "a claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal pursuant to LC. § 194906 if the applicant has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." (Quoting, Berg v.

Stale, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998)).
As summarized by the Rhoades Court on summary dismissal, the trial court:

lh ]as free review of questions of law. Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 626, 167
P.3d 761, 763 (2007). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court dete1111ines whether a
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions
together with any affidavits on file and will liberaliy construe the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving paity. Hauschulz v. State, 144
Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138
Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). However, "while the underlying facts
must be regarded as true, the petitioner's conclusions need not be so accepted."
Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985). "[W]here the
evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the
trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the
conflict between those inferences." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180
P.3d 476, 482 (2008).
148 Idaho at 250,220 P.3d at 1069.
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DISCUSSION
1. ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DEPRIVE}) OF A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO THE
STATE'S WITHHOLDING OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF
BRADY J--: MARYUND, 373 U.S. 88 (1963).
In his first claim, Adamcik argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because the State
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brac{Y v. lvfaryland. 373 U.S. 88, 83 S.Ct. l 194, 10
L.Ed.2d 215 ( 1963) (Brady). The exculpatory evidence that Adamcik claims the State withheld
was the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Charles 0. Garrison, M.D. (Dr. Garrison), who was an expert
witness for the State. See First Cause of Action, P.C.R. Petition, pp. 5-14.
During Dr. Ganison's testimony, upon direct examination, he testified that stab wounds
to Stoddart's body were caused by at least two (2) separate knives. Transcript on Appeal (Tr.
App) p. 2225, LL.16-20. Dr. Garrison testified that one (1) of the knives had a serrated blade
and one (1) had a non-serrated blade. Id. The State introduced two (2) knives into evidence at
trial: one ( 1) with a serrated edge (Trial Exhibit 74 -- the "Rambo knife") and one ( l) without
(Trial Exhibit 70 -- the "Sloan blade").
Adamcik argues that Dr. Garrison testified that what was referred to during the trial as
"Wound # 1", "a potentially fatal wound'\ was caused by a knife with a non~serratcd blade.
P.C.R. Petition, p.5, 130. Adamcik asserts that "Dr. Garrison testified that all other potentially
fatal wounds were caused by a knife with a serrated blade." Id at

,3

L

Dr. Edward Leis, M.D. (Dr. Leis) was an expe1i witness who testified for Adamcik at
trial. Dr. Leis' testimony contradicted Dr. Garrison's opinion and testimony as it related to
"Wound # 1". Dr. Leis testified that "Wound #I" was, in fact, caused by a knife which had a
serrated blade. Tr. App. p. 2615, LL.7-10.

Dr. Leis asserted that Dr. Garrison was wrong on

two (2) separate points: (l) that the ,vound to Stoddart's hand was associated with "Wound #2"
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when it was actually associated \vith "Wound #1"; and (2) that because Stoddart's left hand was
placed over Wound #1 the evidence of the serration appeared on the hand and not "Wound #1"
itself. Tr. App. p. 2614, LL. 5-25, p. 2615, LL. 1-10.
Adamcik asserts that Dr. Ganison was present in the courtroom during the course of Dr.
Leis' testimony, "presumably to prepare himself to testify as a state's rebuttal witness." P.C.R.
Petition, p. 5, 135. However, Dr. Garrison was not called by the State as a rebuttal witness.
Adamcik alleges in his P.C.R. Petition that Dr. Garrison did not reveal his analysis of Dr. Leis'
testimony to any member of the prosecution or defense team and told the prosecution team that
there was no reason for him to testify on rebuttal. Id. p. 6, iJ,40-42.
Adamcik concludes and "alleges on information and belief that Dr. Garrison either
agreed with or could not disagree with Dr. Leis' testimony regarding Wound #1.'' Id. p. 6, 139.
Adamcik asserts, again "on information and belief', that "'Dr. Garrison's analysis of Dr. Leis'
testimony was exculpatory evidence "because it tended to show that only one person inflicted the
potentially fatal wounds" and that Dr. Garrison's analysis "was impeachment evidence because it
contradicted Dr. Garrison's previous testirnony in the trial." Id p. 6, 1,43-44.6
As such, it appears that Adamcik is suggesting that the State was required to either call
Dr. Garrison as a rebuttal witness or disclose his "analysis of Dr. Leis' testimonyH to Adamcik's
defense team. Adamcik asserts that if Dr. Garrison's "analysis of Dr. Leis' testimony'' had been
disclosed the "defense would have called Dr. Garrison to present what would have been either
exculpatory evidence (that he agreed that Wound #1 was caused by a knife with a serrated blade)

6

Bold emphasis relative to "on information and belief" was added by the Court.
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or impeaching evidence (that he could not disagree with Dr. Leis' analysis) of his own prior
testimony. 7" P.C.R. Petition, p. 8.
A. BRADY v. MARYLAND STANDARD

Under Brady, the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the
defense and material to either guilt or punishment, the suppression of this evidence violates due
process. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87. To show a Brady violation, a petitioner must prove three (3)
components with respect to the evidence at issue: "the evidence at issue must be favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued."
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). The United

States Supreme Court has further clarified that the prejudice must create a "probability of a
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant \VouJd
more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its in
absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.
A 'reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's
evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."' Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419,434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) citing to United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).

7

This cm ire argument presupposes one ( 1) crucial fact and that is that Dr. Garrison agreed with Dr, Leis' analysis and testimony,
and would not have been able to offer a rebullal. Jt overlooks the other possible conclusion: that being that Dr. Garrison was
unpersuaded by Dr. Leis' analysis and testimony and did not believe that Dr. Leis' testimony and/or analysis was of sufficient
weight or credibility to respond to in rebuttal. Therefore, when asked by prosecutors if there was a need or "reason for him to
testitY" in rebuttal. as alleged in the !'.C.R. Petition, he responded and advised that there was not. See P.C.R. Petition, p. 6, ~42.
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B. DISCUSSION
The Court will GRANT the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal of Adamcik's P.C.R.
Petition. In sho1t, Adamcik has failed to come forward with any admissible evidence to support
his assertion that Dr. Garrison's testimony, in response to Dr. Leis' testimony, would have been
or was exculpatory in nature.
As pointed out above, the only evidence supporting Adamcik's assertion that Dr.
Garrison's rebuttal testimony would have been exculpatory in nature is contained in Adamcik's
verified P.C.R. Petition. However of significance to the present issue, these asse1tions are not
based upon Adamcik's personal knowledge as required by I.R.C.P. 56(e), but are speculative in
nature and are preceded by the phrase "on information and belief'. The Court is mindful of the
fact that "a verified complaint has the force and effect of an affidavit in support of a motion for
summary judgment so long as it confonns to the requirements of Rule 56(e).'' Drennan v. Idaho

State Correctional Institution, 145 Idaho 598, 603, 181 P.3d 524, 529, footnote 3 (Ct.App.
2007). However, Adamcik's assertions based "on information and belief' do not satisfy the
requirements of LR.C.P. 56(e) because they are not based upon the personal knowledge of
Adamcik or any other qualified affiant. In Van Ste/ton v. Van Ste/ton, 2014 WL 4898591, *10
(N.D. Iowa), the trial court noted as follows:
"Rule 56[c]'s personal knowledge requirement prevents statements in affidavits
that are based, in part, 'upon infon11ation and belief'-instead of only
knowledge-from raising genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat summary
judgment." Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.2002); see
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 831 (1950)
(facts alleged on "information and belief' are not sufficient to create a genuine
issue of fact); Can?field Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Co1JJ., 719 F.2d 1361, 1367
(8th Cir.1983) ("Under Rule 56[c], an affidavit filed in support of or in opposition
to a summary judgment motion must be based upon the personal knowledge of
the affiant; information and belief is insufficient" to create an issue of material
fact); see also SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshowsky, 559 F.3d 133, 138 (2d
MEivtORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON ADAMCIK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY DISPOSJTJON AND
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Cir.2009) ("The Rule1s requirement that affidavits be made on personal
knowledge is not satisfied by assertions made 'on information and belief.' ")
(quoting Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F .3d 206,219 (2d Cir.2004));
Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 851 (11th Cir.2000) ("upon
information and belief'' insufficient); Causey v. Balog. 162 F.3d 795, 803 n. 4 (4th
Cir.1998) ("Rule 56[c] precludes consideration of materials not based on the
affiant's first hand knowledge."); Price v. Rochford, 947 F.2d 829, 832 (7th
Cir .1991) (verification based on personal knowledge or infonnation and belief is
insufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment because it avoids the
possibility of perjury); Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150,
154 (5th Cir.1965) ("knowledge, information and belief" insufficient).
Due to the fact that Adamcik has failed to come forward with any admissible evidence in
response to the State's M.S.D. with respect to the assertion made in his P.C.R. Petition that Dr.
Garrison's analysis of Dr. Leis' testimony was such that he agreed with it or could not dispute it
and that any additional testimony of Dr. Ganison would have been exculpatory in nature, the
Court will GRANT the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to the First Cause of
Action outlined in Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition.
2.
ADAM CI K'S CLAIMS FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE O:F
COUNSEL AT TRIAL lN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
AND IDAHO CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 13, UNDER
STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) BECAUSE
COUNSEL FAILED TO GET IMPORTANT EXPERT TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE JURY IN PART BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO OBTAIN
THE MURDER WEAPONS FOR TESTING BY THE DEFENSE EXPERT.
Adamcik's Second Cause of Action for post~conviction relief, as outlined in his P.C.R.
Petition, alleges that Adamcik was denied effective assistance of counsel because his defense
counsel failed to get important expert testimony before the jury. See Second Cause of Action,
P.C.R. Petition, pp. 14-19. Adamcik alleges that his trial counsel retained a forensic investigator
by the name of Rudolf Reit (Reit) to testify at trial. ll.C.R. Petition, p. 14, iJ48. Adamcik asserts
that his defense counsel's intent with respect to Reit's testimony, was to illicit testimony about
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the police procedures used at the crime scene 8 and to have «Reit testify about the results of an
experiment he conducted which showed that knives similar but not identical to Exhibits 70 and
74 would make different marks on a body." P.C.R. Petition, p. 14, i[~49-50. The claimed impoti
of this testimony was to establish "that Wound #1 was caused by the serrated blade knife."
Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum, pp. 2-3,

iJs l.

Adamcik argues that "Reit's evidence about

the knife marks would have corroborated Dr. Leis' testimony that Wound #1 was inflicted with
the serrated blade. lt could have tipped the balance on that issue and resulted in an acquittal."

Id, at p. 8.

In short, Reit was not allowed to testify at trial concerning the tests he had conducted on
what have come to be referred to as the "exemplar knives." Further, the defense teams attempt
to have the exemplar knives admitted into evidence was similarly denied.
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL STANDARD

The standard the Court must employ in detennining whether or not defense counsel's
performance was ineffective has its genesis in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The applicable standard for a trial court, when presented with a
claim of ineffective assistance counsel, is summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court in Booth v.

State, 151 Idaho 612,617,262 P.3d 255,260 (2011) (Booth):

"The Court will GRANT the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to that portion of Adamcik's Second Cause of
;\ction which purports that Adamcik's trial counsel planned to have Reit testify about the police procedures used at the crime
scene (sec P.C.R. Petition paragraph 49) irnd that this testimony was not elicited due tn the dct1cicnt performance of one (I) of
Adameik's trial counsel, Bron Rammcll, be,.ause of ineffective questions and or techniques. See P.C.R. Petition, paragraphs 53
(including sub-paragraphs) and 54. First, Adamcik appears to have withdrawn this contention. In Adamcik's Supporting
Memorandum he makes no reference to the expected testimony of Reit and "police procedures used at the crime scene." Rather,
this assertion is replaced with the assertion that trial counsel intended to have Reit testify "about the different characteristics of
the knives used in the attack on Cassie Stoddard." See Adamcik Supporting Memorandum, p. 2, il 49. Second, Adamcik has
failed to pul forth, in the record on summary dismissal, any facts or admissible evidence which would support his contention that
whatever this expected testimony was, that by resorting to better questions or techniques would have resulted in the admissibility
of this testimony. Without such a showing, the Court cannot make a determination concerning whether the alleged deficient
performance reached the level contemplated by Strickland and certainly cannot make a determination that the alleged deficient
performance was prejudicial as that term has been defined and applied by Strickland and its progeny.
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"The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
1, Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,
570, 225 P .3d 700, 703 (2010). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may
properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Baxter v. Slate, 149
Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct.App.2010). To prevail on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's
performance was deficient and that the defendant \Vas prejudiced by the
deficiency. McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850, 103 PJd 460, 463 (2004);
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.3d2d at 693.
In Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154 177 P.3d 362, 368 (2008) (Baldwin), this
standard was described as follows:
To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show that his
attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Ivey v.
State, 123 ldaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). This objective standard
embraces a strong presumption that defense counsel was competent and diligent.
Ivey, 123 Idaho at 80, 844 P.2d at 709. Thus, the claimant has the burden of
showing that his attorney's performance fell below the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520,960 P.2d at 741.

B. DISCUSSION
The patties approach to this issue diverges in their post-conviction relief briefing.
Adamcik, who seeks summary disposition of this claim in Adamcik's M.S.D., argues that
defense counsel's performance was deficient under the Strickland standard because they "failed
to move the Court for permission to have the knives tested" and "mistakenly and unreasonably
believed that the state had denied it [sic] access to the evidence."
Memorandum, p. 6.

Adamcik's Suppo1ting

Adamcik argues further that "the Court excluded impo1tant defense

evidence when Mr. Ramm.ell could have gotten the evidence admitted by use of well-known and
simple steps. He could have asked proper questions and he could have obtained the knives
before trial and had Mr. Reit conduct the same tests" on the actual knives. 1' Id. at p. 8.
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The State, in turn, approaches this matter from an entirely different perspective. The
State argues that despite the fact that the State objected to this evidence's admission at trial,
evidence such as this is "generally admissible" pursuant to I.R.E. 702. State's M.S.D., p. 8. The
State continues as follov..,s:
[I]f hired defense experts used actual or exemplar evidence to advance their
theory, the court must be flexible in its approach to its employment to the trier of
fact - the jury. Since the gatekeeping function is the court's, it is awkward to
claim a theory of deficient performance on the defense counsel. The trial court
may have erred in not allowing otherwise admissible evidence to be employed,
despite trial defense counsel's significant efforts to have Mr. Reit's expert tests,
testimony and evidence be considered by the jury - including the trial court's
order to strike a significant portion of Mr. Reit's testimony prior to objection.

Id.
In short, the State attempts to turn this into judicial error with the obvious result being
defense counsel was not deficient in its performance, instead the trial com1 committed error in
not allowing this evidence, the testimony, tests, and exemplar knives into evidence. 9
During defense counsel's direct examination of Reit there is a discussion of various
knives and photographs taken by Reit concerning testing he had conducted. At one point during
this direct examination, the State objected to Adamcik's defense team's attempt to introduce
Defense Exhibits K through G which was the work product of Reit's knife experiments.
Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum, p. 3,

,s6.

The State objected to the admission of these

exhibits arguing as follows:
MR. HEIDEMAN: I would object. And, you know, Your Honor, I think the
witness himself has said this is so far removed from the actual knives, that this
9

Adamcik, in his Response Memorandum, argues that the State should be judicially estopped from asserting this position in
Adamcik's post-conviction relief proceeding, when it asserted the exact opposite during Adamcik's jury trial. The Court ne~d
not address the issue of judicial estoppel, because the Court agrees with the rulings of Judge McDermott, at least based upon that
portion of the record that has been brought to the Court's attention in these summary dismissal proceeding. Therefore, the Court
will not address or rule on Adamcik's assertion ofjudicial estoppcl as it relates lo the apparent contradictory positions asserted by
the State.
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test wouldn't be valid. I should have objected to the first ones, too, because
they're not the actual knives used in the test.
I realize I didn't object to the admission of those, but these are ce1tainly
objectionable - certainly aren't relevant, and I would object to any testing that he
did on the first admissions, also.
Tr. App. p. 2524, LL. 8- 19. 10 In ruling on the objection, the trial court has the following
dialogue with defense counsel:
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rammell, this is a comt of law and atticles being
similar to one in evidence and tests being done on an mticle similar to one in
evidence is not sufficient.
The items in evidence could have been released for testing to your witness, as
some were, but -- not going to allow this fellow to testify to -- testify on tests run
on knives he thinks are similar to one.
Just not going to allow it, so we can sho1ten this up right now. These will not be
admitted, and I'm not going to allow him to give opinions on them. I don't think
this is something the jury -- it could mislead them, I don't think it's proper. He
hasn't been proven to be an expert in this field.
Also, he has not used the items in evidence for his testing. So on two grounds he
should not be allowed to give an opinion -- confuse and mislead the jury, and I
don't think it would be proper.
So, we might as well end this right now unless you got more to offer.
Mr. Rammell: Okay. Well, Your Honor, I think that the standard actually is
substantially similar. We looked at that and I appreciate -The Court: Mr. Rammell, this is a homicide case. If you wanted the witness to
examine evidence, you could have made a motion and it would have been
granted.
He could have examined the items that we had, not talked about something that he
thinks -- I emphasize thinks is similar.
I mean, we're talking - we should be talking apples and apples here, but we're
talking about items that were found at Black Rock, and then you want - and then
10
As a result. the State's o~jection to Exhibits K-G morphed into a successful attempt to slrike and exclude Reit's earlier
testimony concerning other portions of his investigation and testing which had been introduced without a contemporaneous
objection.
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he comes in and says, well, he went out and bought some that looked like. Well,
that's not good enough in my opinion. That's not good enough in a homicide case
like this.
Tr. App. p. 2524, LL. 20-25, p. 2525, LL. 1-25, and p. 2526, LL. 1-13. 11
The first important issue for this Court to address is what legal basis did the State
advance for its objection, and second, upon what basis did the trial court sustain the objection.
The State asse1ted first that the exemplar knives were not the actual knives and second based
upon relevance. Id. at p. 2524, LL.13-17. 12 The trial court, in ruling on this objection, never
addressed the first prong of the State's objection, relevance.

Therefore, there is no need to

discuss the same in this MD&O.
The trial court also never identifies the exact legal basis upon which the State's objection
is sustained. However, a review of the trial court's discussion of this issue clearly demonstrates
that it was for lack of foundation. The lack of foundation appears to be with respect to two (2)
essential issues: (1) that it had not been established that Reit was an expert in this field (Tr. App.
p. 2525, LL. l 0-11 ); and (2) that Reit had not had access to and/or used the items in evidence for
his testing (Id. at LL.12-13).
On the record before the Court 13 on these cross-motions for summary dismissal, the Court
must conclude that it is in full agreement with the trial comt's ruling on the State's objection as it

11
A <lisi:ussion then ensues before the jury concerning whether or not the knives in question ,vcre available to the defense team or
withheld from the defense team by the prosecution. Mr. Rammell claimed that an associate from his omce represented that the
State had refused the defense team access to these items of evidence, a fact which was strongly refuted by the State.
1
~Although the State never expressed its o~jection in legal tenns, it appears that the second prong of its objection was lack of
foundation. In other words, !he defense team had foiled lo lay sullicient foundation to establish that the exemplar knives were the
same as or sufficiently similar to the knives in evidence to allow Reil to testify concerning his testing and the results of his testing
with the exemplar knives. The State established during its voir dire, in aid of objection, that Rcit had never seen the knives in
evidence prior to their being introduced into evidence by the State. See Tr. App. p. 2516, LL. 24-25, p.2517, LL. l-10.
1.1The Court emphasizes that it has not conducted an exhaustive review of the Transcript on Appeal. The transcript of the trial
portion of these proceedings contains over 3,000 pages of testimony and examination. Rather, the Court has relied, in large pan.
on counsel for the parties to cite the Court to !he relevant portions of the transcript that support their respective positions. This is
consistent with summary judgment udvocacy and the expectation that the responsibility lies with the parties to point the Court to
those portions of the record that support their respective positions. In Venable v, Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., 156 ldaho 574.
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relates to lack of foundation.

14

Therefore, the Court must analyze what Adamcik's defense team

might have done differently in order to utilize Reit's testimony, investigation, and test results.
Certainly, the most striking and obvious deficiency is the failure of defense counsel to
obtain access to the knives at issue. If these knives had been obtained through discovery and/or
motion practice, Reit or some other qualified expert would have been able to determine whether
they wanted to perform the tests with the actual knives themselves or if they were able to obtain
the same or sufiiciently similar knives to perform tests with the exemplar knives.
The Court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact conceming Adamcik's
defense team's conduct and their failure to aggressively seek out and obtain these knives to
warrant an evidentiary hearing on this issue. When the Court considers the evidence in the
record on summary dismissal in a light most favorable to Adamcik and construes all reasonably
inferences to be drawn from that evidence in favor of Adamcik, the Court concludes that a
determination could be reached that Adamcik's defense team's perfonnance was deficient as that
term has been defined by Strickland and its progeny.
Therefore, the Court will DENY the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on this issue.
However, the Court does find that genuine issues of material fact exist on this issue, which
similarly warrants the Court's DENYING Adamcik's counter-request for summary dismissal
582,329 P.3d 356,364 (2014), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "'[T]hc trial court is not required to search the record looking
for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing the summary judgment is required to bring that
evidence to the coutt's aHention.' Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc .. 145 Idaho 912,919, !88 P.3d 854,861
(2008)."
14
While stating that the Court is in agreement with the trial court's ruling in this particular instance. this Court will not go so far
as to conclude that the exemplar knives and testing conducted by qualified expert with respect to the exemplar knives could never
come into evidence. However, it would require much more foundation than this Court has been pointed to in the record by the
parties. An expert without having access to the knives in evidence would not be able to testify that they were the same or
sufficiently similar to the actual knives. Even if the expert were able to obtain the exact same knives. if he has never seen or
possessed the knives in evidence, he lacks information regarding the specific character of the knives in evidence vis a via the
exemplar knives. 13y way of example only, he has no ability to compare what kind of condition the knives in evidence are in: ( l)
do they have any defects or particular characteristics whid1 have manifested themselves due to use, abuse or age since their
purchase. Without having access to the knives in evidence. there is insufficient foundation to establish that the exemplar knives
arc the same or sufficiently similar to the knives in evidence.
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relative to the Second Cause of Action in his P.C.R. Petition. 15 Therefore, the Court ,vill proceed
to an evidcntiary hearing on Adamcik's Second Cause of Action.

ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AT TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND IDAHO
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 UNDER STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON,
466 U.S. 688 (1984), BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO MOVE TO
SUPPRESS OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE AND MADE ILLOGICAL TRIAL DECISIONS
WHEN THE STATE THREATENED TO INTRODUCE THAT EVIDENCE.
3.

Adamcik's third cause of action, as outlined in his P.C.R. Petition, alleges that his
defense team was deficient due to their failure to move for the suppression of ce11ain items of
evidence seized by law enforcement pursuant to various search warrants. See Third Cause of
Action, P.C.R. Petition, pp. 20-33. Specifically, Adamcik asserts that a ''Computer Tower found
in the basement TV room of the Adamcik home" and a "notebook" found in Adamcik's bedroom
were obtained by law enforcement in violation of his Fourth Amendment under the United States
Constitution as well as Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. See Adamcik's Supp01ting
Memorandum. pp. 10-11, 1, 72 and 74.
Adamcik argues that his defense team should have moved to suppress the seizure of these
two (2) items on the basis that: (1) there was no probable cause to seize the family computer; (2)
the search warrant, issued on September 27, 2006, did not authorize law enforcement to seize
computers and was therefore outside of the scope of the search warrant; (3) there was no
15
The Cou11 recognizes that it has not ruled on the prejudice prong of the Strickland two (2) pronged test nor does the Court feel
that it is in a position to do so without hearing all of the evidence related to trial counsel's claimed deficient and ineffective
performance on this issue. The Court is mindful of the fact, without regard to what its eventual determination is concerning
defense counsel's performance on the Reit's knife evidence, that the State presented testimony through its expert Dr. Garrison.
This evidence was that two (2) knives were involved in inflicting potentially fatal wounds to Stoddart one ( 1) a serrated knife
and one ( l) a non•serrated knife. It would appear to the Court that in order for Adamcik to prevail on the prejudice component of
the S1rickland two (2) prong test, Adamcik must establish that Reit's testimony, investigation and testing, coupled with Dr. Leis'
testimony would have resulted in Dr. Garrison's opinions changing from those expressed in his direct testimony to views and
opinions consistent with Dr. Leis and Reit. Without such a result, the jury would still, as the finder of fact, have been free to
disregard the testimony of Dr. Leis and Reit as lacking credibility and weight and accept, as being more credible, Dr. Garrison's
opinions and testimony. Nevertheless. the Court concludes, at this stage of the proceedings, that genuine issues of material fact
exist sufficient tn deny both parties' motions for summary dismissal/disposition relative to the prejudice prong ofSJrickland's
ineffective assistance ol' counsel lest.
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probable cause for the first of two (2) search warrants issued on October 4, 2006; and (4) there
was no probable cause for the second search warrant issued on October 4, 2006. 16
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL STANDARD

The same standard of review is applicable with respect to this cause of action as
Adamcik's second cause of action. Therefore, the Court will not repeat the standard, but refers
and incorporates the standard outlined in section 2.A. of this MD&O.

B. DISCUSSION
Adamcik's assertion that his defense team was deficient due to their failure to suppress
evidence focuses primarily on two (2) separate pieces of evidence: ( l) a notebook obtained
incident to a search conducted at the Adamcik residence resulting from a search warrant issued
on October 4, 2006; and (2) "'kiddie porn' photographs [that] had been discovered" by the State
incident to a search of the computers obtained as part of a search of the Adamcik residence
conducted on September 27, 2006 following the issuance of a search warrant issued on the same
date. 17 For purposes of the MD&O, the Court will address the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim as it relates to the «notebook)' and the "kiddie porn" photographs separately.

16
Adamcik also asserts additional grounds upon which he contends his defense team should have moved to suppress the State's
use of the computer and evidence obtained from the computer and the notebook. These grounds are that evidence found on the
computer was not disclosed in a timely fashion by the State, the evidence was not relevant, and finally that the evidence was
improper character evidence and the unfair pr<:iudiee of the evidence outweighed any probative value as rebuttal evidence. The
Court declines to discuss these assertions in the MD&O. These are evidentiary issues which never arose during the triaL In order
for the Court to make any conclusions concerning whether any of these assertions have merit, the Court would be required lo
resort to mere conjecture concerning many possible scenarios that may have played out had the State attempted to use this
evidence. However. quite clearly the Stale did not attempt to introduce this evidence into trial and therefore, the Court will not
engage in hypothecating concerning the various scenarios that could have played out at trial had there been an attempt to
introduce the same. The crux of Adamcik's ineffective counsel claim is grounded in, and must succeed or fail, in his claim that
there was no probable cause for the seizure of the computer and/or that seizure of the same exceeded the scope ol'the warrant,
and that the subsequent warrant authorizing the search of the computer for its contents was not supported by probable cause.
Further, that there was not probable cause for the seizure of the notebook. This will be the focus of the Court's query, not on
evidentiary issues and potential scenarios that are speculative at best. Any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon
these hypothetical issues is DENIED and State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is GRANTED on both the deficiency prong as
well as the pr~judice prong of the Strickland analysis.
17
Thc authorization for the search of the computers themselves was authorized by way of a subsequent search warrant issued on
October. 4, 2006. This was the second of two (2) search warrants issued on this date.
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Suppression of Notebook.

1.

Adamcik argues that his defense team was deficient in their failure to move for the
suppression of the "notebook" obtained by law enforcement during a search of his home,
specifically his bedroom, pursuant to a Search Warrant issued on October 4, 2006. This was the

first of two (2) search warrants issued on this date.
The Court will GRANT the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to
Adamcik' s claim that his defense team was deficient in failing to move for the suppression of the
fruits of the search of the Adamcik residence conducted on October 4, 2006 pursuant to a Search
Warrant issued on October 4, 2006.

The fruits of this search included the "notebook" in

question.
The Court concludes, based upon its review of the evidence advanced in support of the
parties' arguments on these cross-motions for summary dismissal, that there was probable cause
to supp01i the issuance of the first of the two (2) search warrants issued on October 4, 2006. It
was incident to the search conducted following the issuance of this warrant that the "notebook"
at issue was located and seized.
As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Baldwin:

In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a
motion in the underlying action, the court properly may consider the probability
of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's
inactivity constituted incompetent performance. Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520,
526, 927 P.2d 910,916 (Ct.App.1996).
145 Idaho at 155.
In considering Adamcik's un-filed motion to suppress on this issue, the Court concludes
that probable cause existed for the issuance of the first of two (2), Search Warrants issued on
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October 4, 2006. The Court therefore, concludes that defense counsel's failure to file a motion
to suppress on this issue was not deficient and most certainly was not prejudicial.
When considering a challenge concerning the issuance of a search warrant and whether it
was properly supported by a showing of probable cause, the Idaho Comt of Appeals has stated as
follows:
When probable cause to issue a search warrant is challenged on appeal, the
reviewing court's function is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239,
103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548-49 (1983); State v. Josehpson; State v.
Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983). In this evaluation, great
deference is paid to the magistrate's determination. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103
S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d at 546-47; State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213,215,938 P.2d
1251, 1253 (Ct.App.1997). The test for reviewing the magistrate's action is
whether he or she abused his or her discretion in finding that probable cause
existed. State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382,387, 707 P.2d 493,498 (Ct.App.1985).
When a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, the burden of proof is on the
defendant to show that the search was invalid. State v. Kelly, I06 ldaho 268, 275,
678 P.2d 60, 67 (Ct.App.1984).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth
Amendment, except that "oath or affirmation" is termed "affidavit." In order for a
search warrant to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause to believe that
evidence or fruits of a crime may be found in a patiicular place. Josehpson, 123
Idaho at 792-93, 852 P.2d at 1389-90. When determining whether probable cause
exists:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will he found in a particular place.
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Gates. 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 548; see also Wilson, 130
Idaho at 215, 938 P.2d at 1253.
Stale v. Belden, 148 Idaho 277,280,220 P.3d 1097, 1099 (Ct.App. 2009) (Belden).
The affidavit filed in support of the search wa1Tant which was issued contained all of the
factual information which was contained in the initial search warrant issued on September 27,
2006. The information contained in the original supporting affidavit provides that: (1) "Adamcik
is obsessed with knives[,] guns[,] and horror films"; that "Torey [Adamcik] and his friend Brian
Draper are so obsessed with horror films that they are writing their own script for a honor
movie"; that "Torey [Adamcik] gave him/her the script about two months ago to read"; that
"Torey [Adamcik] has a knife collection that he keeps in the closet of his bedroom"; that "Torey
[Adamcik has been heard] bragging about committing the perfect crime and hmv he watches
killing movies and actually takes notes during the m_ovie on how not to get caught when
committing a murder" 18 • However, the infom1ation contained in the original probable cause
affidavit is supplemented with new information obtained from an interview Detective Schei, of
the Pocatello Police Department, conducted with April L. Phillips. The Affidavit of Probable
Cause dated October 4, 2006, reports that Ms. Phillips had observed "a lot [sic] of knives in
Torey's [Adamcik] bedroom closest;" she had been in Torey's [Adamcik] house about five
times"; the last time she was in Adamcik's house was "about a month and a half' prior to the
interviev,, date; " that Ms. Phillips "thought it was weird that Torey's [Adamcik] knives were
hidden from his mom''; Ms. Phillips advised "that Torey [Adamcik] has a place in his bedroom
where he hides stufr' this is a "heating vent in his room and he puts his dresser on top of it."

18

This information is obtained by Bannock County Detective Tom Foltz from a "person who is known to [Detective Foltz] but
wishes to remain anonymous." See Affidavit of Probable Cause, P.C.R, Petition, Exhibit E.
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Based upon the information in this Affidavit of Probable Cause, law enforcement sought
and obtained the first search warrant issued on October 4, 2006. This Search Warrant expressly
authorized law enforcement to "search for [at the Adamcik residence] and seize all evidence
including, but not limited to, bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers and other trace evidence as well as
fingerprints, knives, clothing, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes and any indicia
\Yhatsoever of this crime."
Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum essentially outlines three (3) reasons for his claim
that probable cause was Jacking. First, he argues that the notebooks "were not found in the
alleged hiding place." Instead, they were found in "Torey's [Adamcik] closest.'' See Supporting
Memorandum, p. 18. The fact that the notebooks were found in Adamcik's bedroom closet
rather than the heater vent, does not invalidate the warrant. Second, Adamcik asserts that there
was "no indication in the Affidavit that Ms. Phillips was reliable." Id. This is simply inaccurate.
While there is no express statement vouching for Ms. Phillips' reliability contained in the
Affidavit of Probable Cause; a cursory review of the Affidavit of Probable Cause reveals that
much of the information Ms. Phillips provided in her interview was consistent with other
information law enforcement had garnered during the course of its investigation. This fact, in
and of itself, is evidence of reliability. Further, as outlined in Belden, when the Court of Appeals
cites to the United States Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103
S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983) (Gates), "the task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth
in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be found in a particular place." Applying this language to Ms. Phillips) statements, the
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veracity and basis of knowledge appears to relatively high.

As noted, the information is

consistent with other information law enforcement had acquired from other sources during the
course of its investigation and the source of her knowledge is from her own personal
observations and dealings with Adamcik. Finally, Ms. Phillips' information, when coupled with
the other information contained in the October 4, 2006 Affidavit of Probable Cause, supports the
finding of probable cause and the issuance of the Search Warrant in question. As noted in Gate.,\
the test is a totality of the circumstances of the test. On the record before this Court on summary
dismissal and applying the standard outlined in Belden which requires great deference be
afforded the magistrate judge issuing the search warrant and reviewing the totality of the
circumstances contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause dated October 4, 2006, this Court
cannot find that the Judge Woodland abused his discretion in issuing the requested search
warrant. Rather, the Cou11 finds the determination to issue the Search Warrant dated October 4,
2006 to be a practical, commonsense decision, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying
hearsay information, that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in
Adamcik's residence and specifically in his room's closet or heater vent.
The third and last issue raised in Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum appears to be that
the information provided by Ms. Phillips is stale or dated.

Her information concerning

Adamcik's room and house was qualified by her acknowledgement that she had not been in
Adamcik's house for approximately one and one half months prior to Stoddart's murder.
Similarly, this Court cannot conclude that this information is stale or too remote to be part of the
overall basis for issuing a search warrant. Adamcik was living at his parent's residence. There
is no evidence that he had any other places where he would keep his private items. As noted in
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Belden, the burden of proof is on Adamcik to show that the search was invalid. Adamcik has not
come forward with any evidence that items which he had historically kept in his bedroom, closet
or heater vent, had been moved or relocated in the intervening month and a half. One and a half
months between the time Ms. Phillips was last at Adamcik's residence and the time of the
murder does not make Ms. Phillips' information stale under the facts of this case.
Therefore, in applying the rationale outlined in Baldwin, this Comi concludes that any
attempt by Adamcik's defense counsel to suppress the search by which law enforcement came to
be in possession of the notebook at issue, would have been unsuccessful and denied by the trial
court. Therefore, this issue fails to support Adamcik's claim of deficient performance on behalf
of his defense team. Therefore, the Court will DENY Adamcik's claim of ineffective assistance
counsel on this portion of Adamcik's third cause of action and will GRANT the State's request
for summary dismissal on this p01iion of Adamcik's third cause of action. 19

ii.

Suppression of "Kiddie Pom".
Adamcik's argument in support of his post-conviction relief claim relative to his third

cause of action, as it relates to the suppression of the evidence of "kiddie pom" is circuitous and
complex. In summary, he claims that he has been prejudiced at his trial because of his defense
team's deficient performance. This deficient performance consists of a failure to put on any
proof of Adamcik's good character and also a failure to put on proof of his co-defendant's,
Draper, prior bad acts. Adamcik advances the position that this evidence "formed a large basis
of the [Adamcik] defense."

Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum, p.22.

However, when

confronted with the State's threat to use evidence of '"kiddie porn' photographs", which the
State had discovered when analyzing the contents of a computer seized by law enforcement
19

Based upon the Court's ruling, there is no need for the Court to address the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard.
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incident to the search conducted on September 27, 2006, if Adamcik's defense team called
Adamcik's character witnesses, defense counsel relented and abandoned their plan and strategy
to put on this character evidence. Therefore, Adamcik contends a "large basis of [Adarncik's]
defense" was abandoned and the "critically important [objective] to differentiate Torey
[Adamcik] from Brian Draper" was similarly not pursued.

Adamcik's Supporting

Memorandum, p. 22.
Once again, the critical analysis the Court must grapple with is whether a motion to
suppress, if pursued by the defense team, would have resulted in the suppression of the evidence
i.e. the computer tower and/or the "kiddie pom" photographs retrieved from the computer tower.
The computer tower in issue was seized by law enforcement pursuant to a Search
Wal1'ant issued on September 27, 2006. The basis asserted by law enforcement for the issuance
of the September 27, 2006 Search Wanant is contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause of the
same date.
This issue presents a more difficult analysis than the issue arising from the seizure of the
notebook. The September 27, 2006 Affidavit of Probable Cause, after outlining the pertinent
facts supporting the request, requests authorization "to search for and to seize evidence,
including but not limited to, bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers and other trace evidence as well as
clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes garbage bags, computer, computer
programs, cellular telephones and cellular telephone account information, fingerprints and any
indicia whatsoever of this crime." See P.C.R. Petition, Exhibit E.
However, despite the breadth of this request, the magistrate judge issuing the September
27, 2006 Search Warrant restricted the scope of the Search Warrant to a "search for and seiz[ure
of] all evidence including but not limited to bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers and other trace
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evidence as well as finger prints and indicia of crime"; despite the fact that the request contained
in the September 27, 2006 Affidavit of Probable Cause requested "clothing, knives, scripts,
journals, video cameras, video tapes garbage bags, computer, computer programs, cellular
telephones and cellular telephone account information." Those items are expressly excluded
from the warrant. 20 In this Court's mind, this creates a perplexing and impo1tant issue of fact.
Did the magistrate judge intend to sign a search warrant authorizing a search consistent with the
"requesting language" from the September 27, 2006 Affidavit of Probable Cause or did the
magistrate judge purposefully delete from the "authorizing language" from the September 27,
2006 Search Warrant language that mirrored the requesting language from the supporting
affidavit.21 If the latter is in fact the case, then it would appear that Adamcik's position has merit
and that law enforcement exceeded the scope of the warrant in seizing computers from the
Adamcik residence incident to the search conducted on September 27, 2006. At a minimum this
creates a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to support the presentation of evidence with
respect to this issue. 22

20
This fact is particularly curious to the Court. The Court. having considered and issued many warrants, is familiar with the
process of preparation and obtaining warrants. The normal practice is that the party preparing the affidavit of probable cause and
the search warrant itself generally will copy and paste the same language, verbatim. from the affidavit requesting permission to
search into the search warrant itself. This gives rise to the question - why does the "requesting language'' in the supporting
affidavit not mirror the "authorizing language" in the September 27, 2006 Search Warrant. Adamcik postulates that the reason
for this discrepancy is that the issuing magistrate judge agreed with his position that there was no probable cause to conduct a
search for the excluded items and required that portions of the "requesting language" be stricken from the September 27, 2006
Search Warrant before he would sign the same. See Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum, p. 16 ("the magistrate judge must
have agreed with the above because he did not authorize the seizure or search of any computers"). However, it is also plausible
that this discrepancy is merely a scrivener's error and that during the course of preparing the supporting affidavit and the search
warrant, an error occurred and a portion of the "requesting language" was inadvertently deleted or not properly copied and pasted
into the search warrant itself.
21
1n this Court's mind this also renders moot the inquiry concerning whether there was probable cause pursuant to the September
27. 2006 Affidavit or Probahle Cause to authorize seizure of computers. Whether or not there was probable cause becomes moot
because law enforcement is authorized to search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to a
search warrant. Therefore, if the magistrate, even incorrectly, determines there is not probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant, law enforcement is limited by the parameters of the search warrant issued. See .':i,ale v. Bussard, 114 Idaho 781, 787,
760 P.2d J 197, 1203 (Ct.App. 1988).
22
If seizing the computers from the Adamcik residence exceeded the scope of the September 27. 2006 Search Warrant, the
October 4. 2006 Search Warrant authorizing law enforcement to search the computers it had in its possession must also be invalid
because the computers were obtained and possessed by law enforcement illegally.
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Therefore, the Court concludes that there are genuine issues of fact when the Court
construes the evidence in favor of the non~moving party, Adamcik, and applies all reasonable
inferences in Adamcik's favor. Therefore, the Court will require an evidentiary hearing on this
issue. In construing this issue in Adamcik's favor, the Court concludes that there are genuine
issues of material fact which could support a finding that Adamcik's defense team was deficient
in not identifying this issue and seeking to suppress the fruits of this search.
However, despite this lengthy analysis, the Court concludes that Adamcik's claim in this
respect must fail under the "prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. Therefore, the Court will
GRANT the State summary dismissal on Adamcik's third cause of action as it relates to his
claim that he was prejudiced as a result of his defense team's failure in filing a motion to
suppress the evidence of"kiddie porn" photos.
Adamcik's prejudice argument is predicated upon and anchored in a great deal of
conjecture and speculation. In summary, this argument goes as follows: had defense counsel
successfully suppressed the "kiddie porn" photographic evidence, then they would have put on
evidence of Draper's prior bad acts and of Adamcik's good character. All of this may be true.
However, Adamcik's argument presupposes that this evidence of Draper's prior bad acts and
Adamcik's good character would rise to such a level that it would have tipped the balance in his
favor. In other words, would this evidence of Draper's bad acts and Adamcik's good character
have been sufficient to convince the jury that he was not guilty first-degree murder?
On Adamcik's direct appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the Supreme Court addressed
the quantum and sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction at the hands of the jury.
In doing so, the evidence was chronicled as follows:
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Contrary to Adarncik's argument, there is substantial evidence in the record upon
which a jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Adamcik
was guilty of first-degree murder. Dr. Skoumal, the medical examiner who
performed the autopsy on Stoddart, testified that Stoddart died from multiple stab
wounds to the trunk. Dr. Skoumal also testified that twelve of the thirty kniferelated wounds on Stoddart's body had the potential to be fatal. Of those twelve, Dr.
Skoumal was unable to identify the specific wounds that caused Stoddart's death,
but it is clear from his testimony that she died as a result of more than one of those
twelve stab wounds. According to Dr. Skoumal, one of those wounds, referred to as
wound number 1;
was located in Stodda11's mid, upper chest....
The tissues that it penetrated included the skin, muscle, soft tissue, right rib
number three, the mediastinum-which is in the middle of the chest-the
pericardia! sac-which is the sac overlining the heart-the right ventriclewhich is a part of the heart. And there were two cups of blood in the
pericardial sac surrounding the heart.

It's my opinion that the vital structures were injured, and it had the potential
to be fatal.
In response to a subsequent question from the prosecutor, as to whether wound
number 1 was "potentially fatal," Dr. Skoumal answered in the affirmative.
Dr. Garrison testified that at least two knives were used in the murder of Stoddart,
one with a serrated blade, and another with a non-serrated blade. Dr. Garrison
based this conclusion on the fact that some of the wounds contained excoriations
and tears around their edges, which is consistent with the use of a knife with a
serrated blade, while other wounds contained no such excoriations or tears, which
is consistent with the use of a knife with a non-serrated blade. Dr. Garrison further
testified that wound number 1 did not contain any irregular cuts, which would be
expected if wound number 1 was inflicted by a knife with a non-serrated blade.
From the testimony of these two witnesses, taken together, a reasonable jury
could conclude that wound number 1, which was a potentially fatal wound, was
inflicted by a knife with a non-serrated blade. Therefore, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that two knives were used during the attack on Stoddart,
and that both knives inflicted wounds that could have caused Stoddat1's death.
[Footnote 5 deleted by the Court]
Adamcik's friend, Joe Lucero, testified that he bought four knives for Adamcik
and Draper. Lucero said that he used $45 to pay for the knives-$40 from Draper
and $5 from Adamcik. Lucero identified four of the State's exhibits as the knives
he bought. One of the knives had a serrated blade; the other three knives were
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non-sctTated. Police found all four knives at the BRC site. Lucero testified that
Draper made a point to claim ownership of the serrated knife.
The jury was presented with evidence that two knives inflicted potentially fatal
wounds, and that Adamcik and Draper collaborated in the murder. This
collaboration is supported by the BRC tape wherein Draper and Adamcik discuss
their joint plan to kill Stoddart. The jury was also provided with evidence
suggesting that Adamcik and Draper were together immediately after Stoddart's
murder, and jointly attempted to hide weapons and clothing used during the
commission of the murder. The jury watched the video of police interviewing
Adamcik, during which Adamcik made verbal and nonverbal assertions that can
reasonably be construed as his confessing to stabbing Stoddart. This evidence,
coupled with the testimony provided by the State's experts, is sufficient for a
reasonable jury to conclude that: (1) two knives were used to murder Stoddart; (2)
both knives inflicted potentially fatal wounds; (3) Draper favored the knife with
the serrated blade which inflicted most of the potentially fatal wounds; and (4) the
other knife was used by Adamcik to inflict the other stab wound that injured
Stoddart's vital structures and which had the potential to be fatal. No evidence
was introduced that would contradict such conclusions.
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460-63, 272 P.3d 417, 432-35 (2012).

In order for Adamcik to survive summary dismissal on this issue, he would be required to
establish "'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694. The Strickland
Court provides further guidance when it states that "a reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id
This Court cannot say that even if Adamcik's defense team had put on evidence of
Draper's bad acts and/or evidence of Adamcik's good character, that there is a reasonable
likelihood that such evidence would have tipped the balance in Adamcik's favor and resulted in
the jury disregarding the evidence outlined in the Supreme Court's recitation of evidence
supporting the verdict and resulted in the jury finding him not guilty of the first-degree murder of
Stoddart.

To reach such a conclusion one would be required to reso1t to speculation and

co1\jecture. In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792, 178 L.Ed.2d. 624 (2011)
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the United States Supreme Court noted that "the likelihood of a different result must be
substantial, not just conceivable." As noted in Rhodes "[W]here the evidentiary facts are not
disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is
appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the couit alone will be
responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences." 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P .3d at
1069. In light of the evidence which is in the record on summary dismissal and which was
considered by the jury in the underlying proceeding, this Cou1t will not speculate and in this
Court's mind reach the unreasonable inference that the jury's collective judgment and wisdom
would have been changed by the introduction of this character evidence.
Therefore, the Court concludes that no genuine issue of fact has been established by
Adamcik as it relates to the second Strickland prong, prejudice. As such, the Court will GRANT
the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to that portion of Adamcik's third cause
of action for ineffective assistance of counsel relative to Adamcik's claim that his defense team
failed to move to suppress evidence of~'kiddie porn" photographs.

ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AT TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND IDAHO
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 UNDER STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON,
466 U.S. 688 (1984), BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO MOVE TO
EXCLUDE TOREY'S INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
4.

In his fourth claim, Adamcik argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because his defense team failed to move to exclude Adamcik's invocation of the right to counsel
in a video that was presented to the jury during the course his trial.

See P.C.R. Petition, pp. 34-

35.
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A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard
The same standard of review is applicable with respect to this cause of action as Adamcik's
second cause of action.

Therefore, the Court will not repeat the standard, but refers and

incorporates the standard outlined in section 2.A. of this MD&O.

B. STANDARD ON INVOCATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In general, the State may not comment upon or present evidence at trial of a defendanfs
decision to exercise his right to remain silent or to be represented by counsel. See Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (Doyle)2 3 and Griffith v. California, 380 U.S.
609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (Griffith). 24 These protections are rooted in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

C. DISCUSSION
There is really no dispute that Adamcik's defense team did not bring such a motion on
Adamcik's behalf. Aaron Thompson, one of Adamcik's defense counsel, acknowledges this fact
in his deposition when the following dialogue occurs:

Q.
Okay. Did you file a motion to suppress the actual invocation of the right
to counsel under Doyle versus Arizona? 1 mean Doyle versus Ohio?
A.

No.

Q.

Or Griffith versus California?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay. And did you have a reason not to do that?

11
·

Doyle stands for the proposition that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state prosecutor
seeks to impeach a defondant's exculpatory story or statements which are told for the lirst time at trial, by cross-examining the
defendant about the defendant's post-arrest silence aller receiving Miranda warnings.
1
4cJr{/Jlth stands for the proposition that the Fillh and Fourteenth Amendments forbid prosecutorial comment on the accused's
silence or failure to testify.
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A.
I believe -- and this is all on me. I was the one making the decision with
regard to how to approach the suppression.

I was so focused on the two aspects. I was focused on one, that there was
invocation by Shannon and Sean that should have been respected and I felt like
was completely disrespected. And the post-invocation, functional equivalent of
counseling that the Doyle argument \Vas not made.
Q.

Okay.

A.

That would be my fault.

Deposition Aaron Thompson, p. 75, LL. 8-25, p. 76, L.l.
Therefore; there is not any significant dispute concerning whether the Adamcik defense
team's performance was deficient with respect to the so called Doyle Argument.

As Mr.

Thompson related, he was so focused on the suppression issue regarding the September 27, 2006
intenogation that he neglected to make the Doyle Argument.
The Com1 would note that this issue was not raised by Adamcik on direct appeal to the
Idaho Supreme Court. The Court assumes that the reason this was not raised on direct appeal is
that appellate counsel concluded that because the issue had not been raised at the trial level, it
had not been preserved for appeal.

As discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Fulminantc, 499 U.S.
279, 306-07, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (Fulminante), had this matter been
raised or addressed on direct appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court the standard would be a
"ham1less error" standard:
Since this Court's landmark decision in Chapman v. Califim1ia, 386 U.S. 18, 87
S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( 1967), in which we adopted the general rule that a
constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction, the
Court has applied harmless-error analysis to a wide range of errors and has
recognized that most constitutional errors can be harmless. See, e.g., Clemons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752-754, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1450-1451, 108 L.Ed.2d
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725 ( 1990) (unconstitutionally overbroad jury instructions at the sentencing stage
of a capital case); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 lJ.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100
L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (admission of evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital
case in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Carella v.
California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) jury
instruction containing an enoneous conclusive presumption); Pope v. Illinois, 481
U.S. 497, 501-504, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-1923, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) Gury
instruction misstating an element of the offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 ( 1986) (jury instruction containing an erroneous
rebuttable presumption); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691, 106 S.Ct. 2142,
2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (erroneous exclusion of defendant's testimony
regarding the circumstances of his confession); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (restriction on a defendant's
right to cross-examine a witness for bias in violation of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Ciause);Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-118, and n. 2, 104
S.Ct 453, 454-455, and n. 2, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (denial of a defendant's right
to be present at trial); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76
L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (improper comment on defendant's silence at trial, in
violation of the J;'ifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); Hopper v.
Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982) (statute improperly
forbidding trial court's giving a jury instruction on a lesser jncluded offense in a
capital case in violation of the Due Process Clause); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441
U.S. 786, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979) (failure to instruct the jury on the
presumption of innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232, 98 S.Ct. 458,
466, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (admission of identification evidence in violation of
the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223,
231-232, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1570-1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973)(admission of the outof-comt statement of a nontestifying codefendant in violation of the Sixth
Amendment Counsel Clause); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174,
33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (confession obtained in violation of Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964)); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981-1982, 26 L.Ed.2d 419
( 1970) (admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 20032004, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970)(denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing m
violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause).
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[Bold Emphasis Added by Court]. The United States Supreme Court goes on to discuss the use
of the harmless-error standard in the situation cited above. It states as follows:
The common thread connecting these cases is that each involved "trial error" error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which
may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. In applying han11less-error analysis to these many different
constitutional violations, the Court has been faithful to the belief that the
harmless-error doctrine is essential to preserve the "principle that the central
purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt
or innocence, and promotes public respect for the process by focusing on the
underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of
immaterial error." Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S., at 681, 107 S.Ct., at 1436
(citations omitted).

Id. 499 U.S., at 308, 111 S.Ct. 1264.
However, because this issue is raised on post-conviction relief rather than by way of a
direct appeal, the applicable standard for this Court's analysis is the second prong of the
Strickland standard and not the harmless-error standard outlined in Fulminante. As has been

discussed above with respect to Adamcik's other ineffective assistance of counsel claims
Strickland's second prong requires a showing of prejudice which requires that Adamcik establish

that "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been differene' Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694.
In applying the facts and circumstance before the Court on summary dismissal, the Court
concludes that Adamcik's defense team failed to raise the "Doyle Argument" and that said
failure was deficient and had this motion been raised, at the trial comi level, it likely would have
been successful. 25 Therefore, the Court must consider whether this deficiency on the part of the

2

;Further, the Court also concludes that had the issue been raised at the trial court level and denied by Judge McDermott, this
Court believes that such a ruling would likely have been deemed to be a trial court error by the Idaho Supreme Court under Doyle
and Griffith and their progeny. However, the Court also concludes that the Supreme Court would have determined that this
hypothetical trial court error was harmless-error on a direct appeal.
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Adamcik defense team meets the second prong of Strickland standard. In order to address this
issue, the Courl must address the circumstances surrounding Adamcik 's invocation of counsel.
The evidence in the record on summary dismissal reflects that Stoddart was murdered on
September 22, 2006. Adamcik was first interviewed by Jaw enforcement on September 24,
2006. Adamcik denied "that either he or Brian Draper was involved with Ms. Sloddart's death."
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Suppress Videotaped Interview of Torey
Adamcik, p. 2. On September 27, 2006, a second Adamcik interview was conducted by law
enforcement. This interview was conducted following three (3) separate interviews with Draper
and other investigative efforts of law enforcement.

During the course of these three (3)

interviews, Draper eventually advised that Adamcik had stabbed Stoddait, denying that he had
been involved in the actual stabbing himself. He further led law enforcement to a location in
Black Rock Canyon to locate various items taken to that location by himself and Adamcik.
Prior to the September 27, 2006 interview with law enforcement, Adamcik and his
parents met with counsel.

However, counsel did not accompany them to the interview.

Although it appears counsel was paid an initial fee for this consultation, it does not appear that
counsel was retained to represent Adamcik's interest beyond that initial consultation. lt appears
that there was a factual dispute between law enforcement and Adamcik's parents concerning
circumstances arising immediately prior to the September 27, 2006 interview. Adamcik argued
that his mother invoked his right to counsel before this interview and that this invocation was
disregarded and ignored by law enforcement. Law enforcement disagrees and contends that the
interviews were conducted appropriately under the law. The trial court concluded pursuant to
Adamcik's Motion to Suppress Videotaped interview of Torey Adamcik that: (l) law
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enforcement and Adamcik's parents discussed having counsel present for the interview; (2) if
Adamcik's mother had in fact invoked Adamcik's right to counsel, that invocation had been
waived "once they agreed to go forward with the interview, under the condition that they could
stop the interview at any time"; and (3) Detectives Ganske, Thomas and Marchand did not
coerce [Adamcik's parents] into agreeing to go forward with the interview by threatening them
with Torey's possible detention." Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Suppress
Videotaped Interview of Torey Adamcik, p. 38,

-ii, 1-3.

26

Ultimately an interview was conducted at the Pocatello Police Station. Adamcik and his
parents were present. 27 This first portion of this interview continued for over an hour and
nineteen minutes when Adamcik requested that he be allowed to "talk to with an attorney." See
Trial Exhibit 12. At this time, the detective primarily in charge of the interview, Detective
Ganske, advises "we can do that." Id. Adamcik's father then inquires "can you talk to me" and
Adamcik responds "probably, ya."

Id.

Adamcik's father then inquires of the detectives

concerning whether he can "have a minute with him [referring to AdamcikV' The detective
responds "sure'' and arrangements are made for a private room to allow this conversation
between father and son to take place. Id. 28
After the private conversation with Adamcik and his father, the videotape of the
interview resumes again. Once Adamcik and his father have come back into the interview room,
Adamcik's father has a brief discussion with the detectives concerning his wife's return. He then

26

Thc issues raised by Adamcik through his defense team in the Motion to Suppress Videotaped Interview or Torey Adamcik are
not before this Court in this post-conviction relief proceeding.
27
t\damclk's mother did leave during the course of this interview to pick up her son from a football game.
ixlt should be noted that the entirety of this interview up to and including the request by Adamcik to "talk to with an attorney"
was ruled by the trial court to be admissible and played to the jury. See trial court's ruling as contained in its Memorandum
Decision and Order on Motion to Suppress Videotaped Interview of Torey Adamcik. Again, this issue is not before the Court on
post-conviction relief except as it relates to the Doyle component.
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has a brief exchange with Adamcik before the detectives return to the interview room. The
detectives then return to the room and a few comments are made. At this time, the following
dialogue takes place:
Sean Adamcik: He just um - based upon what the lawyer said- he's just worried
about telling you guys anything ...
Detective Ganske: Well here's the deal. ..
Detective Thomas: (Interrupting Detective Ganske and Sean): Dad, I think we
owe it to you at this point to find out what we know at this point. There's just no
easy way to tell you this. We do know that Sean [Detective Ganske corrects
supplying the name "Torey"] or excuse me Torey and, um [Detective Thomas
supplies the name "Brian"] Brian have gone back in the house, okay, we do know
that the two of them murdered, we do know that they murdered Cassie. Okay?
We've got the evidence at this point to prove that [Detective Ganske makes a
statement that the Court can't quite hear]. We also have some overwhelming
evidence - uh trace evidence, that type of stuff that's going to prove that they did
it as well. It's not just hearsay. It's not just somebody saying it. And then we do
have a confession from another person giving full disclosure.
Sean: (directed to Adamcik) So is that why you want a lawyer?
Detective Ganske: (speaking to Sean) And here's the deal and here's the deal with
you. What I would like to do is maybe when your wife comes back sit down and
talk with you all and get you up to speed.
Detective Ganske: (speaking to Adamcik) You know what you need to do. You
know exactly what happened and you know what you need to do. So
unfortunately, you're not going anywhere tonight. You're going to be placed in
custody tonight. Okay? Um - I'm sorry that's the way it goes, but ...
Detective Thomas: You are going to be charged with First Degree Murder.
Detective Ganske: Okay? But like I said before, before you say anything, I
encourage you to talk to an attomey. You should do that. I am not pulling any
punches here, still, your - your full cooperation can do nothing but help you at
this point in time.
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Sean: Do you understand that Torey? You know you need a lawyer or whatever
- you want to talk to a lawyer -- I understand that's the advice they gave you
today, and then whatever you and the lawyer work out. They want you to
cooperate ...
Detective Ganske: (speaking to Adamcik) We know the details. We got the knife
that you used, we got the mask that you used, we've got the videotape. We've got
it. There's a tape up in there that you buried. Okay? You tried to catch it on fire.
All that stuff. You know what I'm talking about, I don't need to tell you that.
Sean: This is right, Torey ...
Adamcik: Yeah.
Sean: What they are saying is true?
Adamcik: nods in the affirmative.
Trial Exhibit 12.29
It is important when considering the second or prejudice prong of the Strickland standard
that Adamcik's defense team requested that the trial court suppress the entire Adamcik interview
of September 27, 2006 on the basis that his mother had initially invoked Adamcik's right to
counsel on his behalf, well before he invoked his right to counsel. The trial cout1 denied this
motion and this matter is not before the Court on summary dismissal.
The issue before the Court is Adamcik's defense team's failure to seek the suppression of
the invocation of his right to counsel. In considering this failure on the record before the Court,

it cannot be said that this failure was prejudicial as that term has been defined and applied under
the Strickland test. Certainly there is no quantitative measurement for prejudice. However, as
the Court compares the damage done to Adamcik's defense, utilizing an analogy to earthquakes,
NThe quoted version of this dialogue as used in this MD&O was prepared by the Court upon viewing and listening to Trial
Exhibit 12 and also milizing the transcribed portion of this interview as contained in the trial court's Memorandum Decision and
Order. pp. 30·3 l.
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the dialogue between the detectives and Adamcik's father in which Sean Adamcik asked
Adamcik if the detective's recitation of the evidence was true to which Adamcik both replies
"yes" and nods in the affirmative registers a 9 plus earthquake on the Richter Scale and the
invocation of the right to counsel, the tremor that precedes the 9 plus earthquake, registers a 2 on
the Richter Scale. Any inference of guilt the jury may have drawn from the State's introduction
of Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel is far outweighed by the inferences created from
Adamcik's responses to his own father's queries, both of which were expressly ruled upon by the
trial comt to be admissible and are not the subject of collateral attack in this post-conviction
relief proceeding. Any prejudice flowing from this invocation is diluted even further in light of
the evidence outlined by the Idaho Supreme Court in Adamcik's direct appeal supporting the
jury's verdict in this matter. Supra., pp. 25-27. The Court cannot conclude that the exclusion of
Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel would have created "a reasonable probability that
... the result of the proceedings would have been different" nor does it "undermine the [Court's]
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694. 30
Therefore, despite the fact that the trial team was deficient in its perfom1ance in failing to
identify and raise the Doyle issue with the trial court, this Court concludes that the prejudice
prong of the Strickland standard has not been met by Adamcik. He has failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary dismissal on this cause of action. As such
30
The Court recognizes that at the summary dismissal stage of a post-conviction relief proceeding. the Court is to apply the same
standard applicable in a summary judgment proceeding under LR.C.P. 56. This standard requires that the Court construe the
evidence in a light most reasonable to the non-moving party. As it relates to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, the non·
moving party is Adamcik. This standard similarly provides that all "reasonable inferences" must be construed in favor of the
non-moving party. However. the Court again relies upon the language in Rhodes "(w]hcrc the cvidcntiary facts are not disputed
and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences." 148 Idaho
at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069. This Court will make the inference and concludes that to do so would be umeasonable that defense
counsel's failure to raise and suppress the Doyle issue amounted to prejudice as that term has been utilized in Strickland in light
of the much stronger inferences lo be drnwn from Adamdk's responses to his father's queries and the substantial evidence
introduced at trial of his guilt.
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the Court will DISMISS Adamcik's Fourth Cause of Action and GRANT the State's Motion for
Summary Dismissal alleging ineffective assistance of Adamcik's defense team, on the basis that
Adamcik has not raised a genuine issue of fact demonstrating a reasonable probability that the
result of his jury trial and the subsequent guilty verdict would have been different had this issue
successfully been raised at trial.

ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AT TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND IDAHO
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 UNDER STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON,
466 U.S. 688 (1984), BECAUSE THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ALL THE ABOVE
INSTANCES OF DEFECIENT PERFORMANCE PREJUDICIED HIM.
5.

Adamcik's fifth cause of action alleges an ineffective assistance of counsel cause of
action premised upon the argument that although any one (1) of the above referenced claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel may not have resulted in satisfying the prejudice prong of

Strickland, the cumulative effect of the foregoing alleged multiple instances of ineffective
assistance counsel, do satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.

Adamcik's ineffective

assistance causes of action as asserted in his P.C.R. Petition are as follows: ( 1) Second Cause of
Action - Failure to Obtain the Murder Weapons for Testing by Defense Expert; (2) Third Cause
of Action - Failure to Move to Suppress Evidence, a Notebook and Photographs of "Kiddie
Porn"; and (3) Fourth Cause of Action - Failure to Move to Suppress Adamcik's invocation of
his right to counsel during the September 27, 2006 interview.
The Court has ruled that Adamcik is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on whether his
defense team's failure to request, either through pre-trial discovery and/or motion practice, the
actual knives introduced into evidence was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland
standard, as well as the prejudice prong of Strickland. The Court has likewise ruled that there is
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a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Adamcik's defense team was deficient in failing to
move to suppress the prosecution's use of the "Kiddie Porn" photographs.31 Finally, the Court
has also ruled that Adamcik's defense team was deficient in failing to file a motion to suppress
Adamcik's invocation of the right to counsel, the so~called Doyle issue. 32
Because the Court has ruled that there is a genuine issue of material fact on whether
Adamcik's defense team was deficient on cause of action two, and because the Court has ruled
that Adamcik's defense team was deficient on portions of cause of action three and cause of
action four, the Court must DENY both patties' motions for summary dismissal on cause of
action five. The Court must wait and conduct an cvidentiary hearing to review the evidence in
suppo11 of these three (3) claimed deficiencies and whether the combined cumulative effect of
the deficiencies in order determine if the cumulative effect of two (2) or more of these
deficiencies gives rise to "a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceedings would
have been different" thereby "undermin[ing] the [Court's] confidence in the outcome."
Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694.
Therefore, each party's request for summary dismissal of cause of action number five of
Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition is hereby DENIED, and this cause of action ,.vill proceed to
evidentiary hearing.

31

Although the Court granted the State summary dismissal on this cause of action on the basis that there was no genuine issue of
fact that would allow this matter to proceed to an evidentiary hearing as it related to the prejudice prong of the Strickland
standard.
32
Again. the Court granted summary dismissal on this cause of action on the basis that there was no genuine issue of fact that
would allow this matter to proceed to an cvidentimy hearing as it related to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard.
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6.
ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AT TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND IDAHO
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 UNDER STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON,
466 U.S. 688 (1984), BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL :FAILED TO COMMUNICATE A
FAVORABLE PLEA OFFER TO HIM.
In his sixth cause of action, Adamcik argues that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel because his counsel failed to communicate a favorable plea offer to him. The State seeks
summary dismissal of this claim. Adamcik, in turn, concedes that this cause of action is not ripe
for summary dismissal, but asserts that due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact,
this matter should proceed to an evidentiary hearing. The Court agrees with Adamcik that this
claim must proceed to an evidentiary hearing because of the existence of disputed issues of
material fact.
Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition is verified.

In Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition, he asserts as

follnws:
107. Sometime after February 14[, 2007] and before and the start of the Brian
Draper trial [April, 2007]. the state made a plea offer to Torey that it would
withdraw the request for fixed life and recommended a fixed sentence of 30 years
in exchange for Torey pleading guilty to the charges.
108. Defense counsel never informed Torey or his parents of this offer.
109. Torey would have accepted this plea offer had he known about it.
P.C.R. Petition, p. 36, 1~[107-10. 33 In addition Adamcik, in response to the States Motion for
Summary Dismissal on this cause of action, also filed the Heideman Affidavit and Pearson
Affidavit (both asserting that the State made an offer to Adamcik's defense team of "life with 30
years fixed in exchange for a guilty plea to the murder charges") along with the Sean Adamcik

33

As noted earlier in this MD&O, "a verified complaint has the force. and effect of an affidavit in suppot1 of a motion for
summary judgment so long as it conforms to the requirements of Rule 56(e)." Drennan, 145 Idaho at 603, 181 P.3d 524, 529,
footnote 3.
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Affidavit and the Sha1mon Adamcik Affidavit (both asserting that the State's offer was never
communicated to them).
Despite the State's protestations to the contrary, these claims, while in direct
contradictions to the assertions of Mr. Rammell, as outlined in his deposition, do create genuine
issues of material fact and when construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Adamcik,
must be accepted as true at the summary dismissal stage of the proceedings.
In Missouri v. Frye,_ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (Frye),
the United States Supreme Court clearly establishes that "defense counsel has the duty to
communicate fonnal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that
may be favorable to the accused."

The United States Supreme Court then articulates the

prejudice prong of the Strickland test in the context of a failure to communicate a formal offer
from the prosecution in the following tenns:

To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where a plea offer has
lapsed or been rejected because of counsel's deficient performance, defendants
must demonstrate a reasonable probability they would have accepted the earlier
plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance of counsel. Defendants must
also demonstrate a reasonable probability the plea would have been entered
without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they
bad the authority to exercise that discretion under state law. To establish prejudice
in this instance, it is necessary to show a reasonable probability that the end result
of the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a
lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time. Cf. Glover v. United States, 531
U.S. 198, 203, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001) ("[A]ny amount of
[additional] jail time has Sixth Amendment significance").
132 S.Ct. at p.1409.
Based upon the conflicting affidavits in the record on summary disposition, the Comt will

GRANT Adamcik an evidentiary hearing, and DENY the State's Motion for Summary
Dismissal relative to both prongs of the Strickland test, as it relates to his claim that his defense
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team failed to appropriately advise him and his family of a formal plea offer made by the State,
and whether the failure of the defense team in communicating this formal offer of a life with a
fixed thirty (30) year term, was prejudicial under the analysis outlined in Flye.

ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION
IN HIS FAVOR BECAUSE THE FIXED LIFE SENTENCE IMPOSED
PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY VIOLATED THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
AND ARTICLE 1, §6 PROTECTIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENTS UNDER MILLER v. ALABAMA,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)
7.

It is the desire of the Court to issue this MD&O despite the fact that the Court continues
to consider further Adamcik's argument arising out of Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S. _ , 132
S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (Afiller). The Court continues to evaluate Miller, the cases and rationale upon
which Miller relies in relationship to the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling on Adamcik's direct
appeal.

However, because of the necessity of an evidentiary hearing on the other causes of

action as outlined above and an impending trial date in April, 2015 on those issues, the Court
desires to provide the parties with as much advance notice on those issues as possible. It is for
this reason that the Comi will bifurcate this MD&O and will issue its decision on Adamcik's
seventh cause of action shortly in separate Memorandum Decision and Order.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: ( 1) the State's Motion for
Summary Dismissal as it relates to Adamcik's First Cause of Action as outlined in his P.C.R.
Petition is GRANTED; (2) the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to Adamcik's
Second Cause of Action is DENIED; 34 similarly, Adamcik's Motion for Summary Disposition
on this cause of action is also DENIED; (3) the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it
relates to Adamcik's Third Cause of Action is GRANTED in part (failure to move to suppress
34

The Court did GRANT the State Summary Dismissal on a small portion of this claim. sec supra. at footnote 6.
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notebook) and DENIED in part (failure to move to suppress "Kiddie Porn" photographs and
resultant prejudice, if any), Adamcik's Motion for Summary Disposition is DENIED; (4) the

State's Motion for Summary Dismissal as it relates to Adamcik's Fourth Cause of Action is

DENIED, Adamcik's Motion for Summary Disposition as to deficient performance is
GRANTED and as to the prejudice is DENIED; (5) the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal
of Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action is DENIED, Adamcik's Motion for Summary Disposition is
likewise DENIED; and (6) the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on Adamcik's Sixth
Cause of Action is DENIED.
This matter will proceed to an evidentiary hearing on those issues and claims surviving
summary disposition as presently scheduled on April 21 through April 23, 2015.
Dated this 14111 day of January, 2015.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge
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STATE OF IDAHO,
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)
)
)
)

Case No.

CV-2013-3682 -

pc_

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on July 21 and 22 of 2015. The bench
trial addressed a number of Petitioner's, Torey Adamcik ("Adamcik"), claims for postconviction relief raised in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("P.C.R. Petition"). Adamcik
was represented at the evidentiary hearing by counsel, Dennis A. Benjamin and Deborah
Whipple. The State ofldaho ("State") was represented by counsel, Ian N. Service.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, and following discussion with counsel, it was
detem1ined that the Court would require that a transcript of this bench trial be prepared prior to posttrial briefing. The Court outlined a post-trial briefing schedule to be followed by the parties once
the transcript had been completed and provided to the Court and parties. The order required that the
parties submit their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law along with closing arguments
in separate submissions to the Court. The Comt's order outlined the timing associated with the
various posHrial submissions. See Order and Briefing Schedule. The pm.ties complied with the
Court's briefing schedule by submitting the requested post-trial submissions. Upon the filing of the
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parties; post-trial submissions, the Court took the matter under advisement. The Court now enters
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order ("F.F.C.L. &
M.D.O") as required by Rule 52(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("l.R.C.P.,') and Idaho
Code ("LC.") § 19A907(a).

BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Adamcik's P .C.R. Petition arises out of the underlying criminal proceedings in Bannock
County Case CR-2006-17984. In this proceeding, Adamcik was charged with and convicted by
a jury, of committing the first-degree murder of Cassie Jo Stoddart ("Stoddart"). Adamcik was
also convicted of conspiring with co-defendant, Brian Draper (Draper), to commit the firstdegree murder of Stoddart. At sentencing, Adamcik was sentenced to a thirty (30) year fixed
sentence and an indeten11inate life sentence for the conspiracy to commit the first-degree murder
charge and a fixed life sentence for the first-degree murder conviction of Stoddait. Adamcik
filed a motion seeking a reduction of his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("I.C.R.").
This motion was denied after hearing by the trial coutt. Adamcik then filed an appeal. In State

v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 458-59, 272 P.3d 417, 486-87 (2012) ("Adamcik"), the Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed Adamcik's conviction and sentence.

Adamcik filed a Petition for

Rehearing. The Idaho Supreme Cou11 denied the relief sought in Adamcik's Petition for
Rehearing. Adamcik then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari was denied. State v. Adamcik, 133 S. Ct. 141, 184 L.
Ed. 2d 68 (2012).
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Adamcik filed his P.C.R. Petition in September, 2013. His P.C.R. Petition outlines seven
(7) separate claims upon which he requested post-conviction relief. 1 The parties filed cross
motions for summary disposition pursuant to LC. §49-4906(c).
After considering the parties' submissions in support of and in opposition to the various
motions for summary disposition, the Couii issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on
Adamcik's Motion for Paiiial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for Summary
Dismissal. In doing so, the Court granted summary dismissal in favor of the State on a number
of Adamcik's claims for post-conviction relief.

See Memorandum Decision and Order on

Adamcik's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for Summary
Dismissal.
At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court also denied po1iions of
the parties' cross motions for summary disposition, concluding that there were triable issues of
material fact. The claims that the Court ordered would proceed to trial were as follows: (I)
Adamcik's ''SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Torey was Denied Effective Assistance of
Counsel at Trial in Violation of the 61h Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 13
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because Counsel Failed to get Important
Expert Testimony before the Jury in part because they Failed to Obtain the Murder Weapons for
Testing by the Defense Expert"; (2) "FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Torey was Denied
Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial in Violation of the Sixth Amendment and Idaho
Constitution Article I, Section 13 under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because

1
At Adamcik's request, the Court took judicial notice of the trial transcript in Stale v. Torey Adamcik, Bannock County Case CR~
2006-17984. This included the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the "files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and other records
in that case." See Order Taking Judicial Notice. As such, the Court reserves the right to refer to and rely upon the same in these
F.F.C.L. & M.D.O.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POSTCONVICTION RELIEF -3
642 of742

the Cumulative Effect of all the above Instances of Deficient Performance Pr~judiced him"; 2 and

(3) "SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Torey was Denied Effective Assistance Counsel at Trial in
Violation of the Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article l, Section 13 under Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because Trial Counsel failed to Communicate a Favorable
Plea Offer to him."
FINDINGS OF FACT

To the extent that any of the Court's Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of
Law, they are hereby incorporated into the Court's Conclusions of Law.
1. When Adamcik was sixteen (16) years of age he was arrested and charged with the
crimes of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
2.

Shortly after Adamcik's arrest, Adamcik's family retained the law finn of May,

Rammell and Thompson, Chartered to represent his interest in these criminal proceedings.
Adamcik was represented at trial and at all stages of the pretrial proceedings by this law firm.
Adamcik's defense at trial was primarily handled by attorneys, Gregory C. May ("May"), Bron
M. Rammell {"Rammell") and Aaron N. Thompson CThompson") (referred to collectively as
"Defense Team").
3. In Bannock County Case Number CR-2006-17984, Adamcik was convicted by a jury
of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
4.

Following Adamcik's conviction, the Honorable Peter D. McDermott sentenced

2

Although the Corni granted the State's request for summary disposition relative to Adamcik's Third Cause of Action and Fourth
Cause of Action, the basis for doing so was that the evidence did not establish prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 280 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ("Strickland"). However, with respect to both Adamcik's
Third Cause of Action and his Fourth Cause of Action, the Court <lid determine that there were genuine issues of material fact
concerning deficient performance on the part of the Adamcik Defense Team, the first Strickland prong. As a result, at the
cvidentiary hearing, the Court did allow Adamcik to put on proof of deficient performance relative to Cause of Action Two
(which the Court denied at summary dismissal), Cause of Action Three (which the Court granted summary dismissal on with
respect to the prejudice prong), and Cause of Action Four (which the Court granted summary dismissal on with respect to the
prejudice prong), for the purpose of attempting to establish that the cumulative effect of the deficient conduct of the Defense
Team amounted to prejudice under the second S1r/ckla11d prong.
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Adamcik to a thit1y (30) year fixed sentence and an indeterminate life sentence for conspiracy to
commit first-degree murder and a fixed life sentence for the first-degree murder of Stoddart.
Adamcik's Second Cause of Action

5. Adamcik's Second Cause of Action asse11s an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
on the basis that Adamcik's Defense Team's conduct at trial was deficient under the first

Strickland prong.

The basis for this claim was that Adamcik's Defense Team failed to get

important defense testimony before the jury.

The focus of this claim surrounds the expert

testimony of Rudolph Reit ("Reif').
6. At trial, the State called Dr. Charles 0. Garrison, M.D. ("Dr. Garrison"), a forensic
pathologist, to testify.

Dr. Garrison, upon direct examination, testified that stab wounds to

Stoddart's body were caused by at least two (2) separate knives. Trial Transcript (Tr. App.), p.
2223, L. 23. In regard to Dr. Garrison's testimony that there were at least two (2) separate
knives, he testified as follows:
A. It is my opinion that there were at least two knives used, one of which was a
nonscrrated blade and one of which was a serrated blade.
Tr. App., p. 2225, LL. 16-19. Dr. Garrison presented a slide show depicting the various wounds
to Stoddart's body. In doing so, he demonstrated to the jury both wounds that he contends were
inflicted by a knife with a serrated blade and other wounds, including Wound # 1, which he
testified were caused by a non-serrated knife. Tr. App, pp. 2205-27. Dr. Garrison's slide show
demonstrated the distinct characteristics of wounds caused by the two (2) knives and the
distinctions between the wounds that would be caused by the two (2) knives. Id.
7. Adamcik's Defense Team retained Dr. Edward Leis, M.D. ("Dr. Leisn}, a forensic
pathologist, to testify at Adamcik's trial. Dr. Leis' testimony contradicted the testimony of Dr.
Garrison. Dr. Leis testified that Wound# l, which was one (1) of the potentially fatal wounds
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according to the testimony of Dr. Steven Skoumal ("Dr. Skoumal"), was caused by a knife with a
serrated blade. Tr. App., pp. 2610-15. This testimony contradicted Dr. Garrison's testimony that
at least two (2) knives had been used in the attack and supported Adamcik's theory that only one
(1) knife was used and that Draper was the individual wielding that one (1) knife. 3

8.

Reit was retained by Adamcik's Defense Team to provide forensic testimony

concerning the knives admitted into evidence and purpo1ted to be the murder weapons. More to
the point, Reit was being asked to testify concerning experiments he had conducted with
exemplar knives. Specifically, his testimony was intended to establish that the exemplar knives
"would make different marks on a body.n P.C.R. Petition, p. 14,

,r 50.

The intended purpose

behind Reit's testimony was to corroborate and bolster the testimony of Dr. Leis, the forensic
pathologist hired by Adamcik's Defense Team. The purpose of the "knife experiment testimony
was to show that Wound# l was caused by the serrated blade knife." Id.
9.

During Reit's trial testimony, the State objected to Adamcik's Defense Team's

attempt to introduce Exhibits demonstrating Reit's testimony and the results of his testing.
These exhibits were Reit's work product associated with his experiments \Vith the exemplar
knives. The apparent basis for the State's objection was relevance and foundation. 4

10. During the course of the argument concerning the admission of Reit's testimony and
proposed exhibits, much of which occurred in front of the jury, counsel for the parties'
arguments became heated. Adamcik's counsel, Rammell, argued that the Defense Team did "ask
about the testing of the knives and were told that that would not be possible because of the
unique characteristics or whatever of the knives." Tr. App., p. 2526, L. 25, p. 2527, LL. 1-5.
3

Dr. Garrison's opinion regarding at least two (2) knives being used in the attack <>n Stoddart was in large part based upon his
conclusion that Wound# l was caused by a knife with a non-serrated blade.
4
Although the State never actually articulated the legal basis as being foundation, the argument surrounding the objection is most
suggestive of Jack of foundation. The State essentially argued that since tests were performed by exemplar knives, rather than the
actual knives, both the tests and the opinions derived from such tests are no! reliable and should not be admissible. See Tr. App.,
p. 2524, LL 8-19.
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Therefore, Adamcik's Defense Team argued that they were required to use exemplar knives.
11.

Counsel for the State, Mark L. Heideman ("Heideman") aggressively disputed

Rammell's contention in this regard. Heideman asse1ted that the State had "given them full
access to all the evidence." Heideman ultimately stated that "for Mr. Rammell to stand here now
and say the prosecutors or the police prohibited them [Adamcik's Defense Team] from using
those knives, that's - that's a lie. That is not true." Tr. App. p. 2528, LL. 1o~ 13.
12. Reit was not allowed to testify at trial concerning his knife experiments and the
conclusions drawn from those experiments. Additionally, the exhibits that were the product of
his work product were refused admission into evidence. The trial court sustained the State's
objection and concluded as follows:
THE COURT: All right Mr. Rammell, this is a court of law and articles being
similar to one in evidence and tests being done on an article similar to one in
evidence is not sufficient.
The items in evidence could have been released for testing to your witness, as
some were, but -- not going to allow this fellow to testify to -- testify on tests run
on knives he thinks are similar to one.
Just not going to allow it, so we can shorten this up right now. These will not be
admitted, and I'm not going to allow him to give opinions on them. I don't think
this is something the jury -- it could mislead them, I don't think it's proper. He
hasn't been proven to be an expert in this field.
Also, he has not used the items in evidence for his testing. So on two grounds he
should not be allowed to give an opinion -- confuse and mislead the jury, and I
don't think it would be proper.
So, we might as well end this right now unless you got more to offer.
Mr. Rammell: Okay. Well, Your Honor, I think that the standard actually is
substantially similar. We looked at that and I appreciate -The Court: Mr. Rammell, this is a homicide case. If you wanted the witness to
examine evidence, you could have made a motion and it would have been
granted.
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He could have examined the items that we had, not talked about something that he
thinks -- I emphasize thinks is similar.

I mean, we're talking - we should be talking apples and apples here, but we're
talking about items that were found at Black Rock, and then you want - and then
he comes in and says, well, he went out and bought some that looked like. Well,
that's not good enough in my opinion. That's not good enough in a homicide case
like this.
Tr. App. p. 2524, LL. 20-25, p. 2525, LL 1-25, and p. 2526, LL. 1-13.

5

13. While making an offer of proof and outside the presence of the jury, it was later
established that Brian Cheney, a former associate with Adamcik's Defense Team's firm, had
discussed with Detective Ballard, the evidence custodian at the Bannock County Sheriff's Office,
Adamcik's Defense Team's desire to "take the knives with him" apparently for the purpose of
conducting tests. This request was denied with Detective Ballard advising Mr. Cheney that he
could not do so without a Cou1t Order. Tr. App., p. 2534, LL. 21-25, p. 2535, LL. 1-2.

14. It was further discussed, as part of the offer of proof hearing outside the presence of
the jury, that Mr. Cheney had a similar conversation with Vic A Pearson ("Pearson,,) of the
Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and second chair to Heideman at trial.

The

substance of this conversation was that Mr. Cheney had asked that the Defense Team be allowed
access to the knives for testing purposes. This request was rejected due to the approaching
Draper trial. Rammell argued that Mr. Cheney took this to mean that the Defense Team "could
never test the knives.'' Tr. App., p. 2535, LL. 14-25. Pearson asserted that such an assumption
was entirely unfounded. He argued that during his conversation with Mr. Cheney, "I never told
him he couldn't have the knives.n Tr. App. p. 2536, LL. 7-10. Pearson asserted that what he
told Mr. Cheney was "we were going to be using them for the Draper trial, and that if they

3

Again, like the State, Judge McDermott does not articulate the legal basis upon which he sustains the State's Objection, but a
review of his rationale as articulated above clearly demonstrates that it is based, in part, upon lack of foundation for the
testimony.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POST·
CONVICTION RELIEF ·8
647 of742

wanted to use them, he would have to petition the Court to get a Court Order to use them to test
them." Tr. App. p, 2536, LL. 12-15.

15. Adamcik asserts, as a basis for his P.C.R. Petition's Second Cause of Action, that the
Defense Team's performance was deficient under the first Strickland prong.

Specifically,

Adamcik argues that the Defense Team's failure to obtain the actual knives, either by stipulation
or court order, for testing, was deficient under the first Strickland prong.
16. Adamcik had Reit testify at the P.C.R. Petition evidentiary hearing. In advance of
this testimony, Adamcik obtained access to the actual knives pursuant to a stipulation with the
State and an order of the Court. Reit conducted testing with the knives in question and testified
at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing concerning the tests he had conducted and the

opinions he developed incident to the testing.
17.

Approximately two (2) to three (3) weeks in advance of trial, Reit performed some

tests with the knives at the sally port at the Bannock County Courthouse. The purpose of the
testing was to obtain some "exemplars to see if they were similar to what we saw in the photos of
the victim." Transcript of Post-Conviction Relief Evidentiary Hearing ("Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg.") p.

262, LL. 17-18. Reit used ''pig skin" to conduct his testing "since pig skin simulated human
skin." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 263, L. 13. In this case, Rcit testified that he used a "pork belly".
Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg, p. 263, LL. 15-16.
18. Reit used the two (2) knives admitted into evidence at Adamcik's trial, one (1) which
has been referred to as a knife with a serrated blade, referred to by Reit as the "Rambo Knife"
(Admitted into Evidence at trial as Exhibit 74-A) and the other which has been referred to as a
knife with a non-serrated blade, referred to by Reit as the "Tanto Knife". Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg. p.
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264, LL. 24-25, p. 265, LL. 1-3. 6
19.

During the course of Reit's testimony, eight (8) different photographs were

introduced into evidence reflecting eight (8) different "stabbing demonstrations." Exhibit "I"
reflects a "stabbing demonstration" utilizing the Tanto Knife "going all the way in." Tr. P.C.R.
Ev. Hrg., p. 270, LL. 22-25, p. 271, LL. 1-2. Exhibit "J'' "is a photograph of the Rambo knife
with a stab that went all the way to the hilt." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 271, LL. 16-17. Exhibit
"K" is a photograph reflecting a "stabbing demonstration" "from the tanto knife, and it's halfway
in rather than all the way in." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 273, LL. 16-17. Exhibit "L,, is a
photograph of a "stabbing demonstration" made by the Rambo Knife in the same manner as
Exhibit "K" "part way." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 273, L. 25, p. 274, LL. 1-2. Exhibit M is a
''stabbing demonstration" with the Tanto Knife "where the hilt has been colored by eyebrow
pencil ... show[ing] where the hilt hit the [pig] skin." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 275, LL. 12-15.
Exhibit "N" is the same photograph as Exhibit "M" except with the Rambo Knife. Tr. P.C.R.
Ev. Hrg., p. 276, LL 14-25, p. 277, LL. 1-5. Finally; Exhibit "0" and "P" depict "stabbing
demonstrations" with the knives being "tilted, as might sometimes occur with a stabbing." Tr.
P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 277, LL 18-20. Exhibit "O" reflects the "stabbing demonstration" utilizing
the Tanto Knife and Exhibit "P" reflects the "stabbing demonstration" utilizing the "Rambo
Knife".
20. The conclusion drawn by Reit as a result of these "stabbing demonstrations" utilizing
the Tanto Knife and the Rambo Knife was "that wounds made by the Rambo knife could in part
be similar to the wounds made by the tanto knife and that the tanto knife wound could be totally
accounted for by the Rambo knife, if the Rambo knife is not plunged all the way into the skin."
Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 279, LL. 8-14.
6

This knife has also been referred to during the trial and these post-conviction relief proceedings as the "Simm" knife.
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21. In explaining this conclusion, Reit testified as follows:

Q. So would you tell us what is different between exhibit Kand exhibit L?
A. They both have characteristics of a knife blade that is sharp, sharp. That is, a
sharpened edge on the back and a sharpened edge on what you would nom1ally
say is the cutting surface.

Q. Okay. And why does exhibit L with the Rambo knife have a sharp, sharp
edge in this photograph?
A. Because it had gone part way in. It is sharpened on the back side
approximately halfway back on the blade. And then it goes to a squared off
thickened blade back. So had it been introduced all the way, it would have a blunt
area, but part way it would appear sharp, sharp.

Q. Okay. So exhibit L could·- exhibit K, the tanto wound, and exhibit L appear
similar because they are sharp on both sides?
A. That's correct.

Q. Okay.
similar?

So in this scenario, a wound made by either knife would appear

A. Yes.
Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 274, LL. 6-25, p. 275, L. 1.
Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action
22. Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
based upon the cumulative or combined effect of the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
as outlined in Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition, Causes of Action Two; Three, and Four. Adamcik
asserts that the combined effect of these claimed deficiencies resulted in prejudice to Adamcik at
trial under the second Strickland prong.
23. Although the Court did grant summary dismissal on Adamcik's Causes of Action
Three and Four, the Court did so on prejudice grounds. The Court did conclude that there were
genuine issues of material fact that warranted a trial on the merits concerning whether Adamcik's
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Defense Team's perfonnance was deficient under the first Strickland prong. See Footnote No. 2.
As such, the Court must make a determination concerning whether the Adamcik Defense Team's
performance, relative to the claims outlined in Adamcik's Causes of Action Three and Four, was
deficient. If a determination is made that the Defense Team's performance was deficient, the
Court must next determine whether the combined effect of this deficient performance, coupled
with the deficient performance with respect to Cause of Action Two, amounted to pre;.judice
under the second Strickland prong.
24.

Adamcik asserts in his P.C.R. Petition's Third Cause of Action that it was his

Defense Team's intention to "call several character witnesses during the trial. P.C.R. Petition, p.
23,187. Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition asserts further that it was also his Defense Team's intent "to
call witnesses to testify about Brian Draper's prior bad acts." Id, p. 24,

,r 93.

Adamcik asserts

in his P.C.R. Petition that "counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Torey because he was
deprived of the character evidence which formed a large basis of the defense." Id., p. 32.
25. On September 27, 2006, Detective Tom Sellers of the Idaho State Police submitted
an Affidavit of Probable Cause in support of a search warrant See Exhibit "C". This Affidavit
of Probable Cause sought a warrant to search the residence located at 1598 Pointview Drive in
Pocatello, Idaho. The Court understands this to have been the residence of Adamcik and his

family. It also sought a wairnnt to search a red 1994 Geo Prism.
26. The Affidavit of Probable Cause outlined a lengthy "Statement of Facts in Support of
Probable Cause". It then makes a specific request concerning the items law enforcement wishes
to "search for and seize as evidence". These requested items were "bodily fluids, stains, hair
fibers, and other trace evidence as well as clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video cameras,
video tapes, garbage bags, computer, computer programs, cellular telephone and cellular
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telephone account infonnation, fingerprints.'' See Exhibit "C''. This Affidavit of Probable Cause
was "subscribed and sworn" to before the Honorable Gaylen L. Box on September 27, 2006.
27. On September 27, 2006, Judge Box signed a Search Warrant authorizing a search of
the property and vehicle outlined in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. 1t also authorized law
enforcement to "search for and seize all evidence including but not limited to bodily fluids,
stains, hair fibers and other trace evidence as well as fingerprints." See Exhibit "B".

28. It is perplexing to this Court that the warrant itself does not authorize the search for
or seizure of a computer, even though the Affidavit of Probable Cause request includes
computers. In fact, the Search Warrant does not address or include "clothing, knives, scripts,
joumals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, computers, computer programs, cellular
telephones and cellular telephone account information."

29.

The Honorable Gaylen L. Box testified at Adamcik's post-conviction relief

evidentiary hearing. When Judge Box was asked why computers were not specifically listed on
the Search Warrant, he responded as follows:

I issued the wammt as it was presented to me. I recall no specific discussion
concerning the computer.
Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 136, LL. 2-3.
30. On cross-examination, Judge Box testified, that following his review of the Probable
Cause Affidavit, he made no effort to cross-out or delete anything from the Search Warrant
itself. Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 136, LL. 22-25, p. 137, LL. 1-2. However, he did require that the
Affidavit of Probable Cause be modified to "provide some basis for the issuance of a nighttime
search warrant." See Exhibit "C", 111 and Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 136, LL. 2-5.
31. Finally, Judge Box testified that when he signs a search warrant he intends to give
permission to search for the items identified on the warrant and does not intend to grant
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permission to search for items not listed on the search warrant. Tr. 11.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 139, LL
16-23.
32. Pursuant to the Search Warrant issued by Judge Box on September 27, 2006, law
enforcement conducted a search of the Adamcik residence.

Incident to that search, Jaw

enforcement seized as evidence a "computer tower." See Exhibit "D". A review of Exhibit "D"
reflects that twenty-five (25) separate items were seized incident to the search of the Adamcik
residence and not one of the seized items were "bodily fluids, stains, hair fibers, other trace
evidence or fingerprints.'' In fact, each one of the seized items exceeded the scope of the
enumerated items in the Search Warrant.
33. During the course of Adamcik's jury trial, the State notified the Defense Team that it
had obtained a computer that had been seized as evidence incident to the September 27, 2006
Search Warrant. The State notified the Defense Team that if it attempted to introduce character
evidence, the State would attempt to introduce evidence obtained from the computer.

The

computer in question contained what has been characterized by Adamcik throughout these postconviction relief proceedings as "kiddie porn." A CD containing the photographs that have been
described as "kiddie porn" was introduced into evidence at the post-conviction relief evidentiary
hearing. While the images and photographs are distasteful and do show some nude images, this
Court would not characterize the same as "kiddie porn." However, the Court can certainly
understand the Defense Team's desire not to have those images and photographs introduced into
evidence and shown to the jury. 7
34. As a result, the Defense Team made a strategic decision not to put on the character
evidence that it had originally planned to introduce at trial. Neither did the Adamcik Defense

7

ln this Court's personal view, more concerning from Adamcik's and his Defense Team's perspective, would be the images
focusing on Adamcik's fixation with violence and slasher/horror movies. See Exhibit "A".
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Team attempt to prohibit the threatened introduction of this evidence by way of a motion in

. . or mo t·1011 to suppress. 8
l zmme
35. 1l1e Court heard character testimony evidence from numerous friends, acquaintances
and family members touching upon their impression of Adamcik and various positive and
upstanding character traits and qualities which they attribute to him.
36. Adamcik himself testified at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing addressing
issues concerning his Defense Team, trial strategy, and offers or the lack thereof. Finally, he
testified in detail concerning is version of the crime and facts and circumstances sun-ounding the
commission of the crime.
37. Adamcik asserts in his P.C.R. Petition's Fourth Cause of Action that his Defense
Team was ineffective in its failure to move to exclude Adamcik's invocation of the right to
counsel pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (l 976) ("Doyle").
38. Thompson candidly admits that Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel which
occurred during a recorded interview/interrogation that was the subject of a broader motion to
suppress "got lost in the shuffle." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p. 34, L. 18.9 Thompson states that his
focus was "on suppressing the entire video." Thompson acknowledges that the Doyle argument
should have been brought forward.
Adamcik's Sixth Cause of Action

39. Adamcik asserts in his P.C.R. Petition's Sixth Cause of Action that his Defense
Team was ineffective because they failed to communicate a favorable plea offer to him.
40.

During the course of the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, there was

8

The Court previously ruled on Adamcik's claim that this failure was deficient, concluding that it was not. See Memorandum
Decision and Order on Adamcik's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, p.
17. Footnote No. 16.
9
Jiad the broader motion to suppress been granted, certainly that portion of the intcn-ogation where Adamcik invokes his right to
counsel would have been excluded along with the balance of the interrogation.
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considerable testimony offered by Adamcik that the State made an offer to Adamcik's Defense
Team and that the content of this offer was never communicated or passed on to Adamcik or his
family.
41. Both of these issues were disputed. The Adamcik Defense Team both disputed the
conveyance of the offer, and there failure to communicate offers to Adamcik.
42. The offer testified to by both Heideman and Pearson provided that if Adamcik would
enter a guilty plea to the murder count, the state would recommend a life sentence with a thirty
(30) year determinate sentence. The offer also provided that the conspiracy charge would be
dismissed.
43. Adamcik testified at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing that he would have
accepted such an offer if the same had been communicated to him.
44. At the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, the Honorable Peter D. McDennott
was asked to testify.
45.

Judge McDermott was asked ''what his sentence would have been had Torey

accepted this plea offer and entered a plea under the plea agreement." Tr. P.C.R. Ev. Hrg., p.
315, LL 22-25, p. 317, LL 3-4. Judge McDermott initially expressed difficulty in answering this
hypothetical question. However, in doing so he stated "looking back on everything, all I can say
is that I believe the sentence that I imposed was appropriate given all that I heard in the
courtroom and all of the documents that I reviewed." Id., p. 316, LL 13-16. When additional
questions were asked addressing this same topic Judge McDermott responded further.

The

dialogue went as follows:

Q. Okay. So what I understand your testimony is, you cannot come to a
conclusion?
A. Well you know, Dennis, we're talking eight years ago. If that would have
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been presented to me, its likely that I would have not gone along with it.

Q. Would there be a reasonable probability that you would have given a sentence
less than life without the possibility of parole?
A. You know, I don't think so. I think, given the crime and all that transpired in
the courtroom, and all of the documents I read, I feel that the sentence was
appropriate.
Jd.,p.317,LL.19-25,p.318,LL.1-5.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
To the extent that any of the Court's Conclusions of Law are deemed to be Findings of Fact,
they are hereby incorporated into the Court's Findings of Fact.

1. Adamcik filed his P.C.R Petition on September 27, 2013.
2. At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court granted the State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal with respect to Adamcik's First Cause of Action as contained in his
P.C.R. Petition. The Court now reaffirms those conclusions oflaw.
3. At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Comt granted the State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal with respect to Adamcik's Third Cause of Action as contained in
his P.C.R. Petition. The Com1 now reaffoms those conclusions of law.
4. At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court granted the State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal with respect to Adamcik's Fomth Cause of Action as contained in
his P.C.R. Petition. The Cout1 now reaffirms those conclusions of law.
5. At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court granted the State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal with respect to Adamcik's Seventh Cause of Action. 10
6.

At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court denied stmm1ary

10
The Court would note that Adamcik recently filed his Second Motion for Reconsideration on this issue. This matter has been
set for hearing and the Court will consider the arguments of counsel regarding this Second Motion for Reconsideration. The
Court understands that this Second Motion for Reconsideration is based, in large part, upon the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Afo11tgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016).
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disposition with regard to Adamcik's Second Cause of Action, Fifth Cause of Action 11 , and Sixth
Cause of Action, concluding that there were genuine and triable issues of fact that required an
cvidentiary hearing.
7. In July of 2015, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The Court heard testimony
from the following witnesses: (1) Mary Nelson; (2) Nathan Nelson; (3) David Nelson; (4) Arm
Adamcik; (5) Aaron Thompson; (6) Shannon Adamcik; (7) Sean Adamcik; (8) Honorable Gaylen

L. Box; (9) Barbara Adamcik; (10) Rusty Adamson; (11) Lacey Adamcik; (12) Joy Nelson; (13)
Robert Nelson; (14) Mark Heideman; (15) Vic A Pearson; (16) Rudolf Reit; (17) Bron Rammell;
(18) Honorable Peter D. McDem10tt; (19) Kelly Kumm; (20) David Luras; and (21) Torey
Adamcik. Certain exhibits were admitted into evidence. The Com1 took judicial notice of other
documents. See Order Taking Judicial Notice.
8. Post-Conviction relief proceedings are governed and authorized by the Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA") which is codified at LC. § 19-4901 through 4911.
9. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding, a proceeding govemed
by the I.R.C.P. Rhodes v. State, 148 Idaho 247,249,220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009).
l 0. Just as a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit must establish their claims by a preponderance of the
evidence, a petitioner in a post-conviction relief proceeding must "prove by a preponderance of
evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based." State v.

Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008). See also Idaho Criminal Rule I.C.R. 57(c).

11
Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action asserts that Adamcik was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial in violation of the
Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 13 and Strickland because of the cumulative effect of all of the
claimed issues of ineffective assistance of counsel as outlined in Adamcik's First through Fourth Causes of Action. As noted
above, the Court granted the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on Adamcik's Third and Fourth Causes of Action. The
Court did S() based upon the second Strickland prong, prejudice. However, with respect to both Adamcik's Third and Fourth
Causes of Action, the Court did find that there were genuine and triable issues of fact concerning whether Adamcik's Defense
Team's performance was deficient. Therefore, the Court in considering Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action, must necessarily
consider nnd make a determination concerning whether Adamcik's Defense Team's performance was deficient with respect to
Adarncik's Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action and if so whether said deficiencies. when combined together, satisfy the
second Strickland prong of prejudice.
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11. "A post-conviction applicant has the burden of proving the grounds upon which he
seeks relief' by a preponderance of the evidence. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d
964, 965 (Ct.App.1990). The trial court, as the finder of fact in post-conviction relief proceedings,
is to assess "the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 794, 798
(2000).
12.

Where there is competent and substantial evidence to suppo1t the district comt's

decision made after an evidentiary hearing on an application for postwconviction relief, that decision

will not be disturbed on appeal. Id
Adamcik's Second Cause of Action

13. The standard the Court must employ in determining whether or not defense counsel's
performance was ineffective has its genesis in Strickland v. ·washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ("Strickland"). The applicable standard for a trial court, when
presented with a claim of ineffective assistance counsel, is summarized by the Idaho Supreme
Coutt in Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612,617,262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011)("Booth"):
"The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
1, Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,
570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may
properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Baxter v. Slate, 149
Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct.App.20 I 0). To prevail on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's
performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the
deficiency. McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460, 463 (2004);
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.3d2d at 693.
14. In Baldwin v. S1a1e, 145 Idaho 148, 154 177 P.3d 362,368 (2008) ("Baldwin"), this
ineffective assistance of counsel standard was described as follows:
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To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show that his
attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Ivey v.
State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). This objective standard
embraces a strong presumption that defense counsel was competent and diligent.
Ivey, 123 Idaho at 80, 844 P.2d at 709. Thus, the claimant has the burden of
showing that his attorney's performance fell below the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Berg, 131 Idaho at 520,960 P.2d at 741.
15. The second Strickland prong is the prejudice prong. In addressing this prong of the

Strickland two (2) prong test, the Strickland Court stated that the evidence must establish "that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
16. Strickland also provides additional guidance by defining the phrase "reasonable
probability" as "a probability sufficient to undennine confidence in the outcome." Id
17. In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111-12, 131 S.Ct. 770, 791-92, 178 L.Ed.2d
624 (2011) ("Harrington"), the United States Supreme Court once again articulated this standard
in the following terms:
In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether a court can be
certain counsel's performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is
possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted
differently. See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 27, 130 S.Ct. 383, 390, 175
L.Ed.2d 328 (2009) (per curiam) (slip op., at 13); Strickland, 466 U.S., at 693,
104 S.Ct. 2052. Instead, Strickland asks whether it is "reasonably likely" the
result would have been different. Id., at 696, l 04 S.Ct. 2052. This does not require
a showing that counsel's actions "more likely than not altered the outcome," but
the difference between Strick/ands prejudice standard and a more-probable-thannot standard is slight and matters "only in the rarest case." Id., at 693, 697, 104
S.Ct. 2052. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable. Id., at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
18. In the present case, the Court concludes, after considering all of the evidence and
pursuant to the Court's findings of fact, that Adamcik's Defense Teams' performance relative to the
issue of obtaining the knives, testing the knives and presenting testimony concerning the knives and
lhe theory espoused by Reit, which was supportive of the expert testimony of Dr. Leis, was deficient
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and did fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
19.

The Comt concludes that Adamcik's one (]) knife theory was an important

component of the Adamcik defense. It matters not in this Court's analysis whether the Adamcik
Defense Team was told "no" when they requested access to the knives for testing purposes or
whether they just mistakenly concluded, based upon the conversations Mr. Cheney had with
Detective Ballard and Pearson, that the State's position was that they could not have access to
the knives as was testified to by Pearson. The deficient performance was the Defense Team's
failure to insist upon access to the knives either by way of further dialogue with the State, which
presumably would have identified and cleared up any confusion or miscommunication, if such
confusion existed, or by motion practice before the trial court, specifically requesting access to
the knives. 12
20. However, without access to these knives, the Defense Team was not able to lay the
foundation necessary to get Reit's opinions and test results before the jury. Reit's opinions, as
presented at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing did suppo11 and corroborate Dr. Leis'
opinion. Dr. Leis' opinion, coupled with Reit's opinion and testing, did support Adamcik's "one
knife theory.''

21. The Court concludes that while the first prong of Strickland has been satisfied, the
pr~judice prong has not been met. This Court, afrer considering the evidence before the Couti
and the Cami's Findings of Fact, concludes that Adamcik has not established prejudice flowing
from the Defense Team's deficient conduct relative to the knives, Dr. Reit and his testing and
12

The Court must assume that such a motion would have been granted, in fact Judge McDermott intimated as much in his ruling.
See Finding of Fact No. 12. The Court also concludes that it is unfortunate that Judge McDermott, after allowing the dialogue
outlined in Findings of Fact Nos. 10, 11, and 12 to occur in the presence of the jury, did not cratl some type of curative
instruction to the jury designed to alleviate the remarks of Heideman characterizing Ramme!l as a liar. The discussions which
occurred during Rammell's offer of proof clearly established that the Defense Team had been denied access to knives by both
Detective Ballard and Pearson. It matters not to this Court that the Defense Team may have read more into those refusals than
intended. The characterization of Rummell as a liar was both inaccurate and unprofessional in the setting in which it occurred.
See Findings of Fact Nos. 13-14. However, the Court concludes that no prejudice under the second Strickland prnng resulted
from this characterization. See Conclusion of Law No. 21 and Footnote No. 13.
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• •

13

opm1ons. 22. This Court did not preside over the jury trial which resulted in Adamcik's conviction.
As a result the Court did not see and hear all of the evidence presented to the jury. However, the
Court, in its consideration of Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition, the summary disposition proceedings
and presiding over the evidentiary hearing, has read large portions of the transcript of the trial
and reviewed and considered many of the exhibits introduced at said trial. This Court acting in
its capacity as the presiding judge in Adamcik's post~conviction proceeding subscribes to the
same viewpoint expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Adamcik's direct appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court. In this decision, the Idaho Supreme Court in addressing the sufficiency of the
evidence introduced at Adamcik's trial stated as follows:
Contrary to Adamcik's argument, there is substantial evidence in the record upon
which a jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Adamcik
was guilty of first-degree murder. Dr. Skoumal, the medical examiner \:vho
perfom1ed the autopsy on Stoddart, testified that Stoddart died from multiple stab
wounds to the trunk. Dr. Skoumal also testified that twelve of the thirty kniferelated wounds on Stoddart's body had the potential to be fatal. Of those twelve, Dr.
Skoumal was unable to identify the specific wounds that caused Stoddart's death,
but it is clear from his testimony that she died as a result of more than one of those
twelve stab wounds. According to Dr. Skoumal, one of those wounds, referred to as
wound number l;
was located in Stoddart's mid, upper chest.. ..
The tissues that it penetrated included the skin, muscle, soft tissue, right rib
number three, the mediastinum-which is in the middle of the chest-the
pericardia! sac-which is the sac overlining the heart-the right ventricle13

A review of Adamcik's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions or Law and Closing Argument suggests that because
Heideman called Rammell a "liar" and because the trial court "chastised" Rammcll in front of the Jury concerning his
performance and approach with respect to Reil, that Adamcik was prejudiced. While this Court agrees that trial counsel never
wants to be reprimanded by the trial court in the presence of the jury, this Court cannot find that this discussion and chastisement,
as it has been characterized by Adamcik's current counsel, amounted to prejudice as that term has been defined and applied in
Strickland and its progeny. First, this Court has confidence that the Adamcik jury possessed the capacity to set aside this
dialogue between the prosecutor, the trial court and Rammell and decide Adamcik's guilt or innocence based upon the admitted
evidence and not a dialogue between the trial court and counsel as instructed by the trial court in its jury instructions. Second, in
order to establish prejudice under the second Strickland prong, the evidence must reach a heightened level that but for this
chastisement and dialogue, there is a reasonable probability a diITerent result would been reached by the jury. The Court cannot
reach such a conclusion on this record. The fact that this dialogue occurred and that Rammcll was called a "liar" by Heideman
and "chastised" by the trial court, docs not "undermine" the Court's "confidence in the outcome" of this jury trial based upon its
review of the testimony admitted both at the underlying trial phase and in the post-conviction relief proceedings.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON POSTCONVICTION RELIEF -22
661 of742

which is a patt of the heart. And there were two cups of blood in the
pericardial sac surrounding the heart.
It's my opinion that the vital structures were injured, and it had the potential
to be fatal.
In response to a subsequent question from the prosecutor, as to whether wound
number 1 was "potentially fatal," Dr. Skoumal answered in the affirmative.
Dr. GaITison testified that at least two knives were used in the murder of Stoddart,
one with a serrated blade, and another with a non-serrated blade. Dr. Garrison
based this conclusion on the fact that some ofthe wounds contained excoriations
and tears around their edges, which is consistent with the use of a knife with a
serrated blade, while other wounds contained no such excoriations or tears, which
is consistent with the use of a knife with a non-serrated blade. Dr. GaITison further
testified that wound number 1 did not contain any irregular cuts, which would be
expected if wound number 1 was inflicted by a knife with a non~serrated blade.
From the testimony of these two witnesses, taken together, a reasonable jury
could conclude that wound number 1, which was a potentially fatal wound, was
inflicted by a knife with a non-serrated blade. Therefore, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that two knives were used during the attack on Stoddart,
and that both knives inflicted wounds that could have caused Stoddart's death.
[Footnote 5 deleted by the Court]
Adamcik's friend, Joe Lucero, testified that he bought four knives for Adamcik
and Draper. Lucero said that he used $45 to pay for the knives-$40 from Draper
and $5 from Adamcik. Lucero identified four of the State's exhibits as the knives
he bought. One of the knives had a serrated blade; the other three knives were
non-serrated. Police found all four knives at the BRC site. Lucero testified that
Draper made a point to claim ownership of the senated knife.
The jury was presented with evidence that two knives inflicted potentially fatal
wounds, and that Adamcik and Draper collaborated in the murder. This
collaboration is supported by the BRC tape wherein Draper and Adamcik discuss
their joint plan to kill Stoddart The jury was also provided with evidence
suggesting that Adamcik and Draper were together immediately after Stoddart's
murder, and jointly attempted to hide weapons and clothing used during the
commission of the murder. The jury watched the video of police interviewing
Adamcik, during which Adamcik made verbal and nonverbal assertions that can
reasonably be construed as his confessing to stabbing Stoddart. This evidence,
coupled with the testimony provided by the State's experts, is sufficient for a
reasonable jury to conclude that: (1) two knives were used to murder Stoddait; (2)
both knives inflicted potentially fatal wounds; (3) Draper favored the knife with
the serrated blade which inflicted most of the potentially fatal wounds; and (4) the
other knife was used by Adamcik to inflict the other stab wound that injured
Stoddart's vital structures and which had the potential to be fatal. No evidence
was introduced that would contradict such conclusions.
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State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460-62, 272 P.3d 417, 432-34 (2012). 14
23.

Certainly, Reit's aborted testimony and testing was intended by the Adamcik

Defense Team to corroborate and strengthen Dr. Leis' testimony and bolster and support
Adamcik's one (1) knife theory. However, this Court cannot find that it is "reasonably probable"
that had the Defense Team obtained the knives in question, conducted the tests that were
performed in the post-conviction relief proceeding, elicited the testimony from Reit that was
elicited at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, and introduced the exhibits that were admitted
at the post-conviction relief proceeding at Adamcik's trial, that "the result of the proceeding
would have been different."
24. This Court did not have the opportunity to observe and hear the testimony of Dr.
Garrison and Dr. Leis. However, the jury did. It appears that the jury found Dr. Garrison to be
more credible than Dr. Leis with respect to this issue. The jury heard a great deal of detailed
testimony from Dr. Garrison on this point concerning his opinion that more than one knife was
used in the attack and murder of Stoddart.

See Finding of Fact No. 6.

25. Reit's testing and testimony in no way disproves Dr. Garrison's conclusion that two
(2) knives were used during the course of the Stoddart attack and murder.

While Reit's

testimony and testing is consistent with Dr. Leis' testimony, his testimony and testing are equally
consistent with Dr. Garrison's testimony and opinions. The only thing established by Reit's
post-conviction evidentiary hearing testimony is that the effect of stab wounds by both knives
would appear, and did appear in his testing, similar if the knife that has been referred to as the
14
Thc only correction or clarification this Court would make with respect to the foregoing statement, based upon this Court's
review of the transcript, evidence and presiding over the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, is the last sentence of the
foregoing quote, that "no evidence was introduced that would contradict such conclusions." This Court believes that there was
evidence offered by the Adamcik Defense Team contradicting the evidence that two (2) l<nives were used and that two (2) knives
inflicted the potentially fatal wounds. This contradicting evidence was introduced in the form of Dr. Leis' testimony which
suggested that Dr. Garrison's conclusion of"at least two l<nives" was inaccurate, at least as it related to "Wound l." See Finding
of Fact No. 7.
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Rambo Knife only penetrated half way into the knife blade as opposed to all the way to the hilt
of the knife. See Findings of Fact Nos. 19 and 20.
26.

While it is certainly possible that Reit's testimony and testing could have been

viewed by jurors as supporting Dr. Leis' testimony; it is more probable, in this Court's view, that
such testimony would have been viewed as supporting Dr. Garrison's testimony. 15 To conclude
that Defense Team's failure to secure the knives and have Reit testify concerning his testing and
opinions at trial as he did in the post-conviction relief proceeding effected the outcome of
Adamcik's trial would require this Coutt to speculate to a point that this Court is not comfortable
as the finder of fact in these post-conviction relief proceedings. The addition of Reit's testimony
and testing does not "undermine [this Court's] confidence in the outcome" of Adamcik's jury
trial. In fact, if anything it confirms in this Court's mind Dr. Garrison's testimony. See Footnote
15. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Harrington, "the likelihood of a different
resultmustbesubstantial,notjustconceivable." 562 U.S. 86, 111-12, 131 S.Ct. 770, 791-92.
27. Based upon the foregoing, the Court will DENY Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition with
respect to his Second Cause of Action. Although the Court has found that the first Strickland
prong was established by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court concludes that Adamcik
has failed to establish the second Strickland prong. Specifically, Adamcik has not established "a
reasonable probability that, but for [Adamcik's Defense Team's] unprofessional enors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Additionally the
introduction of this evidence at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing does not
"undermine [this Couti's] confidence in the outcome" of Adamcik's jury trial and the subsequent
1
'1n this Court's mind, as the finder of fact in this post•conviction relief proceeding, it is a far more probable inference that the
stabbing would have resulted in the knife being inserted in such a manner that it would have been stopped by the impact of the
hilt upon the person or body of the victim. It is less probable that the stab would stop halt\vay up the blade. This was a violent
attack accompanied by high emotion and great force. It seems improbable to the Court that the emotions, adrenaline and
physicality associated with this attack would result in a circumstance where the knife would be withdrawn before it was forcibly
stopped due to the hilt's impact with the victim's person or body.
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verdict. Id.
Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action

28. For purposes of Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action, this Court hereby incorporates
Conclusions of Law Nos. 13 through 17 as if set forth in full herein.
29. Adamcik's asserts that the actions, or rather the omissions, of the Defense Team in
making the strategic decision not to offer character evidence on Adamcik's behalf was deficient
under the first Strickland prong. Adamcik also asserts that the Defense Team's failure to file a
motion in limine or a motion to suppress the State's threats of using the so called "kiddie pom"
evidence was deficient under the first Strickland prong.
30.

This Court concludes that it was not deficient conduct under the first prong of

Strickland for Adamcik Defonse Team to fail to move to suppress the evidence of so called ''kiddie
porn".
31. As outlined in Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct.App.1989)

(Davis), a post-conviction relief petitioner bears a heavy burden in proving that his attorney's
perfom1ance was deficient. Due to the distmting effects of hindsight associated with evaluating
defense counsel's conduct at trial, "there is a strong presumption that counsel's perfon11ance was
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance - that is, sound strategy" Id. (Citing

Strickland). The Davis Comt continues by stating that because of the presumption in favor of trial
counsel's performance being reasonable, "strategic or tactical decisions made by trial counsel will
not be second guessed on review, unless those decisions are made upon a basis of inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other sh01tcomings capable of objective evaluation."

Id.
32. This Court concludes, upon a complete and thorough review of the Affidavit of
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Probable Cause, Exhibit "e', that the scope of the Search Warrant signed by Judge Box was more
restrictive than the request made by the Affidavit of Probable Cause was due exclusively to a
scrivener's error.
33. The Probable Cause Affidavit requesting authority to conduct the search was very
detailed in the facts outlined in suppott of a search wan-ant. It was very descriptive concerning the
information and facts upon which the Search Warrant was being requested.
34. In this CoUit's view, the Affidavit of Probable Cause established probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant allowing a search for and seizure of evidence as outlined in the Affidavit of
Probable Cause, i.e. "clothing, knives scripts, joumals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags,
computer, computer programs, cellular telephones and cellular account information."
35. Each of the foregoing items \Vere specifically requested in the Affidavit of Probable
Cause and inexplicably not included in the Search Wanant signed by Judge Box.
36.

The Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Belden, 148 Idaho 277, 220 P.3d 1096

(Ct.App.2009) ("Belden") provides a lengthy, but good analysis of what constitutes probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant and the process the issuing magistrate must follow in
determining whether a warrant should issue.
When probable cause to issue a search wanant is challenged on appeal, the
reviewing court's function is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239,
103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548-49 (1983);State v. Josephson, 123
Idaho 790, 792, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1993); State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684,
672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983). In this evaluation, great deference is paid to the
magistrate's determination. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d at
546-47; State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213,215,938 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Ct.App.1997).
The test for reviewing the magistrate's action is whether he or she abused his or
her discretion in finding that probable cause existed. State v. Holman, 109 Idaho
382, 387, 707 P.2d 493, 498 (Ct.App.1985). When a search is conducted pursuant
to a warrant, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the search was
invalid. State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268,275,678 P.2d 60, 67 (Ct.App.1984).
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, suppo1ted by oath or
affi1111ation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fomth
Amendment, except that "oath or affin11ation" is termed "affidavit." In order for a
search warrant to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause to believe that
evidence or fruits of a crime may be found in a particular place. Josephson, 123
Idaho at 792-93, 852 P.2d at 1389-90. When determining whether probable cause
exists:
The task of the issuing n1agistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set fo1th in the affidavit before
him, including the ''veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying
hearsay infonnation, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a paiticular place.

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 548; see also Wilson, 130
Idaho at 215, 938 P.2d at 1253.
37. One cannot read the Affidavit of Probable Cause and not come to the conclusion that
there has been an error with respect to the Search Warrant signed by Judge Box.
38. The only rational explanation for exclusion of requested items such as clothing, knives,
scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage bags, cell phones, items that were specifically
mentioned in the Affidavit of Probable Cause and clearly related to the crime and the information
uncovered in law enforcement investigation, is some sort of clerical error in the drafting of the the
Search Warrant. It is inconceivable to this Court that Judge Box would have intentionally limited
the scope of the Search Warrant to items delineated in the Search Warrant 1o the exclusion of the
items outlined in the Affidavit of Probable Cause (that were not included in the Search Warrant)
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which have direct bearing on the facts outlined in the Probable Cause Affidavit.

16

39. Judge Box clearly testified that he did not request that the scope of the Search Wanant
be modified or restricted. He merely signed the Search Wanant as presented by law enforcement.

See Findings of Fact No. 29
40.

'Iberefore, this CotUt, as the finder of fact in this evidentia1y hearing, makes the

inference, based upon the evidence before the Court, that Judge Box intended to sign a Search
Warrant consistent with the request made by law enforcement as outlined in the Affidavit of
Probable Cause. The Court also concludes that there was an error in the preparation of the Search
Warrant whereby the individual who prepared the Search Warrant failed to properly include,
transfer or reproduce all of the items upon which law enforcement was seeking authority to "search
for and to seize" from the Affidavit of Probable Cause to the Search Warrant.
41. Consistent with the holding of the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Bollingberg, 674 N.W. 2d 281 (2004) ("Bollingberg'') on a similar set of facts dealing with a

scrivener's en·or, which this Comt considers to be persuasive on this issue, this Court concludes that
the true intent of Judge Box in issuing this Search Warrant was to authorize a search consistent with
the request contained in the Affidavit of Probable Cause and would have done so but for the fact
that there was an error in the preparation of the Search Warrant.
42. The Court similarly concludes that the failure of the Search Wa1Tant to include language
authorizing a search for "clothing, knives, scripts, journals, video cameras, video tapes, garbage
16

Perhaps the most blatant and obvious examples are that the Search Warrant excludes the following items which were requested
in the Affidavit of Probable Cause: (I) "clothing" (despite the fact that Draper's statement indicates that the clothes Adamcik
wore, high top converse tennis shoes and black jeans were O()t burned); (2) "garbage bag" (despite the fact that Draper's
statement states that they went back to Adarncik's Imme after the murder and retrieved a "blue garbage sack" from the garage to
put the costumes and knives in10; (3) scripts and journals (despite the fact that the anonymous informant who appears to be a
student at P()catello High School said that Adamcik and Draper were writing a "script for a horror movie"); and (4) knives (the
Affidavit of Probable Cause is replete with the facts that the murder was eommilted with a knife, Drnper and Adamcik are
obsessed with knives. Incidentally, despite being requested in the Affidavit of Probable Cause and precluded in the Search
Warrant itself, each of these items was seized in the search of the Adamcik residence. See Exhibit "D". As an aside in today's
m()dern world of computers and word processors where else is it more probable than a computer that script for a h()rror movie
would be stored.
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bags, cellular telephones and cellular telephone account information" as requested in the Probable
Cause Affidavit was the function of a clerical or scrivener's error and was not the function of Judge
Box's detennination that the Affidavit of Probable Cause lacked a sufficient showing of probable
cause to support a search for these items. 17
43. Therefore, the Court concludes that it would have been futile for the Defense Team to
pursue such a motion and had such a motion been pursued, the Com1 expects that the motion would
have been denied.
44.

This Court has previously ruled, at the summary disposition stage of these

proceedings, that the failure of the Defense Team to raise the "Doyle" argument and bring a
motion to suppress Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel as reflected in the video
admitted into evidence amounted to deficient performance under the first Strickland prong. Sec
Memorandum Decision and Order on Adamcik's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and
the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, p. 31. Upon review of the testimony presented at the
post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, the Court concludes that the evidence supported the
Court's earlier determination on this issue and the Court concludes that Adamcik's Defense
Team was deficient under the first Strickland prong by its failure to file a motion in limine or
motion to suppress Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel on the video tape that was
ultimately played to the jury during the course of Adamcik's trial.
45.

As a result, the Court must now determine whether the cumulative effect of the

Defense Team's deficient performance under the first Strickland prong constitutes prejudice to
Adamcik during the course of his jury trial under the second Strickland prong. The Court has

17

As was noted by the Court in its Finding of Fact No. 32, every item seized by law enforcement incident to the search conducted
incident to the September 27, 2006 Search Warrant, exceeded the scope of the Search Warrant. This Court cannot imagine Jaw
enforcement to be so brazen in its disregard of Judge Box's restrictions to the Search Warrant, if in fact, such restrictions were
imposed. In short, there were no restrictions; there was a mistake in the preparation of the Search Warrant.
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concluded in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the Defense Team's conduct was
deficient under the first Strickland prong with respect to Adamcik's Second Cause of Action (See
Finding of Fact Nos. 5 through 21 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 18 through 20). Likewise the
Com1 has concluded in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the Defense Team's
conduct was deficient under the first Strickland prong with respect to Adamcik's Fourth Cause of
Action (See Findings of Fact Nos. 37 and 38 and Conclusion of Law No. 44).
46. Although the Court concluded that Adamcik's Defense Team's conduct was not
deficient under the first Strickland prong as it relates to Adamcik's Third Cause of Action, the
Court will nonetheless include and consider this claimed failure (for appeal purposes) in
considering Adamcik's prejudice claim based upon cumulative nature of Adamcik's Defense
Team's conduct.
47. The Court reiterates its Conclusion of Law No. 20. In considering the evidence
presented in these post-conviction relief proceedings, including the character witness introduced
in support of Adamcik's Third Claim for Reliet: this Court concludes that Adamcik has not
demonstrated prejudice sufficient for this Court to conclude that but for these combined
deficiencies that it is reasonably probable that the result of the jury trial would have been
different. See Strickland, 466 U.S., at 694. Based upon this Court's review of the record before

it, and the Court's fairly thorough review of the trial transcript and evidence submitted at trial,
this Court concludes its confidence, as the fact finder in this proceeding, has not been
undermined. Id. This Court, acting in its capacity as the finder of fact, crumot conclude based
upon the evidence presented at the post-conviction evidentiru·y hearing that the introduction of
the same evidence and the exclusion of Adamcik's invocation of counsel at trial would have
created a substantial likelihood of a different result. See Harrington, 562 U.S., at 112.
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48.

For the same reasons the Court concluded that these deficiencies (and claimed

deficiency relative to Third Cause of Action) did not amount to prejudice individually, this Court
concludes they do not amount to prejudice under the second Strickland prong collectively. The
Court has already articulated this with respect to Adamcik's Second Cause of Action - Reit's
testimony does not disprove Dr. Garrison's testimony.

In fact, if anything it supports his

testimony as is addressed in this Court's Conclusions of Law Nos. 25 and 26. Nothing about
combining this deficiency with the others increases quantum of prejudice, or lack thereof, in
regards to a jury weighing testimony concerning whether one ( 1) or two (2) knives were used in
the attack and murder of Stoddart. Similarly, the fact that a number of individuals were called to
give character evidence on behalf of Adamcik, each of whom spoke highly of Adamcik's
character and qualities as they understood and perceived, negates the powerful and substantial
evidence introduced in support of his conviction and which is outlined in the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460-63, 272 P.3d 417, 432-35 (2012).
Finally, as it relates to the failure of the Defense Team's failure to file and pursue a motion to
suppress Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel, this oversight and any prejudice flowing
from said failure of the Defense Team is minuscule when compared to Adamcik's responses to
his father's queries. The Court continues to adhere to its previous conclusion in granting the
State's summary disposition on this issue:
Any inference of guilt the jury may have drawn from the State's introduction of
Adamcik's invocation of his right to counsel is far outweighed by the inferences
created from Adamcik's response to his own father's queries, both of which were
expressly ruled upon by the trial to be admissible and are not the subject of
collateral attack this this post-conviction relief proceeding.
Memorandum Decision and Order on Adamcik's Motion for Patiial Summary Disposition and
the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, p. 38.
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49. For the reasons outlined above, none of the deficient conduct found by the Court in
these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (including the claimed instance of deficient
conduct related to the Defense Team's failure to move to suppress law enforcement's seizure of
the computer containing the so called "kiddie porn'' and the Defense Team's strategic
determination not to call character witnesses which the Court found to be strategic and not
deficient) either individually or combined qualify as prejudice under the second Strickland
prong.
50.

Therefore, the Court will DENY Adamcik's Fifth Cause of Action for post-

conviction relief asserting that the combined effect of Adamcik 's Defense Team's deficient
conduct resulted in prejudice under the second Strickland prong.
Adamcik's Sixth Cause of Action

51. For purposes of Adamcik's Sixth Cause of Action, this Court hereby incorporates
Conclusions of Lav.i Nos. 13 through 17 as if set forth in full herein.
52. This Court need not resolve the factual dispute concerning whether an offer was
made by the State that would have allowed Adamcik to plead guilty to one ( 1) count of murder
accompanied by a recommendation from the State for a thirty (30) year determinate sentence and
whether that offer was communicated to Adamcik and his family by the Defense Team.
53.

Judge McDermott's trial testimony makes reaching a conclusion on the issue

outlined in the foregoing paragraph unnecessary. Even if this Com1 were to detem1ine that the
foregoing offer was made by the State to Adamcik's Defense Team and the Defense Team failed
to communicate said offer to Adamcik and his family, the fact that Judge McDermott, the
presiding judge over the Adamcik criminal proceeding, clearly stated that he felt the sentence he
imposed was appropriate under the facts of this case, resolves the issue relative to prejudice
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under the second prong of Strickland. He further testified that had the plea agreement referenced
above been presented to him "its likely I would not have gone along with it." S'ee Finding of
Fact No. 45. More importantly when asked, in the context of the hypothetical plea agreement, if
"there would be a reasonable probability that you would have given a sentence less than life
without the possibility of parole", Judge McDermott responded, "I don't think so. I think, given
the crime and all that transpired in the courtroom and all of the documents I read, I feel that the
sentence was appropriate." See Finding of Fact No, 45.
54. As has been described in length above, the use of the phrase "reasonable probability"
by Adamcik's counsel was purposeful. This is the standard for prejudice under the second
Strickland prong. Judge McDem10tt's response to this question is the death kneJl to Adamcik's

Sixth Cause of Action. Adamcik cannot prevail on this issue unless it is reasonable probable that
the deficient conduct of his Defense Team resulted in prejudice. Judge McDermott's response,
as the presiding judge over the criminal proceeding, including his sentencing proceeding,
succinctly and simply answers that question. Therefore, even if the Defense Team's conduct,
with respect to Adamcik's Sixth Cause of Action were deficient, no prejudice flowed from said
conduct because Adamcik has failed to establish that it would have resulted in a "reasonable
probability" of a different result or in this case a different sentence being imposed by Judge
McDermott.
55. Based upon the foregoing, Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition, Sixth Cause of Action will be

DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Comt hereby

DENIES Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition claims as related to his Cause of Action Two, Cause of
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Action Five and Cause of Action Six.
The Court, during the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, previously
granted the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal with respect to Adamcik's Cause of Action
One, Cause of Action Three, Cause of Action Four, and Cause of Action Seven. The Court will
defer preparing a final judgment on Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition until it issues its ruling with
respect to Adamcik's Second Motion for Reconsideration as that relates to Adamcik's Cause of
Action Seven.
Dated this 21st day of March, 2016.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL D1STRICT2diir (iiJ:PE24
STATE OF IDAHO,

,\, 8~ li 0

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANN~)l(__.,..ct"'A_L~ 7 -~--~·
DE€-~1Y CLEJ<.K

******
)
TOREY ADAMCIK,
Petitioner,

)

CV-2013-3682

)
)

vs.

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Respondent.

Case No.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON SUMMARYDISPOSITION
RE: MILLER V. ALABAMA, __ U.S.
_ , 132 S.CT. 2455 (2012)

)
)

This matter is before the Comt on cross-motions for summary dismissal/disposition
arising out of Petitioner's, Torey Adamcik (Adamcik), Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(P.C.R. Petit1on). Adamcik has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition (Adamcik's
1

M.S.D). The State ofldaho (State) also filed its motion for summary disposition and supporting
brief in one (1) document titled Respondent's Dispositive Motion with Brief in Support of
Motion for Summary Dismissal (State's M.S.D). Adamcik filed his Response to Respondent's
Dispositive Motion (Response Memorandum). 2 Finally, Adamcik submitted a document entitled
Supplemental Authority shortly in advance of the oral argument on these cross-motions. The
parties argued their cross-motions to the Court, and following argument, the Court took this

1
Adamcik's M.S.D. was supported by a Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition (Adamcik's
Supporting Memorandum).
2
Adamcik's Response Memorandum was supported by sevcrul affidavits: (I) the Affidavit of Mark Heideman (Heideman
Affidavit); (2) the Affidavit of Vic Pearson (Pearson Affidavit); (3) the Affidavit of Sean Adamcik (Sean Adamcik Affidavit); (4)
the Affidavit of Shannon Adamick [sic] (Shannon Adamcik Affidavit); and (5) the Affidavit of Barbara Adamcik (B. Adamcik
Affidavit).
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matter under advisement.3

The Court has previously issued its Memorandum Decision and

Order on Adamcik's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for
Summary Dismissal. However, while the Court issued its decision on six (6) of the seven (7)
claims raised by Adamcik in his P .C.R. Petition, the Court did not issue its decision on the
seventh claim. Adamcik's seventh claim seeks a declaration by this Court that Adamcik's life
without parole sentence is in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution on the basis that life without parole for a juvenile offender who commits a capital
offense, is cruel and unusual punislunent under the rationale outlined in Miller v. Alabama, _
U.S. _ , 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (Miller) and other United States Supreme
Court precedent upon which Miller is predicated.
The Court, having considered the paities' written submissions along with the argument
presented, now issues its Memorandum Decision and Order on Adamcik's seventh cause of
action (MD&O).

BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Adamcik filed his P.C.R. Petition in September, 2013. His P.C.R. Petition outlines seven
(7) separate claims upon which he seeks post-conviction relief. This MD&O will address the
seventh claim or cause of action raised by Adamcik in his P.C.R. Petition. Each party has moved
for summary disposition of Adamcik's Seventh Cause of Action.
Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition arises out of the underlying criminal proceedings in Bannock
County Case CR-2006-17984. In this proceeding, Adamcik was charged with and convicted by

'It should be noted that incident to this post-conviction relief proceeding, the Court has taken judicial notice of the entire record
of the criminal proceedings in Bannock County Case CR-2006-17984 pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 (I.R.E.). See
Order Taking Judicial Notice. Additionally, at the hearing on the cross-motions for summary dismissal/disposition, the parties
apprised the Court of their stipulation that the summary dismissal/disposition record will include the depositions taken of
Adamcik 's defense team, Greg May, Bron Rammell, and Aaron Thompsnn.
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a jury, of committing the first-degree murder of Cassie Jo Stoddart (Stoddart). Adamcik was
also convicted of conspiring with co-defendant, Brian Draper (Draper), to commit the firstdegree murder of Stoddmt. At sentencing, Adamcik was sentenced to a thirty (30) year fixed
sentence and an indeterminate life sentence for the conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and
a fixed lite sentence for the first-degree murder conviction of Stoddart. Adamcik filed a motion
seeking a reduction of his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (I.C.R.). This motion
was denied after a hearing by the trial court. Adamcik then filed an appeal. In State v. Adamcik,
152 Idaho 445, 458-59, 272 P.2d 417, 486-87 (2012), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
Adamcik's conviction and sentence. Adamcik filed a Petition for Rehearing; the Idaho Supreme
Court denied the relief sought in that petition.

Adamcik then filed a Petition for Writ of

Certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. This petition was denied. State v. Adamcik, 133
S. Ct. 141, 184 L. Ed. 2d 68 (2012).

STANDARD OF REVIEW SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Post-Conviction Relief proceedings are generally governed by the Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) which is codified at Idaho Code §§ 19-4901 through 194911 (LC.) As summarized in Rhoades v. State. 148 Idaho 247, 249-50, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068-69
(2009) (Rhoades):
[A]petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646
(2008). However, "[t]he 'application must contain much more than a short and
plan statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under l.R.C.P.
8(a)(l)."' State v. Payne, 146 Jdaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008) (quoting
Good'tvin v, State, 138 Idaho 269,271, 61 P.3d 626,628 (Ct.App.2002)). Instead,
the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth the
grounds upon which the application is based." Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d
at 136 (citing I.C. § 19-4903). "The application must present or be accompanied
by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be
subject to dismissal." Id.
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The UPCPA applies to the Adamcik's M.S.D. and the State's M.S.D. LC. §19-4906(c)
provides that:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
As stated in Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 713, 274 P.3d 11, 14 (Ct.App.2012),
summary dismissal is the functional or procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Rule
56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (l.R.C.P.). In considering a sununary judgment, or in
this case a motion for summary disposition, this Court applies the same standard applied by the
appellate courts on appeal. S'yringa Networks-, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 63,
305 P.3d 499, 507 (2013).

DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (DeRushe), provides
that "a claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal pursuant to LC. §194906 if the applicant has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." (Quoting, Berg v.

State, 131 ldaho 517,518,960 P.2d 738,739 (1998)).
As summarized by the Rhoades Court on summary dismissal, the trial court:
[h]as free review of questions of law. Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 626, 167
P.3d 761, 763 (2007). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court determines whether a
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions
together with any affidavits on file and will liberally constrne the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Hauschulz v. State, 144
Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138
Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). However, "while the underlying facts
must be regarded as true, the petitioner's conclusions need not be so accepted."
Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985). "[W]here the
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evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the
trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the
conflict between those inferences." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180
P.3d 476, 482 (2008).
148 ldaho at 250,220 P.3d at 1069.

ADAMCIK'S CLAIM THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION IN HIS
FAVOR BECAUSE THE FIXED LIFE SENTENCE IMPOSED PROCEDURALLY AND
SUBSTANTIVELY VIOLATED THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, §6 IDAHO CONSTITUTION AND THEIR
PROTECTIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS UNDER MILLER
v. ALABAMA,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)
In Adamcik's initial appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, one of the issues raised was that
his sentence was "unreasonable or cruel and unusual under the Idaho Constitution." State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,459,272 P.3d 417, 431(2012) (Adamcik). Although Adamcik asserted

that his sentence violated the Article I, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, he did not make a
similar claim as it relates to the

gth

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

In Adamcik, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that it had adopted the test "proposed by
Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct 2680, 115
L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)" in determining whether or not the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
Article I, Section 6 has been violated.
In applying this test to the facts and issues raised in Adamcik's appeal, the Idaho
Supreme Court concluded as follows:
Adamcik's fixed life sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under Article I, section 6 of Idaho's Constitution because no gross
disproportionality exists in this case. Adamcik conspired, carefully planned and
executed the cold-blooded stabbing death of his fellow high school student,
Stoddart, based solely on his desire to achieve fame as a serial killer. Like the
heinous crimes committed by the defendants in Thomas and Brown, whose fixed
life sentences were upheld on appeal, the gravity of the first-degree murder that
Adamcik conunitted supports the severity of his fixed life sentence. Fmthennore,
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the fact that Adamcik's fixed life sentence falls within the sentencing parameters
set out in LC. § 18-4004 (entitled "Punishment for murder") indicates that no
disparity exists between the sentence imposed by the trial court and the gravity of
Adamcik's crime.
Because we do not find the existence of a gross dispropo1tionality, we decline to
consider any of Adamcik*s proportionality arguments because "intra and interjurisdictional" analysis is only proper where the Court makes an initial finding
that a gross dispropo1tionality exists. State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 626, 851
P.2d 336, 340 (1993). Adamcik's argument that this Comt should find his
sentence to be cruel and unusual due to Adamcik's minority and the growing
international rejection of life imprisonment for minor offenders is without merit.
This Court has never held that extra-jurisdictional international conventions shall
be considered in any way in interpreting and applying the Idaho Constitution.
Adamcik's sentence comports with Article 1, section 6 of Idaho's Constitution and
is not crnel and unusual.

Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 487,272 P.3d at 459.
The Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Adamcik was issued in January of 2012. In June
of 2012, the United States Supreme Comi issued its decision in Miller. In Miller, the United
States Supreme Court announced that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of
18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual
punishments."' 132 S.Ct. at 2460. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court further explains
its holding in these terms:
The cases before us implicate two· strands of precedent reflecting our concern with
proportionate punishment. The first has adopted categorical bans on sentencing
practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and
the severity of a penalty. See Graham, 560 U.S., at--, 130 S.Ct., at 20222023 (listing cases). So, for example, we have held that imposing the death
penalty for nonhomicide crimes against individuals, or imposing it on mentally
retarded defendants, violates the Eighth Amendment. See Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Several of the
cases in this group have specially focused on juvenile offenders, because of their
lesser culpability. Thus, Roper held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital
punishment for children, and Graham concluded that the Amendment also
prohibits a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a child who
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committed a nonhomicide offense. Graham further likened life without parole for
juveniles to the death penalty itself, thereby evoking a second line of our
precedents. In those cases, we have prohibited mandatory imposition of capital
punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a
defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death.
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944
(1976) (plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57
L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Here, the confluence of these two lines of precedent leads to
the conclusion that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate
the Eighth Amendment. [Footnote Omitted]

Id. at 2463-64. Finally, the Miller Court continues as follows:
We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole thr juvenile offenders. Cf.
Graham, 560 U.S., at - - , 130 S.Ct., at 2030 ("A State is not required to
guarantee eventual freedom," but must provide "some meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation"). By making
youth (and all that accompanies it) inelevant to imposition of that harshest prison
sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.
Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider
Jackson's and Mil1er's alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a
categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and
younger. But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about
children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty
will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted
in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between "the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." Roper, 543 U.S.,
at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183; Graham, 560 U.S., at--, 130 S.Ct., at 2026-2027.
Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in
homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in
prison.

Id. at 2469. In conclusion the Supreme Court states:
Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a
judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all
children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility
of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of
their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of
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proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. We accordingly reverse the judgments of the Arkansas Supreme
Comt and Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cases for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Id. at 2475.
As part of Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition, he asserted his seventh claim which relies upon the
United States Supreme Court decision in Miller.

In his arguments in support of summary

disposition, Adamcik argues as follows:
In light of Miller, the District Court violated the Eighth Amendment of Article 1
[sic], §6 of the Idaho Constitution by failing to take into account how children are
different from adults and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing a child to a lifetime in prison. Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._,_,
J32 S.Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). The fixed life sentence also violates the Eighth
Amendment and Article 1 [sic], §6 of the Idaho Constitution because a fixed life
sentence may only be imposed in the most unusual of circumstances,
circumstances which do not exist in this case, Id. In the alternative, the fixed life
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and Article 1 [sic] §6 of the fixed life
sentences for juveniles are categorically impennissible. Id.
Supp011ing Memorandum, p. 33.
The State argues, in response to Adamcik's seventh claim in his P.C.R. Petition and in
support of its own motion for dismissal, that Miller has no application in the case at bar. The
State asse1ts "the State of Idaho can still impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole
upon a juvenile offender, as long as the crime is that of homicide ... because [life without parole]
is not a mandatory sentence within the State." State's M.S.D., p. 19.
A review of Adamcik's submissions relative to this issue reveals essentially three (3)
arguments in support of his request for summary disposition on this this issue. Those arguments
are capsulized in the foregoing quote from Adamcik's Supporting Memorandum: (1) that the
sentencing judge failed "to take into account how children are different from adults and how
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those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing a child to a lifetime in prison"; (2) that
the fixed life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and A11icle I,
Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution because ''a fixed life sentence may only be imposed in the
most unusual of circumstances, circumstances which do not exist in this case"; and/or (3) in the
"alternative, the fixed life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and Article 1, [sic] §6 of the
fixed life sentences for juveniles are categorically impem1issible." Supporting Memorandum, p.

33. The Court will address these arguments stai1ing first with Adamcik's alternative argument
that a fixed life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and At1icle I, §6.
A. Does Adamcik's Fixed Life Sentence Violate the 81h
Amendment's Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishment?

There can be no doubt that the simple answer to this question is no. As was articulated in

M'iller, one of the positions asserted by Jackson's and Miller's counsel was the same position
being advanced by Adamcik as his altemative position; that the 81h Amendment proscribes an
absolute prohibition against life without parole sentences for juveniles. The Supreme Court's
response to this was as follows:
Because that holding [the holding announced previously in the decision] is
sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider Jackson's and Miller's
alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life
without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger.

***
Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in
homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in
prison.

Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. This excerpt from Miller clearly establishes that in appropriate, albeit
rare and uncommon factual circumstances, life without parole is a pennissible sentence under the
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cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 81h Amendment. What appears to be required is that
the sentencing be ''individualized" affording the sentencing court "the opportunity to consider
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles." Id. at
2475. Encompassed within this individualized sentencing, the sentencing court is required "to
take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.'' Id. at 2469.
Therefore, the Court rejects Adamcik's alternative argument that Adamcik's fixed life
sentence is, as a matter of Jaw, violative of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 8111
Amendment.
B. Did the Sentencing Court Fail to take into Account how Children are Different from
Adults and how those Differences Counsel Against Irrevocably Sentencing a Child to a
Lifetime in Prison?

Adamcik asserts that the sentencing court violated the mandate of Miller because the
sentencer failed to take into account how children are different from adults and how those
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing a child to a lifetime of prison. Hov,.icver, upon
review of the sentencing transcript and the transcript of Adamcik's Rule 35 proceeding, this
Court must disagree with Adamcik's assertion in this respect.
The sentencing comi had the benefit of the pre-trial psychological report which was
prepared by Kenneth P. Lindsey, Ph.D., a psychologist. This repo11 noted, among other things,
that Adamcik was immature for his age, that he had difficulty seeing things from the perspective
of others, and that his MMPI-A showed depression and obsessive anxiety.

Supporting

Memorandum, pp. 27-28, 11123-127.
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The sentencing court also heard and considered the testimony of Dr. Mark Corgiat, Ph.D.,
a psychologist. Dr. Corgiat concurred in Dr. Lindsey's assessment that Adamcik was immature
for his age and "less mature [than] he would expect in a seventeen-year old male with normal
brain development." He also opined that Adamcik "demonstrated a pattern of net1rocognitive
difficulties that indicated less than age appropriate judgment, impulse control and complex
problem solving abilities." Dr. Corgiat testified that "adolescent brains are not fully developed,
particularly in the precortex area" and that "in males, the development continues until their midto-late twenties." Dr. Corgiat also testified that an average adolescent "possesses less than adult
capabilities in planning, reasoning and judgment", and "is less capable of autonomous choicemaking, self-management, has poorer judgment, is more impulsive, has less capacity for
regulating his emotions, and has a risk-taking propensity that can overcome whatever
development he has for regulating judgment."

Dr. Corgiat emphasizes that "research ...

unequivocally demonstrates that the adolescent brain does not function the same as the adult
brain."

Dr. Corgiat continues in his testimony that Adamcik "functions even below age

appropriate levels", has a "history of ADHD and his IEP [Individual Education Plan] at school
were indicators of frontal lobe immaturity." Supporting Memorandum; pp. 29-30, 1,131-139. 4
Dr. Corgiafs testimony at sentencing also provides the opinion that Adamcik would be
"a good candidate for rehabilitation because of his age and ... [his] amenability to education and
training is better than someone with more advanced brain development" Dr. Corgiat concluded
that Adamcik was "a very low risk to reoffend» and possessed a greater capacity for change due
to his "current underdevelopment and consequent ability to make a greater change than someone

4

Tne quotations of Dr. Corgiat's testimony at sentencing is not a direct quote from the sentencing transcript, but rather is a direct
quote from Adamcik 's Supporting Memorandum characterizing Dr. Corgiat's testimony at sentencing.
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fully developed."

Dr. Corgiafs opinions were driven in part upon his conclusions that

Adamcik's "absence of a pathological drive or pathological desire to commit oiJcnses", "no
evidence of sociopathy", and that Adamcik "does not have the personality pattern associated
with violent crime." Supporting Memorandum, pp. 30-31, ili!l40-141.
Despite this individualized sentencing hearing, where the sentencing court heard and
considered precisely the type of testimony mandated by Miller, focusing on the individual
characteristics of Adamcik, including Adamcik's "youth (and all that accompanies it)"; the
sentencing court, after hearing and considering this evidence and testimony, in the exercise of its
discretion, found Adamcik' s conduct to be one those "uncommon" cases where the "harshest
possiblc penalty for juveniles" was warranted.
Specifically, at sentencing the sentencing court noted as follows:
[M]r. Adamcik, 1 believe pretty much on this, you're an entirely different
individual than portrayed by your family and friends. You do have ADHD, the
frontal Jobe of your brain not being fully developed due to your age .... They say
you have knowledge within normal limits, but your processing is below normal.
Sentencing Transcript, p. 55, LL. 20-25, p. 56, LL. 1~2.
However, it is clear that the sentencing court, in its discretion having heard and
considered both the mitigating testimony including Adamcik's "youth (and all that accompanies

it)" and the aggravating factors associated with Adamcik's crime, detennined that the most
serious sentence for a juvenile was appropriate in this case. In doing so, the sentencing court
stated as follows:
Dr. Garrison said there were two knives used in killing Cassie Jo, in his opinion.
On the video after the killing, when Mr. Draper was exclaiming his -- I don't
know how else to put it -- his excitement and pleasure at just killing Cassie, you
said, Shut the F up. We've got to get our act together. You didn't say, Why did
you kill Cassie? 1 thought it was a joke.
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***
[Y]ou both methodically and intelligently planned to murder Cassie Stoddart.
This was not a joke. I'm convinced neither one of you thought it was a joke. You
put your masks on, you took your real knives, you went back to the house with the
definite intention of killing her, which you did. You both wanted to be famous as
killers.

***
You both have been convicted of murder in the first degree, and it's clear to the
Court and the evidence at the trials, Cassie was savagely stabbed many times.
The hmwr, fright and pain she surely encountered before death was certainly
immense. You disguised yourselves with masks in darkness, which made it more
frightening for her. You both were excited after the murder about the killing> and
you both attempted to destroy the evidence initially. The killing was a barbarous,
cold~blooded horrific act.
lYJou both have forfeited your privilege to live in a free society, and based on all
the evidence and all that I've read, I'm convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
if you two, or either one of you, were released that you will kill again ....
I'm not unmindful of how young you fellows are, but you commit a crime of this
nature, and it's got to be -- it's got to be known, not only by those who commit it,
but to others in the community thal the punishment will not -- will not be so
merciful. There's no mercy. Guys, I'm sorry. Guys, like I said, you guys are
kids, but I just feel like this is a just sentence, given all the evidence that I had to
look at. So I -- I'm sorry. I hope you two can have some kind of a life in the state
correctional facility. At least it's more than Cassie has.
Sentencing Transcript, pp. 56-59.
This Court will not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the sentencing court. The
sentencing court, although it did not have the benefit of the Miller decision, based upon this
Court's review of the record of the underlying criminal proceedings and specifically the
sentencing transcript, concludes that the sentencing court conducted an individualized sentencing
taking into account all aggravating and mitigating factors, including Adamcik's "youth (and all
that accompanies it)." However, upon doing so, the sentencing court concluded, in its discretion,
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that the "barbarous, cold-blooded" actions of Adamcik were one of those "uncommon" situations
where the most serious penalty for a juvenile offender was wan-anted.
The same conclusion is supported by the sentencing court's ruling at Adamcik's Rule 35
hearing.

In announcing the sentencing court's decision on A<lamcik's Rule 35 motion, the

sentencing court stated as fol1ows:
[w]e're here because Mr. Adamcik willfully and deliberately conspired to kill
Cassie, and he did kill her. Every time a knife entered Cassie's body, she
certainly was afraid and in pain until her life bled from her, and this is just
unconscionable conduct.

***
I took everything into consideration at sentencing, and I'm not unmindful of how
young Torey is -- and was at the time he killed Cassie. I'm not unmindful of Dr.
Corgiat's testimony and all other testimony we have had at the sentencing.
In our society, at least in my opinion, when someone engages in this type of
conduct, they should be punished as severe as the law allows. There is no
justification, no excuse that condones this type of conduct.
Mr. Adamcik wore a mask, Cassie was alone in the dark, and when the knives
were going in and out of her body, it just had to be ho1Tible for her. And I believe
the sentence this Court imposed was a righteous sentence given the conduct, and I
don't believe Mr. Adamcik should be ever released from prison. I'm going to
deny your motion.
Transcript, pp. 3110-3111. 5
5

The sentencing court has been criticized by Adamcik for this language. Specifically, Adamcik argues that the sentencing court's
use of the language "this type of conduct" is illustrative of the fact that the sentencing court "did what the Miller court said no
one can: Impose a juvenile fixed lifo sentence based solely upon the acts of the offense." Adamcik argues that "just as the
Alabama Legislature may not mandate a fixed life sentence for every first degree murder conviction, an individual court may not
impose that sentence based solely on its evaluation of heinousness of the offense.'' Response Memorandum, p. 26. However, the
Court disagrees with Adamcik's rationale on two (2) levels. First, under Miller the Court cc1tainly may impose a fixed life
sentence based upon the heinousness of the offense, as Jong as it considers all mitigating factors, "including youth (and all that
accompanies it).'' If upon completing that analysis, the sentencing court determines, in its discretion, that the aggravating factors
that make the crime so heinous sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors, "including youth (and all that accompanies it) the
sentencing court certainly possess lhe discretion to impose a life sentence without parole. Second, any suggestion by Adamcik
that the statements made by the sentencing court demonstrate that the sentencing court possessed an attitude that life without
parole would be the appropriate sentence in every circumstance where a juvenile, convicted of first-degree murder, appeared for
sentencing is not borne out by the record. Rather, the sentencing comt repeatedly remarked that it considered all of the evidence,
both aggravating and mitigating. There is nothing in the record to support Adamcik's claim that the sentencing court possessed
an attitude that every time and in every instance that a juvenile presented for sentencing on a first-degree murder conviction il
would impose life without parole. What the sentencing court stated was "you commit a crime of this nature ... the punishment
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In conclusion, this Court finds that there is nothing in the sentencing court's sentence or
sentencing that runs afoul of the directives and requirements of the Miller decision of the United
States Supreme Court. The sentencing court did conduct an individualized sentencing in which
all mitigating factors associated with Adamcik's youth and immaturity were considered by the
sentencing court. Adamcik's assertion to the contrary is without merit.
C. Is the Sentencing Court's Fixed Life Sentence in Violation of the Eighth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution because a Fixed Life Sentence may only be Imposed in the Most

Unusual of Circumstances, Circumstances which Adamcik Claims do not .Exist in this
Case?
Utilizing the same analysis outlined in Section B of this MD&O, the Com-t also
concludes that the underlying record, including, but limited to the sentencing record, supports the
sentencing court's exercise of its discretion and finding that this is one of those rare and
"uncommon" circumstances where imposition of the most serious sentence the court may impose
upon a juvenile offender is watranted.
The sentencing court conducted an individualized sentencing. h considered all evidence,
both mitigation and aggravating.

The mitigating evidence specifically included Adamcik's

"youth (and all that accompanies it)" as required by Miller. However, the sentencing court in the
considering the totality of the information presented at sentencing, which was comprised of both
mitigating and aggravating evidence, concluded, in the exercise of its discretion, that this was

will not •• will not be so merciful. There's no mercy." Sentencing Transcript, p. 59. This Court dctennincs that what the
sentencing court was referencing when it speaks in terms of a "crime of this nature" is all of the aggravating factors associated
with this specific crime, not the general crime of first-degree murder. This important distinction is perhaps best illustrated by the
sentencing court's oral decision with respect to Adamcik's Rule 35 Motion. The sentencing court states "this type of conduct
[again referring tn the specific aggrnvating facts of this case, not generally about first degree murder itself] ... should be punished
as severe as the law allows. There is no justification, no excuse that condones this type nf conduct [again referring to the specific
aggravating facts of this case, not generally about first degree murder itselfl." Transcript, pp. 3110-1 l. Finally, the sentencing
court again pointing to the specific aggravating facts of this case, not the general charge of first degree murder notes "I believe
the sentence this Court imposed was a righteous sentence given the conduct." (Bold Emphasis Added].
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one of those "uncommon" cases where the most serious sentence possible, life without parole,
was warranted.
This Court will not second guess the sentencing court on Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition. The
sentencing cou1t heard the testimony, both aggravating and mitigating, at trial and at sentencing.
The sentencing court was in a much better position to consider, weigh, assess witness credibility,
and make informed judgments concerning this evidence than this Court at this stage of the
proceedings.

This Court, unlike the sentencing court, has had the benefit of reviewing and

considering Miller as it reviewed the record of this case and the eventual sentence of life without
parole. In doing so, this Court concludes that nothing about this sentence or the sentencing
process violates the directives of Miller.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the sentence imposed by the
sentencing comt is consistent with Idaho's jurisprudence relative to the cruel and unusual
1

punishment clauses of Article I, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution and the 8 h Amendment to
the United States Constitution and case law interpreting the same, and specifically the United
States Supreme Court decision in lvfiller. Therefore, the Court will GRANT the State's motion
for summary dismissal of Adamcik's Seventh Cause of Action as outlined in his P.C.R. Petition.
Dated this 23rd day of January, 2015.

MITCHELL W. BRO\\TN
District Judge
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICI.AL DHfOSJ-9UtC)$TFJilt

3].h I.

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF tfNNO~.--...- ~ ·

DEPUTY CLERK

******
TOREY ADAMCIK,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
.)

Case No.

CV-2013-3682

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSJDERA TION

______________

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's, Torey Adamcik ("Admacik''), Second
Motion for Reconsideration. 1 The Respondent, State of Idaho ("State") filed Respondenf s
Objection to Petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration ("Objection"). Finally, Adamcik
filed

his

Reply

Memorandum in Support of Motion for

Reconsideration ("Reply

Memorandum"). The Court heard arguments from the parties concerning Adamcik's Second
Motion for Reconsideration.

Following said arguments, Adamcik filed a document entitled

Third Supplemental Authority. Following oral argument and Adamcik's submission of his Third
Supplemental Authority, the Court took this matter under advisement. The Com1 now issues its
Memorandum Decision and Order on Second Motion for Reconsideration ("MD&O").

1

Adamcik's Second Motion for R(1e:onsidcration was not supported by a separate memorandum; rather the authority for
Adamcik's Second Motion for Reconsideration was contained in the motion itself However, Adamcik had filed a document
entitled Supplemental Authority roughly twenty-one (21) days prior to filing his Second Motion for Reconsideration. This
Supplemental Authority quite clearly deals with the issue raised in Adamcik's Second Motion for Reconsideration and thus the
Comi has reviewed that submission and the authority cited therein as par1 of its consideration of Adamcik's Second Motion for
Reconsideration.
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BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Adamcik's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("P.C.R. Petition") arises out of the
underlying criminal proceedings in Bannock County Case CR-2006-17984. In that proceeding,
Adamcik was charged with and convicted by a jury, of committing the first-degree murder of
Cassie Jo Stoddart ("Stoddart"). Adamcik was also convicted of conspiring with co-defendant,
Brian Draper ("Draper"), to commit the first-degree murder of Stoddmi.

At sentencing,

Adamcik was sentenced to a thirty (30) year fixed sentence and an indeterminate life sentence
for the conspiracy to commit the first-degree murder and a fixed life sentence for the first-degree
murder conviction of Stoddart. Adamcik filed a motion seeking a reduction of his sentence
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("I.C.R."). This motion was denied after hearing by the trial
court. Adamcik then filed an appeal. In State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 458-59, 272 P.3d 417,
486-87 (2012) ("Adamcik"), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Adamcik's conviction and
sentence. Adamcik filed a Petition for Rehearing. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the relief
sought in Admncik's Petition for Rehearing. Admncik then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorm·i
from the United States Supreme Court. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari was denied. State v.
Adamcik, 133 S.Ct. 141, 184 L.Ed.2d 68 (2012).
Adamcik filed his P.C.R. Petition in September, 2013.

Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition

outlined seven (7) separate claims upon which he requested post-conviction relief. The parties
filed cross motions for summary disposition pursuant to LC. §49-4906(c).
After considering the parties' submissions in support of and in opposition to the various
motions for summary disposition, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on
Adamcik's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for Summary
Dismissal. In doing so, the Court granted summary dismissal in favor of the State on a number

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON SECOND MOTION TO RECONSIDER ·2

693 of 742

of Adamcik's claims for post~conviction relief.

See Memorandum Decision and Order on

Adamcik's Motion for Paitial Summary Disposition and the State's Motion for Summary
Dismissal.
At the summary disposition stage of these proceedings, the Court also denied portions of
the parties' cross motions for summary disposition, concluding that there were triable issues of
material fact. The claims that the Court ordered would proceed to trial were as follows: (l)
Adamcik's "SECOND CAUSE UF ACTION: Torey was Denied Effective Assistance of
Counsel at Trial in Violation of the Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article I, Section
13 under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because Counsel Failed to get
Important Expert Testimony before the Jury in part because they Failed to Obtain the Murder
Weapons for Testing by the Defense Expert"; (2) Adamcik's "FlFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
Torey was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial in Violation of the Sixth Amendment
and Idaho Constitution Article I, Section 13 under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
( 1984), because the Cumulative Effect of all the above Instances of Deficient Performance
Prejudiced him"; 2 and (3) Adamcik's "SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Torey was Denied
Effective Assistance Counsel at Trial in Violation of the Sixth Amendment and Idaho
Constitution A1ticle I, Section 13 under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because
Trial Counsel failed to Communicate a Favorable Plea Offer to him."

2
Although the Court granted the State's request for summary disposition relative to Adamcik's Third Cause of Action and Fourth
Cause of Action, the basis for doing so was that the evidence did not establish prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v,
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 280 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ("Stricklcmcf'). However., with respect to both Adamcik's
Third Cause of Action and his Fourth Cause of Action, the Court did determine that there were genuine issues of material fact
concerning deficient perfonnance on the pmi of the Adamcik Defense Team, the first Strickland prong. As a result, at the
cvidcntiary hearing, the Court did allow Adamcik to put on proof of deficient performance relative to Cause of Action Two
(which the Court denied at summary dismissal), Cause of Action Three (which the Court granted summary dismissal on with
respect to the prejudice prong), and Cause of Action Four (which the Court granted summary dismissal on with respect to the
prejudice prong), for the purpose of attempting to establish that the cumulative effect of the deficient conduct of the Defense
Team amounted to prejudice under the second Strickland prong,
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In a separate memorandum decision, the Cou1t also granted the State summary dismissal
on Adamcik's Seventh Cause of Action. See Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary
Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). Adamcik's Seventh
Cause of Action claimed that "the fixed life sentence imposed on Torey procedurally and
substantively violates the Eighth Amendment and A1ticle I, § 6 protection against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment under Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S. _ , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)." P.C.R.
Petition, pp. 37-55.
It is from the Court's decision as outlined in its Memorandum Decision and Order on
Summary Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S. - · ' 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) that Adamcik
seeks reconsideration in his Second Motion to Reconsider.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion seeking reconsideration of a trial court's interlocutory orders is governed by
Rule ll(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (LR.C.P.). I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(2) provides that a
motion for reconsideration "may be made at any time before entry of final judgment."
In the Idaho Supreme Coutt's decision in Johnson v. North Idaho College, 153 ldaho 58,
62, 278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012), the purpose for alIO\ving a motion to reconsider a trial court's
interlocutory order was succinctly stated in the following terms:
A motion for reconsideration is a motion which allo\vs the court-when new law
is applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously
presented law, or any combination thereof-to reconsider the concctness of an
interlocutory order. In this case, the district court did just that, and in a manner
fitting within the broad language articulated in Rocky Mountain Power, where the
most important consideration is the conectness of the interlocutory order.
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In short, a motion to reconsider is designed to allow the trial court an opportunity to "get it right"
before a judgment becomes final. Therefore, a motion to reconsider can be based upon the same
record that the original motion was based upon, or it can be based upon a supplemented record.
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen, 154 Idaho 549,554,300 P.3d 1037, 1042
(2012). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court

conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to dete1mine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it;
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.

DISCUSS.ION
The United State Supreme Court has recently issued two (2) decisions addressing
juvenile offenders sentenced to life sentences without the opportunity for parole and the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The first of these two (2)
decisions is Miller v, Alabama, 567 U.S. _ , 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)

("Miller"). The Miller decision was the basis for the Seventh Cause of Action contained in
Adamcik's P.C.R. Petition. The Court has previously granted the State's Motion for Summary
Disposition relative to Adamcik's Seventh Cause of Action. See Memorandum Decision and
Order on Summary Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).
Specifically, the Comt concluded that:
[t]he sentence imposed by the sentencing court is consistent with Idaho's
jurisprudence relative to the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of Article 1,
Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution and the 8111 Amendment to the United States
Constitution and case law interpreting the same, and specifically the United States
Supreme Court decision in Miller.
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Id. at p.16.
The second case recently issued by the United States Supreme Comt addressing juvenile
offenders sentenced to life sentences without the opportunity for parole and the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is Montgomery v. Louisiana,
_U.S._, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) ("Montgome1y"). Adamcik asse1ts that

Monlgomery read in conjunction with Miller "confirms that there are substantive Eighth
Amendment limits on sentences for juvenile homicide offenders." Reply Memorandum, p. 2.
Adamcik continues that "absent proof that the defendant is that rare juvenile whose crime
reflects hTeparable corruption, a juvenile may not be exposed to a fixed life sentence, even under
Idaho's discretionary scheme." Id. Finally, Adamcik asse1ts that the sentencing comt "did not
adequately consider the mitigating circumstances» outlined in Miller and revisited in

lvfontgomery and that the evidence at Adamcik's sentencing hearing established that he "is not
irreparably corrupt" but instead his offense "reflected transient immaturity and that Torey could
be rehabilitated." Id.

Montgomery, like Miller, involves an individual who was sentenced under a statutory
sentencing scheme that mandated a sentence of "life without parole" following the defendant's
guilty verdict.

136 S.Ct. at 725-26.

Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in

Montgomery. In doing so, the holding in Miller was restated in the following terms:
[M]iller held that mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on " 'cruel and unusual
punishments' "Id., at_, 132 S.Ct., at 2460. "By making youth (and all that
accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence,"
mandatory life without parole "poses too great a risk of disproportionate
punishmene' Id. at _ , 132 S.Ct., at 2469. Miller required that sentencing
courts consider a child's "diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
change" before condemning him or her to die in prison. Ibid. Although Miller did
not foreclose a sentencer's ability to impose life without parole on a juvenile, the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON SECOND MOTION TO RECONSlDER ·6

697 of742

Court explained that a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but
the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect " 'irreparable corruption.' "
Ibid. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed. 1
(2005).
136 S.Ct. at 726.
The Montgomery decision, in addressing whether the Miller holding should be applied
retroactively, framed the issue in the following terms:
This leads to the question whether Miller's prohibition on mandatory life ,:vithout
parole for juvenile offenders indeed did announce a new substantive rule that,
under the Constitution, must be retroactive.
136 S.Ct. at 732. The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative, holding that

"Miller announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review." Id.

In

holding that the ruling in Miller announced a substantive rule subject to retroactive application,
the Montgomery Court expounded upon the holding in Miller. In doing so it stated as follows:

Miller, then, did more than require a sentence to consider a juvenile offender's
youth before imposing life without parole; it established that the penological
justifications for life without parole collapse fo light of "the distinctive attributes
of youth." Id., at_, l 32 S.Ct., at 2465. Even if a court considers a child's age
before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the
Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects " 'unfortunate yet transient
immaturity.' " Id., at_, 132 S.Ct., at 2469 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S., at 573,
125 S.Ct. 1183). Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life
without parole is excessive for all but "the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption,' " 567 U.S., at_, 132 S.Ct., at 2469 (quoting
Roper, supra, at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183), it rendered life without parole an
unconstitutional penalty for "a class of defendants because of their status" -that
is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.
PemJ', 492 U.S., at 330, l 09 S.Ct. 2934. As a result, Miller announced a
substantive rule of constitutional law. Like other substantive rules, Miller is
retroactive because it " • necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant' "
-here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders-" ' faces a ptmishment that the law
cannot impose upon him. Schriro, 542 U.S., at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (quoting
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828
(1998)).
136 S.Ct. at 734. [Bold Emphasis Supplied].
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What this Court takes away from Montgomery and its "did more" discussion is that the
sentencing comt must do more than merely "consider a juvenile offender's youth.'' Id.

The

reason being that "even if a comt considers a child's age before [or as a component ofJ
sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment"
if the defendant's crime reflects "unfortunate yet transient immaturity." Id. Rather, to withstand
a Constitutional Eighth Amendment challenge of cruel and unusual punishment, the sentencing
court must make a finding that the defendant is one of those "rare juvenile offender[s] whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption." 1d.
This Comt has previously found that Judge McDermott conducted an individualized
sentencing with respect to Adamcik.

In doing so the Court noted that this individualized

sentencing considered Adamcik's "youth (and all that accompanies it)." See Memorandum
Decision and Order on Summary Dismissal Re: Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455
(2012). However, in doing so, the Court did not have the benefit of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Montgome,y and more specifically the discussion of the United States
Supreme Court that this Cou1t has referred to as the ''do more" discussion. Upon review of the

Montgome1y decision and the "do more" discussion, upon reconsideration of Miller, combined
with a reconsideration of the paiticular facts of the Adamcik case, this Court concludes that
Judge McDem10tt did make an appropriate finding under Miller and more recently Montgomery,
that Adamcik's crime qualifies and meets the criteria of being that "rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption."
The Court specifically adopts its Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary
Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 132 S.CL 2455 (2012), the rationale, authority,
findings and conclusions contained therein. Further in support of the Court's conclusion that
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Judge McDermott concluded and made findings consistent with the "irreparable corruption"
standard articulated in Montgomery the Court cites to the entirety of Judge McDermott's
sentencing discussion. See Sentencing Transcript. More specifically, the Court outlined in its
Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Disposition Re: Miller v. Alabama, -·_ U.S.

_ , J32 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) the factors discussed by Judge McDermott which are, in this Court's
view, the most salient with respect to the Miller holding. Those same excerpts are equally
applicable in supporting Judge McDermott's conclusion that are the equivalent of Monlgom<!ly's
requirement of a finding of irreparable corruptness.
Dr. Garrison said there were two knives used in killing Cassie Jo, in his opinion.
On the video after the killing, when Mr. Draper was exclaiming his -- I don't
know how else to put it -- his excitement and pleasure at just killing Cassie, you
said, Shut the F up. We've got to get our act together. You didn't say, Why did
you kill Cassie? I thought it was a joke.

***
[Y]ou both methodically and intelligently planned to murder Cassie Stoddart.
This was not a joke. I'm convinced neither one of you thought it was a joke. You
put your masks on, you took your real knives, you went back to the house with the
definite intention of killing her, which you did. You both wanted to be famous as
killers.

***
You both have been convicted of murder in the first degree, and it's clear to the
Court and the evidence at the trials, Cassie was savagely stabbed many times.
The hotTor, fright and pain she surely encountered before death was certainly
immense. You disguised yourselves with masks in darkness, which made it more
frightening for her. You both were excited after the murder about the killing, and
you both attempted to destroy the evidence initially. The killing was a barbarous,
cold-blooded horrific act.

[Y]ou both have forfeited your privilege to Jive in a free society, and based on
all the evidence and all that I've read, I'm convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that if you two, or either one of you, were released that you will kill
again ....
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I'm not unmindful of how young you fellows are, but you commit a crime of this
nature, and it's got to be -- it's got to be known, not only by those who commit it,
but to others in the community that the punishment will not -- will not be so
merciful. There's no mercy. Guys, I'm sorry. Guys, like I said, you guys are
kids, but I just feel like this is a just sentence, given all the evidence that l had to
look at. So I -- I'm sorry. 1 hope you two can have some kind of a life in the state
correctional facility. At least it's more than Cassie has.
Sentencing Transcript, pp. 56-59. [Bold Emphasis Added].
Unless Judge McDennott was clairvoyant he could not have foreseen the rulings of the
United State Supreme Court that would come down in Miller and Montgomery.

As such, it

would he impossible to expect usage of phrases such as "irreparably conupt" or "unfortunate yet
transient immaturity." Yet a review of the sentencing transcript clearly establishes that Adamcik
was given a full blown sentencing hearing which consisted of three (3) days of testimony and
argument, much of which focused on his age and youthful characteristics.

However, the

sentencing judge, who is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the witnesses and
dete1111ine the credibility and what weight to attach to it, made the detennination that he was
"convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that if you two, or either one of you, were released that
you will kill again." Without using the plu·ase coined by the Supreme Court in Montgomery and
its forerunners of "irreparably conupt", this finding by Judge McDermott can only be construed
as being the equivalent of "ineparably corrupt."3

3

Adamcik has focused on statements expressed by Judge McDermott during the pronouncement of Adamcik's
sentence and during the course of denying Adamcik's Rule 35 motion to suggest that Judge McDermott did not
consider Adamcik's "youth (and all that accompanies it)" and that Judge McDem1ott's personal attitudes were such
that he would impose a life without parole sentence in every instance where a juvenile committed murder. See
comments made by Judge McDermott at sentencing ("Teenage killers perhaps should receive no mercy. I don't
know") Sentencing Transcript, p. 56 and comments made by Judge McDermott at Adamcik's Rule 35 hearing (In
our society, at least in my opinion, when someone engages in this type of conduct, they should be punished as severe
as the law allows''). Transcript p. 3110-1 l. These statements arguably stand for the proposition that Judge
McDermott would have imposed this sentence regardless of the evidence and would impose the same sentence for
any juvenile convicted of first degree murder. However, the Comt does not need to address this specific issue. The
Comi is convinced, based upon the discussion above, that in this specific case, Judge McDermott made the requisite
findings under Eighth Amendment case law to support a finding that Adamcik's crime and the attendant
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court will DENY Adamcik's Second Motion to
Reconsider. Incident to the Court's previous ruling on each of Adamcik's Claims as outlined in
his P. C.R. Petition, the Court wi11 enter, by separate order, a final .I udgment of Dismissal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 19111 day of July, 2016.

~;#!/~
MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

circumstances surrounding the crime equate to one of the rare instances identified in Mo11tgome1y where Adamcik's
crime reflects "irreparable con-uption" on his part.
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